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Abstract 
George MacDonald (1824–1905) was writing at a time of Evangelical unease. Some, in the face 
of challenge, retreated behind the walls of traditional Evangelical dogma, while others accom-
modated their beliefs to a rapidly changing world. This ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ bifurcation 
of Evangelicalism provoked a response from MacDonald: he brings before us a child that offers 
a via media. Appearances are deceptive: it may look ‘Romantic’, but is rather a radical, sacra-
mental icon undermining false doctrines of God and challenging the human response.  
This is a necessarily broad study, not only to do justice to the complexity of the Victorian 
context, but because MacDonald’s theology—which Chesterton described as ‘jewels in an une-
ven setting’—is fragmented in an unsystematic opus of some fifty volumes of varying genre. 
An overview of MacDonald’s theology is constructed first; this is then used as the foundation 
for a close reading of his more opaque works before answering the question: What are the theo-
logical implications of MacDonald’s ‘child’? 
This overview is presented in Chapter 5. To construct this, we consider (in Chapters 1–4) 
the wider context of MacDonald’s thought: his interlocutors, key influences, and social context. 
We consider, in some detail, the Victorian child: How did his contemporaries, religious and 
otherwise, view this enigma at the heart of society? What theology shaped those views? How 
did MacDonald challenge such received wisdom? 
We then use our wider, and more specific, understanding of MacDonald’s theology as a 
foundation for a more nuanced reading of fantasy novels such as Phantastes and Lilith (Chap-
ters 6–8): these, it is proposed, do not illustrate what he thinks; they are what he thinks, and are 
a rich theological source. 
We close (Chapter 9) with a critical evaluation of MacDonald’s ‘theology of the child’, 
evaluating its contribution to theology today. 
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Chapter 1 The context of George MacDonald’s work 
1.1 Introduction 
Like many Victorians, George MacDonald’s (1824–1905) journey was one of emancipation 
from ‘childhood’ ways. His was a journey away from Calvinism in favour of a more benign vi-
sion of Christianity at the centre of which is the image of ‘the child’, an axiomatic image sym-
bolising both the nature of God and the disposition of the faithful. One Presbyterian critic, 
George McCrie, lamented that he ‘constantly harps about the […] “childlike”’, resulting in ‘the-
ological opinions, which are most unsound and dangerous’.1 The central question we explore 
here is: What are the theological implications of MacDonald’s understanding and use of this 
motif? We begin, however, with some comments regarding the validity of reading MacDonald’s 
work—especially his novels—as theology. 
To engage in theology is, in a fundamental sense, to become a worshipper. God cannot be 
the object of human investigation for this would require an impossible perspective ‘outside’ of 
being; rather, investigation into the nature of God can only be the result of a personal encounter 
with God, should God so permit—a permission, it would appear, granted only to those who are 
humble; to those who recognise their dependency on, and subordinacy to, God—the ‘babes’ of 
Matthew 11.25. In MacDonald’s language, true theology is understood, practised, and expressed 
only by the child, one who embodies this attitude. To know the truth, then—as Pilate failed to 
realise—is to engage with the person of God. As such, three considerations are evident: first, 
that, since theology’s ‘object’ is not only infinite but personal, it can never be fully known; se-
cond, that such knowledge is essentially ‘storied’ in that the truth regarding a person cannot be 
established by factual statements, however verifiable or logically correct; third, that truth is im-
precise since subjectively perceived. George McCrie’s conclusion that MacDonald’s novels are 
‘most unsound and dangerous’ is a tacit recognition that ‘literature’—in its broadest sense as a 
medium of personal, imaginative (even childish) expression—is capable of making theological 
proposals (his fellow Presbyterian, Samuel Law Wilson, explicitly takes MacDonald to task for 
                                                




his erroneous theology of conversion as expressed in a novel); however, the implication is that 
the imprecision of literature is unsuitable to express the ‘facts’ of theology; that literature is 
merely the frothy surface hiding a substrate of true—that is, logically verifiable—bedrock be-
liefs.  
It may be argued that theology is essentially a second-order, objective reflection on such 
personal stories, notably the gospel narratives’ articulation of Christ, but, in light of the ‘person-
ality’ of truth, literature may be viewed as not only a source of personal or imaginative fuel for 
subsequent reflection, but as itself a means of theological reflection and articulation. One thinks, 
for example, of Augustine’s Confessions, or Dostoevsky’s novels.2 Speaking of Dante’s Com-
media, for example (a poem that has significantly informed European theology), Vittorio Mon-
temaggi proposes that truth is always the fruit of ‘human encounter’ (truth, in other words, is 
always in some sense embodied) and that—in recognition of this—literature such as Dante’s 
draws the reader into a ‘personal’ encounter with the author, others, and ultimately God, 
through his text. In Montemaggi’s words: ‘Dante’s text requires us to read it not only objective-
ly but also by consciously situating our interpretation of it in the context of our subjective, first-
person experience.’3 MacDonald is similarly driven by a conviction that theology involves more 
than the objective, academic analysis of presenting facts; rather, subjective engagement is re-
quired with the source of those facts, God. To this end, he writes imaginatively, demanding that 
interpretation is not dispassionate, but a conscious, subjective involvement with the text—and 
therefore with himself, as writer. This is most evident in Lilith, in which we are invited to ‘read’ 
MacDonald’s mind. 
For Montemaggi, Dante’s poem is theology.4 This thesis, likewise, understands MacDon-
ald’s work—notably his novels—as theology; as the articulation of the human encounter with 
God. Such encounters may be fictional, but, as Montemaggi notes regarding the prevalence of 
human characters in Dante’s fiction, ‘Human particularity and encounter destabilize easy dis-
tinctions between truth and fiction. A nonfictional story that fails to awaken us to the infinite 
                                                
2 See especially Williams, Rowan, Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, & Fiction (London: Bloomsbury, 2008). 
3 Montemaggi, Vittorio, Reading Dante's Commedia as Theology: Divinity Realized in Human Encounter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 36. 




value of human particularity can from this perspective be considered less true than a fictional 
one that succeeds.’5 This tension between ‘real’ theology and that expressed in literature is a 
fundamental concern of MacDonald. Inasmuch as the former is the fruit of ‘adult’ endeavour—
that is, of formal academic training in the discursive arts—it is suspect; only the more subjective 
and intuitive approach of the child, MacDonald asserts, is capable of expressing the ‘personali-
ty’ of truth. This thesis explores this claim. While certainly not a systematic or dogmatic theo-
logian, it will be argued that MacDonald, whether in essays or novels, is making strong theolog-
ical claims; not least, that he himself is such a child and therefore a medium of true theology. In 
this light, we will consider how his novels are not merely illustrative but constitutive of what he 
thinks; that even the most ‘frothy’ novels (fantasy works such as Phantastes and Lilith, for ex-
ample) must be approached as theological works. We will also consider how MacDonald’s 
preference for imaginative story-telling represents a conscious methodological choice reflecting 
the view that theology has less to do with imparting factual information as awakening imagina-
tive perception with a view to encouraging that personal encounter with the divine that is its 
essence. His pastoral goal in writing is the animation of childhood in us, for the Father can only 
embrace children. In what follows, it is assumed that since MacDonald is writing primarily as a 
theologian intent on leading his flock towards Christ,6 that the best way to read it is as theology, 
which, as Montemaggi suggests concerning the Comedia, is— 
to be open to the claims it makes on our active participation in the journey of which it speaks. We 
might or might not agree with the propositional import of the particular way in which Dante con-
ceptually and imaginatively articulates his theology in the Commedia. But if we are to read 
it as theology, and not simply engage in a detached analysis of its theological ideas, we need to al-
low ourselves, existentially, to interact with the text not simply as an object under examination, 
but as a living partner in a journey seeking to explore the deepest dimensions of our being, of the 
cosmos’ being, and of the point of encounter between the two.7 
 
Having read natural philosophy (sciences) at the University of Aberdeen, MacDonald 
trained for the Congregational ministry at Highbury Theological College, London. Often por-
                                                
5 Ibid., p. 26. 
6 See page 120. 




trayed as having been ousted from his first pastorate (in Arundel, Sussex) by a diaconate of du-
plicitous shopkeepers and tradesmen unsympathetic to his liberal ‘German’ theology, the truth 
may be more prosaic. His aspirations lay elsewhere: the loss of living was, it seems, to some 
extent self-engineered and little lamented. His theology, in any case, was never likely to appeal 
to a provincial Congregational congregation.8 
By mid-century he was working primarily as a writer. Friends and acquaintances included 
Charles Dodgson (who tested Alice on the MacDonald children),9 Charles Kingsley,10 John 
Ruskin,11 Lady Byron,12 and Alexander John Scott, later principal of Owen’s College, Manches-
ter.13 He became a critic of the world he had left behind, but unlike disenchanted Evangelicals 
of the era such as George Eliot, Francis W. Newman (brother of John Henry), or Edmund Gosse 
whose trajectory was away from faith,14 MacDonald remained ‘evangelical’. He published and 
lectured in a quest to promote Christianity in an era increasingly uncomfortable with traditional 
religion. His work might be summarised as a rejection of childishness (petulant, stubborn wor-
ship of a misconceived God) in favour of childhood (genuine submission and relationship to the 
Father). 
While C. S. Lewis was of the opinion that MacDonald always had an enduring respect for 
his childhood religion,15 Chesterton dryly remarks that he said things ‘that were not in the least 
like the Calvinists’ and suggests his contribution to theology might be significant: 
                                                
8 Greville MacDonald emphasises ‘constructive dismissal’ (George MacDonald and His Wife (London: G. Allen & 
Unwin, 1924), pp. 177–87), however contemporaneous letters suggest MacDonald’s heart was elsewhere. From 
Highbury he writes, ‘I am not very happy myself [due to] wrong and painful thoughts’, and soon after accepting the 
pastorate confesses that his ‘greatest desire is […] to go out itinerating’: ‘I mean to take another mode of helping 
men’ (An Expression of Character: The Letters of George MacDonald, ed. by Glenn Edward Sadler (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1994), pp. 26, 50, 54). 
9 GMAW, p. 342. 
10 Kingsley’s Water Babies was a response to Phantastes. (Colin N. Manlove, ‘MacDonald and Kingsley: A 
Victorian Contrast’, in The Gold Thread, ed. by William Raeper (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), pp. 
140–62 (p. 143).) 
11 ‘One of the closest friends of my father’ (GMAW, p. 192). MacDonald arranged clandestine meetings with Rose La 
Touche in his house, against the wishes of her parents (ibid., ch. 11). 
12 Lady Byron praised MacDonald’s first poem Within and Without, subsequently financing family wintering in Al-
giers. (Ibid., p. 265.) 
13 ‘The man he revered beyond any met since leaving home’ (ibid., p. 191). 
14 David Hempton, Evangelical Disenchantment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008). 
15 Lewis notes MacDonald’s repudiation of Calvinist doctrines yet suggests that he sees ‘elements of real and perhaps 
irreplaceable worth in the thing from which he is revolting’ (George MacDonald: An Anthology (London: Geoffrey 




As Protestants speak of the morning stars of the Reformation, we may be allowed to note such 
names here and there as morning stars of the Reunion. 
‘I fancy’, says Chesterton, ‘that he stands for a rather important turning-point in the history of 
Christendom.’16 His relative obscurity, however, and absence from current theological discourse 
is perhaps testimony to the opposite, however his ‘obscure’ ideas have found their way into 
popular culture, especially through The Lord of the Rings.17 C. S. Lewis also credits him for 
leading him to faith, describing him as his ‘master’18—perhaps particularly so in his role as a 
fantasy author. I shall argue that, in some measure, Chesterton was right: that MacDonald was 
‘a morning star of the Reunion’ by providing a via media between conservative and liberal 
Evangelicalism, and by helping those of faith to reconnect with pre-Reformation roots. 
Recent work, such as Kerry Dearborn’s Baptized Imagination, gives an excellent over-
view of MacDonald’s theology. The aim here is to expand on this by exploring in greater detail 
MacDonald’s nineteenth century context, and to engage more critically with MacDonald’s theo-
logical conclusions. Dearborn, for example, suggests that MacDonald’s proviso for accepting 
ideas from eclectic sources was that they were ‘consistent with the Trinitarian faith’.19 However, 
universal salvation (including that of Judas and Satan) and a purgatorial hell, to give but two 
examples, are ideas which might indicate otherwise (if for ‘Trinitarian’ we read ‘Evangelical 
orthodoxy’). His theology is a syncretistic amalgam of ideas, happily exploring, for example, 
evolution and Eastern mysticism. Such leanings lead one scholar to remark that he has ‘a view 
of human experience quite different from that of much of historic Christianity’;20 another, that 
his faith amounts to a ‘private religion’.21 These comments cannot, in my view, be justified. It 
seems, rather, that MacDonald’s work reflects (as one contemporary put it) ‘the noble protest of 
                                                
16 GMAW, pp. 12–13. 
17 There is a ring-wielding villain in David Elginbrod, the ring being inscribed in an undecipherable foreign tongue. 
In the short story, The Castle, there is a lost ring which ‘had for ages disappeared from the earth, but which had con-
trolled the spirits, and the possession of which made a man simply what a man should be, the king of the world’ (The 
Portent and Other Stories (London: T. Fisher Unwin, [1890(?)]), pp. 175–76). 
18 Anthology, p. 20; see also Surprised by Joy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), pp. 179–181, 225, 226. 
19 Baptized Imagination (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 177. 
20 Rolland Hein, The Harmony Within (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982; Eureka, CA: Sunrise, 1989), p. 53 (emphasis 
mine). 
21 Richard H. Reis, George MacDonald’s Fiction (New York: Twayne, 1972 [as George MacDonald]; Eureka CA: 
Sunrise, 1989), p. 32. Chesterton likewise writes: ‘He evolved out of his own mystical meditations a complete alter-




men like Maurice and Kingsley and [F. W.] Robertson, with whom the recovery of the central 
truth of Christianity, that God is love, came as almost a new gospel’.22 His views are—as we 
explore in this chapter—firmly embedded in contemporary thinking, and as he himself ob-
serves: ‘No man could sing as he has sung, had not others sung before him.’23 However, it is 
apparent that he has more in common with Emanuel Swedenborg (who imaginatively journeys 
into heaven and hell),24 Jacob Boehme (whose mystical theology is produced despite the cen-
sure of church authorities, and whose humble station in life as a shoemaker probably appealed 
to MacDonald’s Romantic leanings) or Gregory of Nyssa (with his focus on epektasis—the 
soul’s progressive journey towards God) than any of the progenitors of the Westminster Con-
fession.25 
While it is profitable to explore MacDonald from different perspectives, our focus here is 
firmly theological. Daniel Gabelman has a similar focus and I am indebted to him for his insight 
into MacDonald’s fairytales, particularly the notion that ‘levity’—understood as both ‘lightness’ 
and ‘joyful unseriousness’—can only be experienced by those who renounce Enlightenment 
‘gravitas’,26 and that levity, in some sense, describes the playful nature of God, perhaps echoed 
here in my discussion of MacDonald’s ‘child’. Unlike Gabelman, I focus primarily on Mac-
Donald’s realist and fantasy works, exploring these in the light of the biblical sources quoted or 
implied, set within a broader historical study. I am indebted also to the many scholars quoted 
throughout this work, particularly to William Raeper—who started me on this journey—John 
Pennington, and Stephen Prickett. 
Much of MacDonald’s writing is a thought-experiment which tests the boundaries of the 
Evangelical orthodoxy of his day. It explores two related questions. What did Jesus mean when 
he challenged his followers to become ‘as children’? How might this work out in practice? 
Questions that must take account of the distortions, limitations, and power structures of a world 
                                                
22 A. L. Moore, ‘The Influence of Calvinism on Modern Unbelief’, in Religion in Victorian Britain, Vol. iii: Sources, 
ed. by James R. Moore (Manchester: Open University, 1988), pp. 333–39 (p. 334). 
23 England’s Antiphon (London: Macmillan & Co., 1868), p. 3. 
24 Note 52. 
25 The similarity between Boehme’s cosmology and MacDonald’s is discussed in Chapter 5, pages 134–135; reso-
nances with Gregory are discussed in the final chapter, page 252. William Raeper singles out Swedenborg and 
Boehme as influences (George MacDonald (Tring: Lion, 1987), p. 240), and one suspects MacDonald had Boehme 
in mind when he cast a cobbler as the hero of Salted With Fire. 




where the choice to be a ‘child’ appears misguided. MacDonald explores the nature and impli-
cations of that choice. This theological enquiry evaluates MacDonald’s answers to these ques-
tions and explores their implications and contribution to theology. 
1.2 George MacDonald’s theology: key ideas and influences 
The enduring, and ambiguous, influence of Scotland is evident. On the one hand, the liminal 
realm of Faerie exercised its magic power: 
tales […] of mountain, stream, and lake; of love and revenge; of beings less and more than natu-
ral—brownie and Boneless, kelpie and fairy; such wild legends also, haunting the dim emergent 
peaks of mist-swathed Celtic history.27 
This was a colourful world contrasting with the blacks worn to Sunday service. Scotland, for 
MacDonald, was a land of paradox with ‘the sweetest songs in its cottages, and the worst sing-
ing in its churches, of any country in the world’.28 
On the other hand, then, was an inflexible Calvinism, a counterpoint providing both foil 
and foundation for his thought, an inflexibility of which MacDonald’s immediate predecessors 
and mentors had fallen foul. In his childhood, for example, A. J. Scott’s and John McLeod 
Campbell’s licenses had been revoked (1831) by the General Assembly of the Church of Scot-
land for suggesting that Christ had died for all, not just the elect. One of Scott’s accusers, the 
leader of the Evangelical party, Andrew Thomson, considered Scott and his circle to have: 
propagated doctrines which belie the word of God most odiously—which reason repudiates as in-
consistent and mistaken—which break the constitution of the gospel into pieces, and substitutes 
for it freaks of fancy and unwholesome paradoxes—and which introduce into religion all that is 
silly and bigoted and presumptuous.29 
With such shadows hanging over him, it is unsurprising that the enduring respect for Cal-
vinism that Lewis detected in MacDonald is not immediately apparent:30 Calvinism is invaria-
bly, almost obsessively, disparaged leading one contemporary to complain: ‘His Calvinistic 
characters […] are nearly all fanatics, cranks or oddities [yet they are presented as] the legiti-
                                                
27 George MacDonald, Malcolm, 3 vols (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1875), III, p. 88. 
28 David Elginbrod, 3 vols (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1863), III, p. 99. 
29 J. Philip Newell, ‘Unworthy of the Dignity of the Assembly: The Deposition of Alexander John Scott in 1831’, 
Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 21 (1983), 249–62 (p. 250). 




mate products of Calvinism’, whereas in truth they are representative of only ‘two or three wiz-
ened, juiceless crabs from some out of the way lightning-smitten bough’.31 In MacDonald’s 
mind, however, that ‘lightning-smitten bough’ equated to most established religion, leading an 
earlier critic to observe that ‘his quarrel is therefore with all the Evangelical Churches at home 
and abroad’.32 That said, non-Evangelical religion does not escape: the ‘fashionable sheep’ of 
Anglicanism are mocked,33 and there is an early critique of ‘Pentecostal’ emotionalism, observ-
ing that ‘scream will call forth scream, as vibrant string from its neighbour will draw the an-
swering tone’.34 
In MacDonald’s view, hard Calvinism is the worst idolatry. First, it defames the character 
of God. Its God ‘car[es] not for righteousness, but for his rights’,35 dramatized by Murdoch 
Malison, the ‘Scotch schoolmaster of the rough old-fashioned type’ in Alec Forbes of Howglen: 
His pleasure was law, irrespective of right or wrong, and the reward of submission to law was im-
munity from punishment. He had his favourites in various degrees, whom he chose according to 
inexplicable directions of feeling ratified by “the freedom of his own will.”36 These found it easy 
to please him, while those with whom he was not primarily pleased, found it impossible to please 
him.37 
In contrast, MacDonald described God (as both Lewis and Chesterton put it) as ‘easy to 
please but hard to satisfy’.38 Conceiving of God as the ideal Victorian father he writes: 
That no keeping but a perfect one will satisfy God, I hold with all my heart and strength; but that 
there is none else he cares for, is one of the lies of the enemy. What father is not pleased with the 
first tottering attempt of his little one to walk? What father would be satisfied with anything but 
the manly step of a full-grown son?39 
                                                
31 Samuel Law Wilson, The Theology of Modern Literature (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1899), pp. 272–73. 
32 The Religion of Our Literature, p. 305. 
33 David Elginbrod, III, pp. 178, 182. 
34 Malcolm, III, p. 59. 
35 Unspoken Sermons: Third Series (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889; Eureka, CA: Sunrise, 1996), p. 161. 
36 This phrase of John Locke (Second Treatise of Civil Government, VI. §63) concerns a child coming of age, now 
governed by ‘reason’ instead of trustees, and is probably a dig at Calvin’s voluntarism (see 5.2 (d)). 
37Alec Forbes of Howglen, 3 vols (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1865), I, pp. 239–40. 
38 Anthology, p. 41; GMAW, p. 12. 





Robin Stockitt notes that such negative views of God result from the dominance of a ju-
ridical model in Western theology leading to a theological grammar of lord and servant or mas-
ter and slave. He concludes: 
The outcome of this starting point has been to place ethics at the heart of what it means to be hu-
man with the originating reference point being legal decree rather that the divine creative Word.40 
The disjunction between ‘creative Word’ and ‘legal decree’ is at the heart of the matter. 
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen identifies ‘the biblically, historically, dogmatically and ecumenically 
unfounded and counter-productive tendency in some conservative Protestant traditions to make 
the forensic framework not only the dominant one but also the exclusive one’ while neglecting 
the many other New Testament soteriological metaphors.41 This concern was shared by Mau-
rice42 and likewise MacDonald: in response he, like Coleridge before him, placed ‘the creative 
Word’ (that is, Christ) at the heart of his theology and of his understanding of the imago Dei. 
MacDonald’s second concern was the reduction of faith (a relational and obedient re-
sponse to God) to belief (merely intellectual assent to ‘correct’ dogma).43 It is evident that nega-
tive childhood experiences led to sympathy with popular polemics against the ‘miserable, puri-
tanical, martinet’ God,44 such as Herbert Spencer’s 1884 broadside:  
The visiting on Adam’s descendants, through hundreds of generations, dreadful penalties for a 
small transgression which they did not commit; the damning of all men who do not avail them-
selves of an alleged mode of obtaining forgiveness, which most men have never heard of; and the 
effecting a reconciliation by sacrifice of one who was perfectly innocent are modes of action 
which, ascribed to a human ruler, would call forth expressions of abhorrence; and the ascription of 
them to the Ultimate Cause of things, even now felt to be full of difficulties, must become impos-
sible.45 
                                                
40 Robin Stockitt, Imagination and the Playfulness of God (Eugene OR: Pickwick, 2011), p. 138. 
41 Justification: Five Views, ed. by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (London: SPCK, 2012), p. 124. Walter 
Schmithals identifies ten NT soteriological metaphors (Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. by Colin Brown 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1986), I, pp. 437–479); see also John McIntyre, Faith, Theology, and Imagination 
(Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1987), pp. 60–61. 
42 The Kingdom of Christ, 2nd edn (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1843), p. 97 (2. 2. 3). 
43 See Alister E. McGrath, Heresy (London: SPCK, 2009), p. 22. 
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Such issues provoked a theological response (in this particular case, a sermon)46 with a strong 
leaning towards theodicy. 
As Brian Cummings notes, having started with the goal of justifying humanity to God, by 
the time Milton was writing Paradise Lost the Reformation had come full circle with Milton 
finding it necessary to ‘assert Eternal Providence, | And justifie the wayes of God to men’.47 
MacDonald felt himself to be in the same position. Foremost was the paradox of an omnipotent 
God of love and grace who, apparently, was content to eternally damn the majority of the crea-
tures made in God’s image—being either unwilling or unable to save them—as articulated by 
the false gospel of Calvinism, ‘founded on the pagan notion that suffering is an offset for sin’;48 
a religion that ‘would have us love Christ for protecting us from God, instead of for leading us 
to God’.49 
MacDonald found resolution by aligning himself with a more imaginative Romantic ap-
proach to theology. In contrast to a ‘profoundly anti-intellectual and anti-aesthetic’ Evangelical-
ism,50 he found solace, for example, in Swedenborg. A letter to his father expresses a measure 
of emancipation and reflects a Coleridgean view of faith as organic, rather than static:51 
I grow younger and happier. I see an outlet now from miseries of the mind, unknown to any which 
form portions of my earliest recollections, and have grown with my growth—but which by & by I 
shall quite outgrow. Swedenborg says that the angels are always growing younger. In this saying, 
which is logically absurd, there is a very deep meaning. Oh I know a little now […] what Christ’s 
deep sayings mean about becoming like a child.52 
This early discovery of ‘childlikeness’ underlines the influence of ‘German’ (European) 
mysticism. Prior to this, while in the north of Scotland, there is evidence from his fiction that he 
read mystics such as Novalis and poets such as Goethe.53 Whenever and however discovered, 
the issue is that he found an alternative, imaginative approach to faith. This letter, written short-
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ly before his departure from Arundel, is indicative of this epiphany, and his unease at Highbury 
was no doubt down to excessive dogmatism quenching such mystical leanings.54 The influence 
of English Romantics—Coleridge, Wordsworth, Browning and Shelley (and a Romantic rever-
ence for Shakespeare)55—cemented this very imaginative approach to epistemology. It repre-
sents a strong alignment to Romanticism and a suspicion of Enlightenment rationalism. 
1.2 (a) The influence of Romanticism 
Imagination and childhood preoccupied the Romantics, and in Coleridge—‘one of the first Brit-
ish theologians to assert that all of creation shared in the gift of life given by God’56—
MacDonald found the foundation for his theology of imagination. Chapter XIII of Biographia 
Literaria begins with lines from Paradise Lost affirming human being as the pinnacle of God’s 
created order: 
To intellectual!—give both life and sense, 
Fancy and understanding; whence the soul 
REASON receives, and reason is her being, 
Discursive or intuitive.57 
MacDonald took on board Coleridge’s understanding of ‘reason’ (cognition) as being 
both ‘discursive and intuitive’ and echoed his famous division of imagination into primary im-
agination, secondary imagination, and fancy, the former being ‘a repetition in the finite mind of 
the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’58 and therefore the spark of the divine presence 
in the human mind. On this basis, MacDonald insists that imagination is the prime cognitive 
faculty that leads ‘reason’: 
the imagination labours to extend [the intellect’s] territories, to give it room. She sweeps across the 
borders, searching out new lands into which she may guide her plodding brother. The imagination 
is the light which redeems from the darkness for the eyes of the understanding.59 
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Crucially, however, after Coleridge, the ‘light’ referred to in this last sentence is divine. 
Human imagination is not simply like God’s but ‘a repetition in the finite mind’—it is God’s 
direct presence in human consciousness: 
But God sits in that chamber of our being in which the candle of our consciousness goes out in 
darkness, and sends forth from thence wonderful gifts into the light of that understanding which is 
His candle. Our hope lies in no most perfect mechanism even of the spirit, but in the wisdom 
wherein we live and move and have our being.60 
Human imagination is the divine gift uniting the poles of being—God in nature and God in con-
sciousness. The imagination leads in ‘finding out the works of God’; the ‘intellect’ must follow: 
What we mean to insist upon is, that in finding out the works of God, the Intellect must labour, 
workman-like, under the direction of the architect, Imagination.61 
The distinction between imagination and fancy is evident. In Coleridge, fancy is ‘emanci-
pated from the order of time and space’, however this does not imply a similarly transcendent 
dimension: it deals with ‘fixities and definites’ and ‘must receive all its materials ready made 
from the law of association’.62 That is, fancy transcends spatio-temporal constraints but is nev-
ertheless earth-bound, a human capacity. Robin Stockitt summarises thus: ‘The exercise of 
choice that is open to Fancy is deliberate and intentional but the raw materials available to it are 
limited to what the human mind can remember or has experienced.’63 MacDonald reflects this in 
his advice to those who would foster imagination in the young. The good teacher should— 
point out to him [the pupil] the essential difference between reverie and thought; between dream-
ing and imagining. He will teach him not to mistake fancy, either in himself or in others, for imag-
ination, and to beware of hunting after resemblances that carry with them no interpretation.64 
As Cardinal Newman remarked, it was through such philosophical engagement that Cole-
ridge, a ‘very original thinker’, had ‘made trial of his age, and succeeded in interesting its geni-
us in the cause of Catholic truth’,65 praise centred on the recognition that, unlike Kant’s reverse 
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Copernican revolution in philosophy, Coleridge’s quest was to centre meaning back on God. 
Newman, however, qualified his accolade by observing that Coleridge ‘indulged in a liberty of 
speculation, which no Christian can tolerate’, a comment to be borne in mind here as we evalu-
ate MacDonald’s ideas, particularly as those more sceptical of Coleridge, such as F. J. A. Hort, 
described the latter—in an age with a predilection for taxonomy—as: 
that which refuses to be classified. An author whose opinions will not range with those of any rec-
ognised party, or whose works never seem quite rightly lodged in any one division of a well-
regulated library, occupies in general estimation what was once the place of a zoophyte or platy-
pus,—an uncanny creature, possibly of demoniacal origin. Such a divine monster was Coleridge.66 
Is MacDonald also ‘an uncanny creature, possibly of demoniacal origin’? 
F. D. Maurice, like Newman, mediated Coleridgean ideas to the Victorian church. His in-
fluence, however, was not confined to Anglicanism: through men like R. W. Dale, James Bald-
win Brown, and MacDonald, his influence on nonconformity (especially Congregationalism) 
was considerable.67 ‘In fact,’ writes F. J. Powicke in the 1870s about his student days at Spring 
Hill College, ‘a Maurician cult grew up, and probably did more to shape our theology than the 
lectures of the principal, Dr. [David Worthington] Simon’.68 ‘Maurice’s influence on MacDon-
ald’, says William Raeper, ‘cannot be stressed too strongly.’69  
Through the mouth of the hero in David Elginbrod, MacDonald paid tribute:70 
I seldom go to church […] but when I do, I come here; and always feel that I am in the presence of 
one of the holy servants of God’s great temple not made with hands. I heartily trust that man. He is 
what he seems to be.71 
Maurice singled out his debt to Coleridge, writing, for example, that Aids to Reflection—
a book that particularly appeals to ‘childlike men and women’— ‘is [a book] to which I feel 
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myself under […] deep and solemn obligations’,72 and that with regard to the history of the Bi-
ble, he had ‘said very little indeed of which [Coleridge’s] thought was not the germ’, confessing 
to have stolen ‘many other thoughts’.73 Geoffrey Rowell identifies three in particular: ‘that eter-
nity was independent of duration; that the power of repentance is not limited to this life; and 
that it is not revealed whether or not all will ultimately be saved’.74 As well as his father’s Uni-
tarianism, Rowell notes the impact of the ‘teaching of the Scottish divines, Erskine of Linlathen 
and McLeod Campbell; the Cambridge Platonists; the mystical tradition of Jacob Boehme and 
William Law; all these left their mark on Maurice’s theology’75—and MacDonald’s, through 
whom they were mediated to a wider audience. 
Jeremy Morris notes a focus on the imago Dei. Maurice particularly objected to Pusey’s 
idea that at Baptism the candidate received a new nature, the implication being that the old na-
ture was at best suspect, at worst evil—in other words, a doctrine that undermined the goodness 
and ‘grace’ of creation and the universality of the impact of the Incarnation.76 Maurice stressed 
that the Articles of the Church of England— 
did not begin, as was the case with Calvinism, from a conviction of human sinfulness which then 
became the basis for a theological system, but from a restatement of the ‘Catholic foundation’ of 
the Trinity, the Incarnation, the being of God, the Scriptures, and the Creeds.77 
Other themes we find in Maurice include a focus on the kingdom of God in contrast to 
human self-focus, ‘each in reference to a separate centre’, that is the essence of sin: 
And it is the Kingdom of God because men are brought into it that they may see themselves, their 
fellow creatures, the whole universe, as He sees them; not partially, or each in reference to a sepa-
rate centre, as they naturally do.78 
The fatherhood of God is also contrasted with ‘schemes for our deliverance’: 
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We have theories of sin, of justification, of apostolical succession, schemes of divinity Protestant, 
Romish, semi-Romish, Anglican, Dissenting. But where is God in them all? Not first at least, not a 
Father; but merely the provider of a certain scheme for our deliverance.79 
On this view, faith is not to be found in ‘correct’ dogma (Maurice was particularly suspi-
cious of doctrines that distinguished between ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ belief—notably Evangeli-
calism and Tractarianism) but instead focused on ‘complete fidelity to God’s will’80—
obedience. Stephen Prickett identifies a corresponding preference for ‘aesthetic rather than dis-
cursive forms of apprehension’, and that this ‘poetic’ methodology necessarily led to a distrust 
of systems. Instead, truth must be perceived organically, the latter concept not only emphasising 
the need for holistic vision able to discern ‘organic’, symbolic truth, but drawing attention to the 
subjective, fluid, and developmental nature of revelation.81 All these ideas are evident in Mac-
Donald. 
MacDonald, then, is part of a Romantic tradition tracing its heritage back through the 
Lakes poets to European writers such as Schelling, Goethe, Kant, and Rousseau. In addition, we 
find the likes of Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg), Heinrich Heine, 
Friedrich Schiller, and Friedrich Schleiermacher providing chapter epigrams for MacDonald’s 
first published novel, Phantastes. Add to this the influence of Jacob Boehme, Dante, and Eman-
uel Swedenborg and a picture emerges of a mystical and imaginative approach to faith privileg-
ing ‘feelings’—understood not as the means to discern religious truth, but as the result of view-
ing truth from a holistic and imaginative perspective.82 Wordsworth’s mediation in this respect 
is clear. We simply note at this point that—commenting on ‘Lines Written a Few Miles Above 
Tintern Abbey’—MacDonald praises the poet’s ability to express how the imagination unites 
the poles of being: ‘the result of the conjunction of the mind of man, and the mind of God mani-
fested in His works; spirit coming to know the speech of spirit’.83 
The term ‘imagination’ in this essay will be used (until further clarified) in this Romantic 
sense (as I believe MacDonald understood it) to refer to the high level cognitive ability to intui-
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tively discern the meaning of symbols; a bridge uniting the ‘poles of being’, that is, a divine gift 
providing the means to discern the presence of God in the soul and in nature—the bridge to 
transcendence. 
1.3 The Victorian backdrop: a divided Evangelical world 
Such views placed MacDonald on a collision course with a conservative Evangelicalism that, 
following Calvin, saw human imagination as essentially corrupt. We find Samuel Law Wilson, 
for example, complaining that MacDonald’s Romantic leanings lead to ‘theological perversities’ 
and a ‘sentimental piety’ considered superior to ‘ordinary Evangelical religion’; that he reduces 
conversion to a ‘slight and facile process’, ignoring ‘the awful controversy caused by sin’ and 
the need for redeeming grace. Furthermore, ‘natural influences in the process of man’s salva-
tion’ are given undue prominence, marginalising the Spirit of God.84 
While critical of MacDonald’s artistic misrepresentation, Wilson’s real target is unsound 
theology. He has no time for a partnership between nature and the inward working of the Spirit 
that negates the need for an infallible Bible interpreted by an ‘official’ church. For example, the 
conversion (or at least the reformation) of two alcoholics in Alec Forbes—accomplished by the 
working of ‘one good and strong spirit—essential life and humanity [, the] spirit was love’85—is 
for Wilson a travesty: 
Thus “the spirit of essential life and humanity” it will be observed, is all the spirit that is needed to 
effect the saving change in this brace of sinners, and there is more virtue in “love” to redeem and 
reform than in all the moral appliances of Evangelical religion.86 
Wilson is unable to concede that ‘love’ is more effective in saving souls from eternal 
damnation than ‘the moral appliances of Evangelical religion’, but behind this lies the more 
fundamental issue of the liberal challenge to Evangelical conservatism against a backdrop of 
social ferment. 
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The latter third of the nineteenth century, when MacDonald produced most of his work, 
was perhaps that century’s most volatile period. In the first half of the century, unchecked capi-
talism, the Irish famine, Asiatic cholera, urbanisation and industrialisation (to highlight merely 
some of the social challenges) had produced a highly unbalanced society with endemic depriva-
tion. Revolution was in the air.87 Conditions, especially in the industrial north where thirteen-
year-old children worked seventy-two hours a week and died at the age of fifteen,88 provoked 
Marx to write The Condition of the Working Class in England (first published in 1845 in Ger-
man) and Engels The Condition of England (1844). Ruskin complained that treating humans 
this way was to— 
smother their souls within them, […] to make the flesh and skin […] into leathern thongs to yoke 
machinery with. [… England’s] multitudes [are] sent like fuel to feed the factory smoke, and the 
strength of them is given daily to be wasted.89 
R. W. Dale, ‘probably one of the most influential Nonconformist theologians of the nine-
teenth century’,90 paints a picture of a fast-changing world full of both danger and promise, but 
emphasises the former: 
We are living in a new world … Immense development of the manufacturing industries, the wider 
separation of the classes in the great towns—a separation produced by the increase of commercial 
wealth—the new relations which have grown up between the employers and the employed, the 
great spread of popular education, the growth of a vast popular literature, the increased political 
power of the masses of the people, the gradual decay of the old aristocratic organization of society, 
and the advance, in many forms, of the spirit of democracy—have urgently demanded fresh appli-
cations.91  
By mid-century, social awareness—‘the spirit of democracy’—was growing. Evangeli-
cals sensed a new dawn: that mere toleration might finally give way to social equality, that the 
Church might finally be disestablished, and that Christ would begin to establish his kingdom 
among the ‘dark satanic mills’. Dale’s call for ‘fresh applications’ from the religious community 
was salutary. It is as if the Ruskinian image of the poor being used as factory-fodder is stirring 
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the religious conscience—revealing the paucity of the theological platitudes supporting social 
oppression—in a way that pre-industrial-revolution exploitation of the poor could not, masked 
as it was by scenes (if only imaginary) of pastoral contentment. It is the driving force behind 
Carlyle’s polemics about ‘the condition of England’: work in factories, in his view, was not 
equivalent to honest artisan work, but merely slavery. He, like Dale, demanded a religious re-
sponse from the ‘ancient guides of Nations, Prophets, Priests’ that had lost contact with reality, 
mocking their apostasy and delusion: 
Ye have forgotten God, ye have quitted the ways of God, or ye would not have been unhappy. It is 
not according to the laws of Fact that ye have lived and guided yourselves, but according to the 
laws of Delusion, Imposture, and wilful and unwilful Mistake of Fact; behold therefore the Unve-
racity is worn out; Nature’s longsuffering with you is exhausted; and ye are here!92 
We must not allow Carlyle’s typically Jeremianic invective to detract from its perspicaci-
ty: theological shift was needed. It came in the form of a transition from the ‘age of atone-
ment’—‘a time when the dominant mode of thought [was] an amalgam of enlightenment ration-
alism and Evangelical eschatology, and its core or “hinge” was the Christian doctrine of the 
Atonement’93—to the ‘age of incarnation’. The preoccupation with personal salvation became 
increasingly a social quest to wake humanity to the knowledge that the race was already part of 
the family of God under the headship of the incarnate Christ; and since it was optimistically as-
sumed that evolution was moral as well as biological, hopes rose for a golden future under King 
Jesus. There was a corresponding rise in postmillennialism94 and an increasing Maurician em-
phasis on the social implications of Christ’s ‘spiritual society’.95  
This shift had a direct impact socially, particularly on the relationship between noncon-
formity and the State.96 The theological emphasis on the incarnation—one aspect of which was 
that Christ’s intervention in human history had already united all under the headship of Christ—
fuelled the nonconformist quest for equality. It led to a stronger emphasis on sanctification (ho-
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ly living in community) rather than simply justification (the personal ‘insurance policy’).97 
Those such as Edward Miall were convinced that the disestablishment of the Church of England 
was imminent. This, combined with increasing nonconformist wealth and education, led to a 
corresponding increase in political engagement driven by a theology emphasising the Chris-
tian’s duty to engage with this life rather than simply focus on the afterlife, facilitated by the 
weakening of the Anglican establishment.  
However, when MacDonald was writing, these long-term implications were only incipi-
ent. Despite strides made to address social deprivation, the ‘brotherhood of man’ theology had 
yet to systematically impact social ills,98 partly due to an almost hallucinatory belief in human 
goodness and a corresponding naivety, perhaps blindness, relating to the true state of society, in 
part because that society was considered ordained by God. This goes some way to account for 
the unconvincing social settings and characters that populate MacDonald’s fiction. If one adds 
to this the general problem of Romanticism’s ambiguity in relation to evil,99 then we have per-
haps uncovered some of the root issues which need to be explored in relation to MacDonald’s 
thought. 
In mid-century there was also fierce debate centred around three issues: the doctrine of 
future punishment for the wicked (as opposed to ‘the larger hope’ that all might be saved), the 
infallibility and inspiration of the Bible (and whether ‘higher criticism’ was acceptable), and the 
implications of scientific advances. Such issues divided Evangelicals. Increasing unease about 
the moral implications of conservative theology led to the prevalence of more liberal ideas, and 
the need for faith to bend with cultural change gained more traction. The central moral dilemma 
concerned the nature of God: was God really like Murdoch Malison, the sadistic schoolmas-
ter?100 Darwin suggested ‘yes’. Unlike Goethe’s Romantic vision of nature as God’s numinous 
robe favoured by Carlyle and MacDonald, Tennyson’s nature ‘red in tooth and claw’, Darwin 
pondered, must have been invented by a demon: ‘What a book a Devil’s Chaplain might write 
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on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low and horridly cruel works of nature.’101 Doubt was in the 
air about both ‘Nature’ and God, leading Tennyson to ask: 
Are God and Nature then at strife, 
That Nature lends such evil dreams? 
So careful of the type she seems, 
So careless of the single life […]?102 
MacDonald was ‘liberal’ in that he chose to engage with such questions. Liberals saw 
conservatives as stubborn and petulant children refusing to modify their views in the light of 
increasing revelation. Conservatives, for their part, considered such ‘revelation’ as fundamental-
ly flawed and accused liberals of rebellion against the hard-won truths of their forebears. 
Judgements against liberals from conservatives such as Wilson and McCrie who accuse Mac-
Donald of inventing a new religion (like the recent conclusion of John Piper and Timothy Keller 
that MacDonald was ‘not a Christian’)103 were not uncommon. Charles Haddon Spurgeon typi-
fied the reaction to liberalism when he remarked in 1877 that ‘a new religion has been initiated 
which is no more Christianity than chalk is cheese’,104 and accused liberals of ‘toying with the 
deadly cobra of “another gospel” in the form of “modern thought”’.105 
MacDonald’s migration towards liberalism was not untypical. William Hale White, for 
example, a fellow Congregationalist who had studied at Highbury College’s reincarnation as 
New College, found himself unable to accept the inflexible dogmatism on offer and was ex-
pelled for questioning whether the Bible should be read as one book (becoming a civil serv-
ant).106 He writes: 
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The theological and biblical teaching was a sham […]. So it came to pass that about the Bible […] 
we were in darkness. It was a magazine of texts, and those portions of it which contributed nothing 
in the shape of texts, or formed no part of the [Calvinistic] scheme, were neglected.107 
Thomas Toke Lynch (whose Romantic poetry was perceived as a threat to orthodoxy) left 
active ministry to become a writer, and within nonconformity generally numerous voices ques-
tioned traditional claims. Many column inches were devoted to religious debates, becoming 
front page in the 1870s and 1880s when events surrounding the Congregational Leicester Con-
ference (1877) became public knowledge, and when Spurgeon went into print to complain about 
the ‘down grade’—the liberalisation—of his own Baptist denomination leading to acrimonious 
exchanges with liberal colleagues such as John Clifford culminating in his secession from the 
Baptist Union in 1887.108 
The general picture in the third quarter of the nineteenth century is one of increasing im-
patience with inflexible conservative Evangelical doctrines109 and a consequent migration to-
wards liberalism or secularism. The flow was not, though, in one direction: many continued to 
find refuge in the ‘old truths’. The result was fragmentation more than migration, and (reminis-
cent of the situation during the interregnum of the seventeenth century when censorship ceased 
to function) it was felt that the abandonment of ‘first principles’ was precipitating a rise in ‘the 
vain speculations of romancing rationalists’.110 
1.3 (a) Conservatism and liberalism 
MacDonald and his mid-century contemporaries faced a dilemma. Enlightenment thinking had 
fostered a more rational approach to Christianity which tended to equate truth with verifiable 
facts and was suspicious of the unverifiable. The architects of the Reformation had constructed 
a Christian edifice built on the ‘factual’ foundation of a divinely-inspired inerrant text and a his-
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torical Jesus who worked miracles to prove his authenticity. As the Methodist theologian Mar-
shall Randles noted, for example, in his First Principles of Faith (1884), ‘theism is essentially 
founded in reason’. As Dale Johnson notes, he ‘built his entire case on the argument from cau-
sality’.111 The dilemma was that the same principles that had given rise to a new, more vibrant, 
more ‘reasonable’ expression of Christianity—the fruit in part of the emphasis on the logical 
and therefore investigable nature of God’s creation—led to erosion of those ‘factual’ founda-
tions, and cracks were appearing in the superstructure.112 Although Evangelicalism did not, and 
does not, equate to Calvinism (as Evangelicalism was also forged in the fire of the Great Awak-
ening with its mystical overtones and Arminian theology), Calvinist thinking was deeply em-
bedded in the resulting system—especially so in MacDonald’s Scotland—a system vulnerable, 
as it were, to self harm on two counts: not only was its internal logic corrosive to its foundation-
al beliefs, the focus on the defence of ‘correct’ beliefs led to increasing fragmentation. As Jacob 
Boehme’s biographer had expressed it (with some perspicacity): 
LEARNED REASON’S Influence and Operations in the Sanctuary [has] split all Christendom into 
numberless Parties; each as sure of it’s [sic] own Rectitude, and of it’s Neighbour’s Deficiency.113 
As Iain McGilchrist observes, if one adds to this Reformed iconoclasm, anti-aestheticism, 
and distrust of imagination: 
What is so compelling here is that the motive force behind the Reformation was the urge to regain 
authenticity, with which one can only be profoundly sympathetic. The path it soon took was that 
of the destruction of all means whereby authenticity could have been recaptured.114 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that MacDonald expressed unease and was depressed by his 
experience at Highbury since such nonconformist colleges set out to produce effective preachers 
of fixed dogma, not critical thinkers. The colleges were ‘“factories for preachers and pastors,” in 
the phrase of the Presbyterian W. G. Elmslie, as opposed to shrines of culture or centers of 
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scholarship and erudition’;115 they championed the principles of dissent but did not allow people 
to be dissenters.116 
MacDonald recognises the paradoxes in the religion of his day. He summarily dismisses 
views he considers based on falsehood while holding in tension conflicting conservative and 
liberal claims, refusing to be drawn towards over-dogmatic conclusions. His Maurician ability 
to live with paradox reflects his mentor’s view that truth is larger than specifics and is ‘organic’ 
in the sense discussed above.117 Although notionally wedded to Reformed factual foundations 
such as a miracle-working Jesus, his general approach to the received wisdom from tradition 
and sacred text is that both may be questioned and must be interpreted imaginatively. 
1.3 (b) The nature of MacDonald’s response 
Both conservative and liberal Evangelicals viewed the cosmos as created by God and that there 
existed beyond it a supernatural realm. The key difference concerned the view of that cosmos 
and the sacred text. The supernatural theism of conservatives regarded creation as entirely sepa-
rate from God and essentially corrupt having been irrevocably damaged by the Fall. The cos-
mos, like ‘un-elect’ humanity, was destined for the fire; it would be recreated, rebellious hu-
manity would not. The sacramental doorway to the more ‘real’ transcendent realm was the Bi-
ble—the inerrant interpreter of history and human experience; it was the unchanging reference 
point in a world of flux. 
Conversely, liberal incarnational theology focused on God’s immanence leading to a sac-
ramental view of observed reality; a Romantic optimism that nature, despite its flaws, revealed 
God. The Bible was a product of human history; history should be used to interpret the Bible, 
not the other way round. The view, however, of both Bible and cosmos was that both were sac-
ramental despite the damage caused by human sin, both were inspired by God; inerrancy in 
scripture and perfection in creation were not prerequisites for sacrality. 
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The view of the Bible as inerrant and the oft-repeated cry ‘THE BIBLE, AND THE BIBLE 
ALONE, IS THE RELIGION OF DISSENTERS’118 reflected a longing for epistemic certainty in a 
changing world, but, as P. T. Forsyth was to observe at the end of the century, this was a cer-
tainty that came with a high price tag: 
“The whole Bible or none,” it was said. “Take but a stone away and the edifice subsides.” This 
came of the Bible having been reduced to a fabric instead of an organism. And how many sceptics 
that course has made! […] If I were a Secularist I would not touch by assault the doctrine of plena-
ry verbal inspiration and inerrancy. I should let it work freely as one of my best adjutants.119 
For conservatives, security was sought in the incontrovertible ‘evidences’ of Biblical mir-
acles and Paley’s natural religion. Liberals also appealed to verifiable facts. The issue between 
them was not so much methodology as the ‘factual’ starting point. Conservatives, for example, 
insisted on a literal Adam and Eve, a ‘young’ earth, and that sin was a perennial obstacle. Liber-
al John Clifford, in contrast, was of the opinion—based on his understanding of Henry Drum-
mond’s The Ascent of Man—that humans were evolving morally and spiritually, and that ‘Man 
[…] is altruistic in the soul of him, in a world that is founded on altruism’.120 Such liberal opti-
mism was dealt a severe blow by Darwin’s observation that if God was the architect of nature, 
God must be ‘demonic’.121 
In this climate, MacDonald’s quest to rehabilitate God relies not on challenging the foun-
dations of truth, but, following Newman and Maurice, redefines truth in aesthetic terms; that 
truth is a ‘symbol’ that must be holistically discerned rather than a proposition to be believed. 
‘The child’—imaginatively exploring a universe of uncertain novelty and mystery with fresh 
eyes—serves this agenda by offering a counterpoint to the hubris of certainty. He thus insists 
that ‘the truth of a thing is the blossom of it’.122 It is the aesthetic ‘surface’ of reality that speaks 
truth to the perceptive child; reality is a metaphor perceived—not primarily deductively or in-
                                                
118 J. A. James (1832) in Religion in Victorian Britain, Volume III: Sources, ed. by James R. Moore (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press/Open University, 1988), p. 132. 
119 Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind (London: Independent Press, 1964), p. 85. 
120 Nonconformity’s Romantic Generation, p. 182. 
121 Note 101. 




ductively—but ‘abductively’ (intuitively) by the power of childlike imagination.123 This is why 
conservatives—despite the fact that MacDonald consistently calls himself a follower of Christ, 
affirms his reverence for the Bible as inspired, and preaches obedience to Christ—are so suspi-
cious of MacDonald’s ‘new religion’: he is challenging the nature of truth and its factual foun-
dations. Being a firm rejection of the inflexible logic of his forebears such as Samuel Rutherford 
who concluded that infants would be sent to hell124—and therefore of a subsequent Evangelical-
ism that had failed to exorcise such doctrines despite efforts to become ‘softer’—MacDonald’s 
Christianity does, for those who subscribe to such views, amount to a ‘new religion’. There are, 
however, strong resonances with traditional themes, evident, for example, in his focus on faith 
as obedience rather than belief.125 The latter, he argues, reduces Christianity to mere intellectual 
assent, whereas obedience to perceived truth resulting in moral improvement is the mark of the 
faithful. 
Such views reflect the medieval understanding of ‘faith’.126 Modernity was preoccupied 
with faith as assensus—intellectual assent to certain ‘enshrined’ propositions (that is, idolatrous 
concepts)—leading to the definition of a Christian as ‘someone who believes the right things’. 
This is constantly challenged by MacDonald, overtly in sermons such as ‘Justice’ and ‘Right-
eousness’ (US3), and covertly through the demolition of fictional hypocrites.127 He repeatedly 
emphasises the need to be an obedient child, reflecting the three other medieval understandings 
of faith as fiducia—practical trust in God as the ‘rock of our salvation’ as opposed to being wor-
ried about tomorrow, fidelitas—loyalty and allegiance to God as opposed to infidelity, and vi-
sio—a way of seeing ‘with the eyes of faith’. The latter, rather than seeing the world adversari-
ally as a place of threat resulting in a defensive posture or indifferently as a neutral place uncon-
cerned about human being, views the world as life-giving, nourishing, and gracious, and em-
braces metaphor. Perhaps this ‘medievalism’ reflects the tendency of Romantics to look back at 
the golden age of chivalry rather than forward to a millennial utopia. However, I will argue that 
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this is not simply a nostalgia for a lost ideal, rather it is a rejection of present ‘unchildlikeness’ 
and the sense that humanity is becoming increasingly disconnected from transcendence. As 
John Pridmore perceptively remarks: 
Childhood in Wordsworth is recollected. For MacDonald childhood is what is promised. Where 
Wordsworth is solaced by memory, MacDonald is upheld by hope. Childhood is not a lost estate 
to be mourned but a condition to which we must aspire.128 
One might say that MacDonald is redefining ‘orthodoxy’ in the medieval sense of ‘right 
worship’ rather than in the modern sense of ‘right belief’ as these three concepts of faith empha-
sise the need for an active response. Visio, central to Romantic theology, is especially important 
since it concerns the ability to see truly. In the Curdie novels, for example, light and vision are 
perennial themes connected to faith. The young princess Irene (‘peace’), lost on the mountain, 
glimpses the great-great-grandmother’s lamp in the distance. The grandmother, a theophany 
(‘the Mother of Light’)129 whose lamp is an image of faith, had earlier said to Irene: 
I will tell you a secret—if that light were to go out you would fancy yourself lying in a bare garret, 
on a heap of old straw, and would not see one of the pleasant things round about you all the 
time.130 
When the princess asks why more people don’t investigate this very obvious phenomenon 
(it shines in the neighbourhood), it is because they dismiss it—‘take it for a meteor, wink their 
eyes, and forget it again’. Now, desperate to find her way home: 
the light that filled her eyes from the lamp, instead of blinding them for a moment to the object 
upon which they next fell, enabled her for a moment to see it, despite the darkness. By looking at 
the lamp and then dropping her eyes, she could see the road for a yard or two in front of her.131 
Faith does not simply provide light, but gives one ‘good eyes’. The grandmother herself 
(God) is only visible to those with ‘good’ eyes. As she remarks to the other protagonist, the 
young miner Curdie: 
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it is one thing what you or your father may think about me, and quite another what a foolish or bad 
man may see in me. For instance, if a thief were to come in here just now, he would think he saw 
the demon of the mine, all in green flames, come to protect her treasure, and would run like a 
hunted wild goat. I should be all the same, but his evil eyes would see me as I was not.132 
This passage illustrates a central thesis: that those with unchildlike ‘evil eyes’ have an er-
roneous vision of God as a ‘demon’, a vision (in both senses of the word) that needs to be exor-
cised from contemporary Christianity. 
In Greville MacDonald’s view, the main difference between his father and John Ruskin 
was his father’s gift of ‘fairy vision’. Speaking of his father’s leaning towards the imaginative 
rather than the rational, he writes: 
That instinct […] was his exalted fairy vision, the light that in lighting every man reveals the se-
crets of all. 
Far from its being the image of his own mind, as Ruskin whimsically said, that my father saw 
in the sky, it was, I think he would answer, only when man is purified of faith in the material—
“the cloak and cloud which shadows me from Thee”—that he will see God.133  
MacDonald’s vision was, one might say, a fiduciary hermeneutic of a world which he 
saw as infused with ‘bright shoots of everlastingness’.134 He chose to look at the world with the 
eyes of faith. That MacDonald sees differently to those such as Ruskin is not in question; what 
we do need to consider, however, is whether MacDonald is seeing truly. Is he, as Ruskin sug-
gested, merely seeing a projection of his own fantasies in the sky? To phrase the question more 
precisely: does his work reveal aesthetic truth or aesthetic fantasy? 
 
This introduction to MacDonald’s thought has outlined the influence of, and resonances 
with, historical and contemporary currents. We have also identified key ideas and questions. 
The task before us is to construct a coherent summary of MacDonald’s theology, a task that, 
because of his methodology and aversion to ‘systems’, involves assembling a mosaic from scat-
tered fragments. The picture of ‘the child’ (henceforth not in quotes), it will be argued, is the 
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dominant image, as it were, on the lid of the puzzle holding the key to its reassembly. However, 
before a closer reading of MacDonald it is necessary to consider the Victorian child. 
34 
 
Chapter 2 The Victorian child: social and theological attitudes 
2.1 Sin and innocence 
This chapter constructs the Victorian view of childhood as a benchmark against which to com-
pare MacDonald’s contrasting image (Chapter 3) as a precursor to considering how he uses it 
(Chapters 4–8). Since children are representative of the race (that is, already fully human, not 
merely potentially so), the ‘theology of childhood’ is central to Christian anthropology. It is 
therefore, as Karl Rahner observed, curious that there is no definitive articulation of such a the-
ology.135 Theological musings on the subject do, nevertheless, abound. They are the focus here 
and are far from inconsequential. Consider, for example, the following. 
Western theology, since Augustine, has been preoccupied with the doctrine of original 
sin, a doctrine contested by Pelagius (and MacDonald): one side insisting that the child is essen-
tially corrupt, the other that it is innocent.136 Taking these emphases to their absurd conclusions 
with respect to child-rearing, we have, on the one hand, Coleridge’s ‘hands off’ approach, leav-
ing Hartley to be mothered by nature. On the other (rejecting the idea that nature, human or oth-
erwise, is in any way benign) we have Jonathan Edwards’s daughter, Esther Edwards Burr, writ-
ing in the 1750s that she has begun to use the whip on her ten-month-old daughter.137 It is im-
mediately apparent that MacDonald’s assertion that God is a child is likely to raise significant 
questions for the later descendants of Jonathan Edwards.  
For most of the nineteenth century, the Puritan view dominated: childhood was consid-
ered a necessary evil, a stage in life to be left behind as soon as possible (despite some insisting 
that childhood extended to the age of thirty).138 Though such views had thawed somewhat by 
mid-century, attitudes to childhood were predominantly negative, especially in a religious 
community suspicious of childhood passion and vice—evidence of original sin. The ascendancy 
of evolutionism did little to emancipate childhood: the burden of original sin was simply ex-
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changed for that of collective racial memory as the ‘little savages’ in their cots were deemed to 
not only recapitulate the dawn of humanity, but carry collective memories of a natural history 
which, unlike the benign vision of the Romantics, was red in tooth and claw. It led to fin de siè-
cle pessimism, such as that of Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure; a vision of children burdened 
with inchoate ancestral memories, predetermined by heredity, and unmoved by free will. Jude 
graphically expresses the logical outcome of evolutionary determinism, particularly—according 
to Shuttleworth—the depressingly pessimistic version of Schopenhauer. Thus the category of 
childhood, viewed as a period of innocence and naivety, is waning by the end of the century, if 
not abolished.139 For Hardy, all children are ‘old’, dramatized most clearly in the child nick-
named Father Time who, according to Hardy, was ‘Age masquerading as Juvenility, and doing 
it so badly that his real self showed through the crevices’; a child made in the image of God, 
perhaps, but ‘an enslaved and dwarfed Divinity’.140 For Hardy, childhood is illusory.  
MacDonald’s suggestion that God is a child is, therefore, a radical challenge to theology 
and forces reconsideration of the value of childhood. MacDonald, like Hardy, conflates age and 
youth but he reverses the analogy, underlining the eternity, as well as the childlikeness, of God: 
it is adulthood with its pretentious cultural accretions, its selfishness, and its power-lust that is 
false; the goal of humanity is not to leave childhood behind as soon as possible, but to embrace 
it and emulate the God that is ‘Juvenility masquerading as Age’. The goal of life is divine child-
likeness. It is adulthood, not childhood, that is synonymous with sin. 
Whether viewed positively, negatively, or simply ignored, childhood was at the heart of 
the Victorian world. ‘The figure of the child’, Shuttleworth suggests, 
lies at the heart of nineteenth-century discourses of gender, race, and selfhood: a figure who is by 
turns animal, savage, or female, but who is located not in the distant colonies, nor in the mists of 
evolutionary time, but at the very centre of English domestic life.141 
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2.2 Early and mid-nineteenth century attitudes to childhood 
2.2 (a) Natural religion and the Romantic inheritance 
At the outset we note, with Ann Wierda Rowland, that ‘the history of children and the history of 
childhood are two different things’; that the child as a social construct has a somewhat tenuous 
relationship to the lived experiences of real children.142 Lamentations regarding the loss or ero-
sion of childhood have more to do with the former.143 This distinction goes some way towards 
accounting for Judith Plotz’s complaint that Romantic ideas did little to contribute to reform. 
Her work nevertheless reveals the weakness of developing philosophical ideas at some distance 
from social context. Wordsworth, for example, stands accused of using his Romantic idealism 
to justify parental neglect,144 and that this distortion of reality—the separation of the child from 
both the adult and the real world—is prescient of later Romantic texts that set a lone child 
against the world (see below). Plotz is not impressed: 
This separation of adult from child defines the Wordsworthian child. It is not innocent radiance or 
joy, but an aesthetically embalmed apartheid that constitutes Wordsworth’s major contribution to 
the nineteenth-century literature of childhood.145 
Theoretically at least, however, childhood for the Romantics was a state of ‘innocent ra-
diance or joy’ where the infant mind was not only attuned to nature’s ministrations, but ‘trailing 
clouds of glory’ as if still semi-conscious of its divine origin. Wordsworth’s manifesto on child-
hood, Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood, suggested that 
such awareness progressively waned, such that 
At length the Man perceives it die away, 
And fade into the light of common day.146 
 
Prior to adulthood, the child mind, with its innate receptivity to divine things, is tutored 
by a sacramental nature. Thus, writing in 1781, a Scottish writer (strikingly at odds with his 
Calvinist compatriots) optimistically observed that ‘Children are especially susceptible of in-
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struction with regard to natural religion. The being of a God, and the worship due to him being 
engraved on the mind, make a branch of our nature’, concluding that, ‘It is easy to fortify in 
children the belief of a Deity, because his existence is engraved on the human heart.’147 Antici-
pating mid-Victorian criticism of religious education, the author expresses a MacDonaldian sen-
timent: 
Religious education thus carried on, instead of inspiring gloominess, and despondence, will con-
tribute more than any other means to serenity of mind and cheerfulness of temper […]. Surely any 
frightful notion of the Deity, must have a dismal effect on a tender mind, susceptible of every im-
pression, of fear above all. 148 
Rowland credits Scottish Romanticism with providing much of the foundation for the 
Romantic discourse on childhood, noting that the work of Adam Smith and John Millar did 
much to reinforce the equation of antiquity with childhood. Emphasising the developmental na-
ture of society, the ancient savage was seen both as a childhood figure at the dawn of civilisa-
tion and as an ‘elder’—a repository of ancient wisdom. Such views informed the view of the 
child mind as ancient well before ideas of evolutionary recapitulation. Most writers in the wake 
of Locke, Rowland argues, ‘embrace a theory of infancy and development that allow them to 
compare child and savage’. Primitive man is a ‘big baby’, and childhood language is that of the 
savage.149 
‘Savage’ childhood language and behaviour implied two things: first, inexperience, 
meaning that new words had to be invented (or old ones recycled) every time a new experience 
was encountered; and second, emotional displays unchecked by the constraints of civilisation. 
Thus imagination was ‘closely associated with the ignorance and inexperience of infancy’, and 
was something that civilised people grew out of.150 In a phrase that MacDonald would have ap-
plauded, Rowland observes: ‘Infancy thus represents an embodied imaginative state.’151 
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2.2 (b) The Romantic theology of childhood 
Those such as Samuel Law Wilson concluded that they and MacDonald worshipped different 
deities.152 Do the claims of Romanticism (and the child in particular) justify such a conclusion?  
Judith Plotz thinks so—that the Romantic obsession with the ideal nature-communing 
child led to its deification. Schiller (an influence on MacDonald),153 she argues, contributed to 
this by insisting on the child’s mediatory role through its affinity with a nature conceived as vir-
gin and untainted by culture—a mediation ‘affording us a retrospective view of ourselves, and 
revealing more closely the unnatural in us’.154 Aligning the child mind with nature, beyond the 
vicissitudes of history and the corruption of culture, places it in a virgin territory of immutabil-
ity and timeless antiquity. Age and infancy are again conflated. Coleridge’s musings in Frost at 
Midnight over the young Hartley reflect this: the baby merges with nature, ‘wander[ing] like a 
breeze by lakes and sandy shores’, listening to the ‘eternal language which thy God utters’. 
While Coleridge is firmly wedded to a Christian God, Plotz is unsure about his succes-
sors. She points to a common Romantic trope of a make-believe kingdom presided over by a 
child-redeemer. Whether the creations of children or adult authors,155 The Child, instead of 
merely connecting to a higher power, becomes that power, a permeating life-giving force—an 
idolatrous concept transplanted into the real world. ‘As an imaginary kingdom,’ she writes, ‘it is 
almost always figured as a lost garden paradise presided over by a child-redeemer or child-idol: 
“Infancy is the perpetual Messiah which comes into the arms of fallen men, and pleads with 
them to return to paradise” (Emerson, “Nature” 54).’156 
In Plotz’s view, it is but a short step from adulation of the concept of the quintessential 
child to worship of The Child—a being ‘who figures powerfully in Golden Age children’s liter-
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ature, especially male-authored fantasy literature’.157 The Romantic discourse on childhood, she 
writes, 
made it easy, unavoidable almost, to assume the living reality and splendor of such an essential be-
ing as The Child, who is unmarked by time, place, class, or gender but is represented as in all plac-
es and all times the same.158 
We will consider later what relationship MacDonald’s Child-God has to the child of Ro-
manticism, but I suggest that Plotz’s theology of The Child seems somewhat overstated: practi-
cal belief in ‘the living reality and splendor of such an essential being as The Child’ seems un-
likely. It seems more reasonable to accept Rowland’s evaluation of the ‘ideal child’ as a motif 
for expressing interiority and innocence—it evokes a ‘natural’ state, and an interior, remem-
bered existence.159 
The preoccupation with childhood (at least in print) was very much a middle- and upper-
class affair. Plotz’s main case is that Romanticism is characterised by a higher-class aloofness 
from real social issues combined with an incorrigible idealism. This is no doubt true, but it 
seems excessive to accept Alan Yui’s claim that ‘there are no children in Wordsworth’s poet-
ry’160 or that the Romantics were bereft of any real understanding of childhood. Plotz does, 
however, remind us that the Romantic child is essentially a literary symbol, idealised and col-
oured by class prejudices. This explains why many of MacDonald’s child characters appear to 
hover improbably above their surrounding grime, and is a reminder not to dismiss them sum-
marily without considering their symbolic value. 
2.2 (c) Class, gender, and the child-mind 
The realm of the nursery was female—where even young boys were dressed in petticoats—with 
little connection with the thrusting male world of commerce and empire. Men knew little of this 
sequestered ‘dark heart’ of the home which, as evolutionary theories took hold, was seen as a 
savage place where infant language mirrored that of primeval ‘man’ (or animals), or where 
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(perhaps justifiably) folklore and old wives’ tales held sway over education.161 It was a woman’s 
place—her highest destiny—and therefore she had little need of education, not least because any 
energy diverted to her brain was sure to undermine her reproductive ability.162 Fathers were ad-
vised to foster a sense of veneration in their daughters on the grounds that ‘[t]he intimacy bred 
of taking liberties is a fatal exchange for the deep sense of trustful reverence’. The husband was 
the ‘family’s monarch’ and advised to ‘allow his girls to listen to the conversation without ex-
pecting to be included in it’.163 
Childhood studies dawned in this world of gender and class division, fuelled by strong re-
ligious sentiment. Who was this creature at the heart of the nursery that was riddled with origi-
nal sin or (later in the century) burdened with racial memory, that could speak the language of 
animal and human ancestors, that was at once innocent and irretrievably corrupt? 
It is, perhaps, surprising that childhood studies as a discipline had not developed earlier, 
considering the Romantic obsession with the child,164 nevertheless the Romantics did bequeath 
to the Victorians ideas about the child mind which, as Plotz somewhat predictably opines, were 
entirely misguided. The Romantic obsession with childhood connectedness to nature led to the 
valuing of disconnectedness from adult society. It was considered laudable to shield a child for 
as long as possible from quotidian reality in order to foster a sense of holism. Plotz, however, 
citing the work of twentieth-century Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, argues that this prevents 
the development of a healthy sense of self, observing that ‘Piaget labels as [mental] defects the 
very attributes the Romantics cite as excellences’.165 
Romantic notions of childhood innocence contrasted, in Victorian times, with an obses-
sion with original sin and its later correlate, savage racial memory. The child became an acci-
dent waiting to happen, and mothers, nurses, and tutors were admonished to watch for signs of 
incipient decline. Babies, and even the foetus in utero, were deemed to be susceptible to mad-
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ness,166 the first post-natal sign of which was prattling nonsense and an over-fertile imagination, 
and that uncontrollable malady of passion which was to be early nipped in the bud. John Has-
lam, apothecary to Bethlehem Hospital, who included in his Observations on Madness and 
Melancholy (1809) a chapter on ‘Cases of Insane Children’,167 highlights not only the hereditary 
nature of insanity, but its roots in faulty education—particularly one deficient in morality, here 
defined as failing to subjugate passions— 
which often plant in the youthful mind the seeds of madness which the slightest circumstances 
readily awaken into growth. It should be as much the object of the teachers of youth, to subjugate 
the passions, as to discipline the intellect.168 
While the prevailing view was that childhood make-believe and play (or the even more 
dreadful secret sins of lying and masturbation—sexual ‘precocity’) heralded insanity or even 
death, some had more tolerant views. The Cambridge University Magazine, for example, re-
ports as early as 1841 that ‘the common idea of the imagination is, we believe, far below its true 
elevation’, and traces misconceptions to ‘too slight attentions to the real operations of the mind’, 
and a propensity to divide mental processes artificially. It advises: 
Away with this cold “cutting up” of that glorious unity called MIND; of whose several kinds and 
species of operation are so inseparably linked together, and harmoniously blended.169 
These sentiments presage, as we shall see, later Victorian liberalism. 
Nevertheless, the subjugation of the passions and the discipline of the intellect is a famil-
iar refrain permeating the early Victorian narrative and was the primary goal of education. 
2.2 (d) Mid-century debate and religious education 
By mid-century, secularization and the growing awareness of child psychology were influenc-
ing educational debates. Questions were raised about whether Sunday schools should teach sec-
ular subjects, whether state schools should teach religion, whether children should be forced to 
learn quickly or allowed to ‘flower’ naturally, or, indeed, whether schooling (for the poor) was 
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necessary at all. On the basis that ‘the whole theological world’ was in disarray, in 1875, the 
religiously sceptical Westminster Review questioned the wisdom of ‘enthralling children’s 
minds with the fetters of doubtful doctrine’.170 This polemic against the ‘religionists’, caricatur-
ing educational practices over the previous decades, reveals popular views. 
Anglicanism is targeted by considering E. B. Ramsay’s Manual of Catechetical Instruc-
tion. The methodology is forensic, even inquisitorial, with rote learning seen as the route to 
forming much-needed ‘precise and correct ideas’. Ramsay claims that three of the questions 
‘involve an abstract of the whole theory of Coleridge’s “Aids to Reflection”’.171 Noting that the 
work is aimed at seven- to ten-year-olds, this draws a predictably sarcastic reaction: 
Those who are conversant with this eminently philosophical work will be able to estimate the 
adaptability of the “Manual” to the mental calibre of the young.172 
There is ‘a total disregard of the principles of psychology’, and children are left with ‘the 
impression that salvation depends on correctly remembering words that convey no possible 
meaning’.173 Ramsay, admitting that ‘[i]t must appear as if directed to the head’, nevertheless 
wants to foster ‘tender feeling [in] his young pupils, and to call forth the emotions of the 
heart’,174 but the Review is quick to point out that it is liable to have the opposite effect. Passag-
es concerning guilt and damnation are especially injurious to young girls of a nervous disposi-
tion who are apt to ‘dwell much on anything which might raise a misgiving or an anxiety’. The 
conclusion is: ‘The power of imagination is not sufficiently taken into account in dealing with 
the young.’175 
The negative psychological effects of religious indoctrination on children were a topic of 
current debate. The Review cites a medical report claiming that religious fervour accounted for 
3% of admissions to mental asylums,176 leading to the conclusion that learning half-understood 
statements concerning the awful consequences of disobedience leads to mental breakdown in 
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the young.177 This catechetical approach, however, was more likely to produce boredom and 
frustration than madness. The liberal Unitarian journal The Theological Review notes in passing, 
while discussing Sunday Schools, that: 
Some of those who have come over from orthodoxy […] evidently conceive of religious instruc-
tion as identical with the inculcation of theological dogmas, and associating these with their pain-
ful remembrance of catechisms and creeds, reach a decided conclusion against bringing young 
scholars, at any rate, under any sort of religious training.178 
Many parents, it seems, who had suffered under Ramsay’s Manual, had—for ten years at 
least—simply refused to subject their children to the same ordeal. 
The second example given, however, was more likely to result in madness.179 In Sermons 
for the Very Young (1864), ‘[t]he Deity is habitually represented as an angry judge ready to in-
flict endless, unutterable tortures upon the trembling and despairing sinner’, and psychological 
pressure is used to effect conversion by describing ‘the most horrible scenes [of hell] which cru-
elty and fanaticism could devise’.180 It carries heart-breaking and gruesome tales of God visiting 
vengeance on sinners, such as the residents of Sodom and Gomorrah, where, after retiring one 
night, the unfortunate inhabitants asked: 
What a rumbling sound wakes them from their slumbers? What glare of light breaks into their 
chambers? Whence the fearful cry—the shriek of horror? The wrath of God is upon them. Do they 
repent now of their sins? It is too late.181 
It is preceded by the advice: ‘Think, little child, of the fearful story.’ 
The Review notes that since it is repeatedly stressed that God does not hear the prayers of 
sinners, and that ‘[e]ven when we wish to do right there is something wrong in it’,182 the child is 
left with no option but to consider itself eternally damned.183 It illustrates the theological belief 
that a ‘state of hopeless degradation [is] the normal condition of children’, and results in the de-
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struction of ‘self respect’, ‘a sense of guilt’, and ‘consciousness of an Unseen Power full of an-
ger […] armed with a fearful system of punishment’—all of which act negatively on ‘sympa-
thetic feelings’, ‘higher aspirations’, and ‘the moral tone’.184 
Psychological manipulation of a more ‘hysterical’ nature is exemplified by ‘The Happy 
Child and the Wicked Mother’ in Familiar Talks with the Children (1870), a volume of senti-
mental tales where saintly, weeping children sacrifice their young lives on behalf of reprobate 
parents who, in consequence, weep themselves (mothers) or turn from alcohol (fathers). 
This article, though sarcastic, reveals a continuing felt need (among ‘religionists’) to save 
the child from itself—to deliver it from its essence, its childlikeness, in processes reminiscent of 
exorcism. In all these schemes, childhood is valued for its potential, not for its essence—a nec-
essary evil prior to adulthood. Whether couched in commercial or religious terms, the goal of 
childhood was to escape from it as soon as possible in order to become either a commercial con-
tributor to society (or a fecund mother) or a consenting adult destined for heaven. In the cate-
chetical approach, the goal is for the child to find refuge from itself in the mother Church; the 
child’s imagination is acknowledged but then virtually ignored, the goal being to supplant child-
ish fancy with adult rationality. The last two methods reflect the Evangelical pressure for a ‘de-
cision’—an activity also, ironically, normally reserved for adults. In these cases, the imagina-
tion is engaged, but then abused. The ‘decision’ is to turn away from one’s corrupt nature, to 
renounce oneself. In the words of a mid-century Wesleyan, for example: 
It must be remembered that the fault of human nature is not merely weakness,— it is corruption; 
and that a renewal cannot spring from any change that intellectual cultivation may effect.185 
Moreover, as we are here discussing the education of children, we are reminded that: 
The only armour which is hell-proof is—“It is written.” […] Our wisdom is to wrap the family of 
man as early as possible in that impenetrable mail.186 
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Notwithstanding the child’s immaturity and inherited defects (from Adam, the apes, or 
merely parents), we are reminded, somewhat ominously, that while the law might regard chil-
dren as exculpable minors, God does not: 
[The Bible’s] best promises are made to young people. It tells us of “little ones” who are admitted 
into covenant with the Lord. It details judgements that have been inflicted on children.187 
In contrast, however misguided the Romantics were about the nature of childhood, they 
nevertheless valued it both as a physical state and a social construct. Although Coleridge does 
muse poetically over the sleeping Hartley about what he might become, there is nevertheless a 
celebration of who the baby is. This contrasts with the (especially male) Victorian impatience 
with, and distance from, childhood, an impatience which translated into schools bent on forcing 
their young charges towards premature flowering, ‘hot-houses’ which not only produced early 
flowering and fruiting, but often an early death. The mid-Victorian years were full of debate as 
to whether such practices should be tolerated.188 
In summary, the early- and mid-century consensus among ‘religionists’ was that child-
likeness equated to irrationality, emotional instability driven by a surfeit of passion (especially 
in girls), immorality due to an unregenerate soul (evidenced particularly by the sins of lying and 
masturbation, both especially feared as they were beyond the sphere of adult control),189 and 
unproductiveness (both commercial and sexual) and therefore of little commercial or social val-
ue. In addition, the nonconformist pressure for a ‘decision’ for Christ not only illustrates the 
negative view of childhood itself, but blurs the boundary between childhood and adulthood:190 
not only must children make ‘adult’ moral decisions, they must also suffer the penalties for not 
doing so. 
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Such negative views of childhood, combined with the idea that education should take into 
account God’s pre-ordained social class divisions,191 form the backdrop to MacDonald’s work. 
As we will explore, he firmly challenges the former but has a tendency to idealise the latter. 
2.3 Post Darwin and fin de siècle attitudes to childhood 
The Wesleyan article cited above is a polemical broadside against encroaching secularism pep-
pered with Bible verses flung in anger. It illustrates the vehemence of mid-century debates 
whose temperature was raised even higher when Darwin published Origin. A major front in the 
battle concerned childhood and children, especially their education, reflecting increasing unease 
with the doctrine of original sin and growing awareness of child psychology. 
Judith Plotz’s complaint that Romantic theory had lost touch with reality might well be 
levelled at much of the Victorian discourse about childhood. The polarity and zealousness of 
both the Christian and evolutionist/secularist camps is striking when reading Victorian texts. 
Both sides made strong, often absurd, claims based on scant knowledge of children themselves 
(the theorists on both sides were primarily male who had little cause to visit the nursery). One 
thinks, for example, of Adolf Kussmaul’s unlikely declaration that infants are born deaf,192 or 
Dr Louis Robinson’s experiments which consisted of suspending new-borns from branches as 
evidence of simian ancestry,193 or of George John Romanes’s claim that seven-week-old infants 
have the intelligence of a mollusc.194 It was even suggested that ‘rock a bye baby in the treetops’ 
offered evidence of our ‘arboreal ancestry’.195  
The growing child study movement was also, at first, reluctant to engage in the messy 
business of interacting with real children; there was also a widespread tendency to use fictional 
characters as source material for ‘scientific’ child studies, and to accept decidedly apocryphal 
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accounts of child behaviour at face value. The latter included a widely-disseminated eighteenth 
century account of the ‘insane baby’ that had to be held down by four nurses to prevent it climb-
ing up the nursery walls (evidence of insanity in infants),196 and (as late as 1911) a report in a 
work called Child Nurture claimed that ‘scientific fathers in Germany’ had taken to dropping 
infants from first-floor windows to see if they would land on all fours like a kitten.197 Even the 
otherwise reasonable James Sully seemed to accept the 1779 account of the famous four-year-
old, Christian Heinrich Heineken of Lübeck, as a credible ‘prodigy of learning’: 
Handed over to his tutor whilst still a baby, the infant was said to have mastered the Old Testa-
ment by the age of one, the history of the ancient world, universal geography, and Latin by the age 
of two and a half, and the deeper mysteries of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical history by the 
age of four, by which time his fame had spread across Europe.198 
The use of fictional literary texts to provide case histories was also widespread, leading to 
a symbiotic relationship between scientists and authors with each fuelling the others’ output. It 
is unsurprising that under such conditions strange theories developed, often surrounding the 
paranoia towards sexual ‘precocity’ that inevitably had a negative effect on the lives of children 
and included, for example, Isaac Baker Brown performing clitoridectomies on girls as young at 
ten to cure them of insanity.199 
However misguided, such theorising and practice demonstrates awareness and explora-
tion of this newly-discovered continent called ‘childhood’ embedded in the heart of society. The 
child was a hot topic. 
2.3 (a) Saint, sinner, or savage? 
The eighteenth century Romantic notion of the child mind as a blank slate on whose virgin sur-
face nature writes divine truth created the saintly child: a positive, if naive, construction of 
childhood. The ascendancy of the Puritan emphasis on original sin among Protestant Evangeli-
cals in the nineteenth century created the sinner child, placing a social burden on children, now 
constantly watched by their guardians for signs of incipient sin (or insanity), and drilled by the 
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Catechism, or its nonconformist equivalent, memorising Bible verses. The literary image of the 
sadistic schoolmaster dramatizes the pressure on children. Henry Maudsley, in a chapter entitled 
‘Insanity in Early Life’ in The Physiology and Pathology of Mind (1868)—‘one of the first ac-
counts that placed childhood mental disorders in an evolutionary perspective’200—records the 
imprisonment of a schoolmaster for beating a child to death (in his view an insane child),201 and 
notes occurrences of mania linked to religious fervour: 
A boy of about eleven years of age who came under my care […] moved about restlessly, throw-
ing his arms about and repeating over and over again such expressions as—“The good Lord Je-
sus,” “They put Him on the cross,” “They nailed His hands,” &c: it was impossible to fix his atten-
tion for a moment.202 
Clearly the pressure on real children from this philosophical page-turn was not positive. 
Despite making confident medical pronouncements, Maudsley’s work reveals a more 
ambivalent attitude to the cause of immoral behaviour, as if feeling his way in the uncertain ter-
ritory opened up by Darwin. On the one hand, childhood insanity is caused by original sin or 
demons:203 
To talk about the purity and innocence of a child’s mind is a part of that […] poetical idealism and 
willing hypocrisy by which a man ignores realities […]. By nature sinful above everything, and 
desperately wicked,204 man acquires a knowledge of good through evil.205 
In other words, God will use evil such that humans evolve morally. On the other hand, he 
recognises the role of hereditary and evolutionary factors: the infant has ‘the latent power of an 
actual evolution which no monkey ever has; in it is contained […] the influence of all mankind 
                                                
200 Ibid., p. 181. 
201 Henry Maudsley, The Physiology and Pathology of Mind (London: Macmillan and Co., 1868), pp. 328–29. 
202 Ibid., pp. 313–14. 
203 Quoted is an account, from one ‘Griesinger from Kerner’, of a girl of eleven, a ‘pious Christian child’, who, in ‘a 
deep bass voice […] kept repeating the words, “They are praying for thee.”… On the evening of the 22nd January 
another voice, quite different from the bass one, spoke incessantly while the crisis lasted…now and then interrupted 
by the former bass voice regularly repeating the recitative… What, however, gave a distinctive character to its ex-
pressions was the moral or rather immoral tone of them—pride, arrogance, scorn, and hatred of truth, God, Christ, 
that were declared. The situation was resolved when a voice cried out [from the girl]—“Get thee out of this girl, thou 
unclean spirit”’ (ibid., pp. 317–18). 
204 Jer. 17.9. 




that has gone before’.206 Whether inherited from Adam or the apes, depravity was nevertheless 
seen as the nascent state of the child. 
2.3 (b) Imagination and insanity in childhood 
Mid-century child psychology saw ‘adult sanity [as] dependent on the ruthless control of imagi-
native visions within childhood’.207 Maudsley, Shuttleworth argues, compounded the negative 
views of childhood imagination by associating it with animal savagery. Using Coleridge’s ter-
minology but rejecting his theology, he equates childhood fantasy with animal passions: 
The instincts, appetites, or passions, call them as we may, manifest themselves in unblushing, ex-
treme, and perverted action; the veil of any control which discipline may have fashioned is rent; 
the child is as the animal, and reveals its animal nature with as little shamefacedness as the mon-
key indulges its passions in the face of all the world.208 
Elsewhere Maudsley makes it clear that childish passion is no more than an animal reac-
tion to an external stimulus: 
Children and savages best exhibit in a naked simplicity the different passions that result from the 
affectation of self by what, when painful, is deemed an ill; when pleasurable, a good.209 
The terms ‘unblushing’, ‘indulging passions in the face of all the world’, and ‘naked sim-
plicity’ clearly reinforce the association of sexual curiosity with mental disease (apparently ig-
noring the fact that young children have very little interest in sexuality). There is also the blur-
ring of the boundary between normal and pathological childlike behaviour: Maudsley appears to 
equate normal childhood—certainly infancy—with insanity. Some thirty years later, Havelock 
Ellis suggested that criminals were those trapped in a savage evolutionary stage by arrested de-
velopment: in a case of guilt by association, children were now viewed (at least potentially) as 
insane and criminal. Shuttleworth remarks that: 
Ellis, building on these theories, argued that moral insanity in the child, exhibited through eccen-
tricity, lying, bad sexual habits, and cruelty to animals, was the first stage of ‘instinctive criminali-
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ty’. As for Maudsley, children were closer to the animal or savage state than adults, and the insane 
child even more so.210 
Charles West (founder of Great Ormond Street Children’s Hospital) offered a more be-
nign view of childhood imagination. Noting the terror experienced by children facing death that 
had been over-zealously catechised or evangelised, he sympathises with their emotional turmoil: 
the dark grave is realised, or, at least, imagined more vividly than its conqueror; and the little child 
[is] driven to look within for the evil which it does not know, and cannot find, but vaguely dreads, 
and would be sorry for if it knew it.211 
Undeveloped reasoning powers in a child, he argues, lead to ‘exaggerated […] perceptive 
faculties [and] a vividness of […] imagination’. Because of this, ‘the griefs of childhood may 
be, in proportion to the child’s power of bearing them, as overwhelming as those which break 
the strong man down’, 212 leading to a plea for compassion: 
These facts deserve special attention; they prove how much more the susceptibility and sensitive-
ness of children need to be taken into consideration than is commonly done. This keenness of the 
emotions in children displays itself in other ways, and has constantly to be borne in mind in our 
management of them.213 
West closes his lecture by suggesting that the only thing which offers any hope for the 
suffering child is that Jesus welcomed children into his arms despite their not having learned the 
Creed. 
West’s criticism as a Catholic of what we would now call fundamentalist Christianity, his 
Romantic leanings, his qualified acceptance of Darwinism while insisting on ‘a perfection to be 
attained not here, but higher,’214 represents a liberal middle road which contrasts with the polar-
ised views we have discussed. Of note is the rejection of inherent depravity in childhood, how-
ever caused, replacing this with a more nuanced understanding of the causes and power of 
childhood passions, underscored by a belief in a benevolent God. 
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2.4 The nineteenth century child 
We have considered the Victorian child as a social construct, a literary device, and a theological 
metaphor. None may directly bear on the biological and psychological state we call childhood, 
but all contribute to a theological anthropology and, inasmuch as the child bears the imago Dei, 
in some measure touch on views regarding God’s nature. Protestant Evangelicalism, however, 
tended to focus on the distortion, even obliteration, of that imago. The focus on original sin and 
the corresponding development of a religious ‘forcing apparatus’ to drive this out of the child is, 
in some measure, a denial of the humanity of the child. It says that the child is something ‘other’ 
which, without intervention, will grow into something sub-human. 
A contrast has emerged between Romantic views of a benign nature nurturing the inno-
cent child-mind and Puritan ideas disdainful of such optimism. However, it must be noted that 
these two opposing ideologies were always present: ‘Most scholars agree that Evangelical ide-
ology held firmer sway in the early years of the century while the romantic gradually gained 
influence, yet both existed at the same time to varying degrees.’215 In the next chapter we will 
consider more closely the Victorian theology of childhood and MacDonald’s particular contri-
bution to the debate. 
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Chapter 3 George MacDonald’s contribution to childhood 
3.1 The metaphysical child 
The tension between Victorian secularists and ‘religionists’ concerned beliefs rather than meth-
odology. Although beginning from different starting points—the former, a new, secular reading 
of the book of nature, the latter, a traditional, ‘scientific’, reading of the Book—both claimed to 
be ‘scientific’. In contrast, it is ironic that in the growing field of child studies, much of the de-
bate took place in the literary realm—that of speculative imagination. Sally Shuttleworth insists 
that this was the major forum where social (and many theological) ideas were developed and 
where the figure of the child was central.216 John Pennington and Jean Webb point to the realist 
novel as being the literary expression of positivism, and that fantasy novels such as Lewis Car-
roll’s Alice or MacDonald’s North Wind expressed a mid-century return to metaphysics.217 For 
Pennington, it is ‘a reaction against literary trends and conventions, and metafictionists often 
undercut and parody these conventions to suggest that our sense of “reality” is tenuous’.218 This 
certainly characterises MacDonald’s work: he regularly challenges convention, particularly so 
in tales such as North Wind, a novel that invites the reader to explore the world through the eyes 
of a child. 
Colin Manlove, earlier in his career, saw MacDonald’s fantasy writing in negative terms 
as a ‘self-protecting silencing of his intellect’; later, however, he concedes that it is an attempt to 
demonstrate that God is beyond rational, theological systems, and that ‘MacDonald believed 
that Christianity had much more to do with lived than proved truths’.219 This is no doubt true, 
but is MacDonald therefore guilty of being anti-intellectual? Is the child protagonist of North 
Wind, for example, too good to be true? Or do we side with him when he remarks that nothing 
can be too good to be true? 
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“There are very few things good enough to be true,” said Diamond; “but I hope this is. Too good 
to be true it can’t be. Isn’t true good? and isn’t good good? And how, then, can anything be too 
good to be true?”220 
With these issues in mind, we close this chapter by exploring North Wind in relation to 
childhood and metaphysics (especially since the protagonist is described as ‘a true child in this, 
that he was given to metaphysics’),221 but first we consider more closely the debate surrounding 
childhood innocence and evil. 
3.2 MacDonald’s vision of the innocent child 
A preoccupation with original sin, rather than the imago Dei (original blessing), distinguished 
‘harder’ Evangelicals from their more flexible counterparts; however, this was not confined to 
Evangelicalism. Here we consider how high churchman H. E. Manning (later Cardinal of 
Westminster) made the doctrine of sin central to his theology, and how MacDonald responded. 
Manning represents the high moral tone of Tractarianism, which considered itself ineffectual if 
not offensive to the morally corrupt and complacent general public.222 
We consider Manning’s 1848 sermon, ‘The Sins That Follow Us’. Taking as his text 1 
Timothy 5.24 (‘Some men’s sins are open beforehand, before going to judgement; and some 
men they follow after’), the Archdeacon discusses blatant sinners ‘who stand in the face of the 
Church, and in the sight of God, self-accused’, but is more concerned with secret sins which 
will only be exposed on the day of judgement. Noting briefly that the context concerns ‘the high 
and dangerous work of ordaining pastors for the flock of Christ’, he nevertheless insists that ‘we 
need not dwell on context’ on the grounds that the words ‘enunciate a great law in God’s king-
dom, and describe an awful fact in the administration of His perfect justice’.223 In other words, 
there is a universal, inescapable, application. 
Manning emphasises that we may be unconscious of the ‘sins that follow us’, that these 
may well have been committed in childhood, and that such is the unconscious ‘state of thou-
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sands’.224 We are reminded that we may forget the life-long accumulation of sins that we draw 
in our wake, but God does not: ‘our forgetfulness [cannot] blot the book of His remem-
brance’;225 childhood sins will come back to haunt us: 
As the sins of the fathers upon the children, so the sins of childhood on youth, and youth on after 
years. How little did we know what we were laying up for ourselves. How little did we think at 
that day, in the hour of our transgression: This will find me out when I am in middle life, or in my 
old age; though it tarry never so long, it will come at last.226 
Furthermore, sin ‘[w]hen at its worst […] is the least perceived’, and most of it relates to 
‘the indulgence of particular sins in youth or childhood’. It is a theme constantly repeated: ‘Our 
early sins of wilfulness, irreverence, self-worship, have followed us’; our present infirmities are 
due to ‘the sins of our past life, following us in chastisement’; and on judgement day, ‘Sins [one 
has] forgotten as never truly to repent of, shall be then gathered in array.’227 
Unfortunately, the only solution offered for this unconscious alliance with evil is the ox-
ymoronic concept of conscious repentance. It begs the inevitable question posed at the end of 
the sermon: having done one’s best to repent, Manning asks, ‘Are you so sure that you do re-
pent?’ If you answer in the affirmative: 
then you have one great reason to mistrust yourself; I mean, because you are so sure. If you were 
less satisfied, you might be surer; because you are so sure, you have the most reason for misgiv-
ing.228 
It is a message at the core of which is doubt which can never lead to assurance of for-
giveness. Doubt, as we will explore, is also central to North Wind: the difference here is that sin 
is the theological foundation and focus. The justice of God is not only untempered by love, but 
love is missing. MacDonald describes this as ‘undivine’, that is, pagan:229 
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a theology which would explain all God’s doings by low conceptions, low I mean for humanity 
even, of right, and law, and justice, then only taking refuge in the fact of the incapacity of the hu-
man understanding when its own inventions are impugned as undivine.230 
In such religious schemes, he argues, ‘hell is invariably the deepest truth, and the love of 
God is not so deep as hell. Hence, as foundations must be laid in the deepest, the system is 
founded in hell.’ It is a theology which has negative consequences for a child’s self-
understanding. MacDonald explores this through the young hero of Robert Falconer (often con-
sidered MacDonald’s most faithful self-portrait):231 
[T]he first article in the creed that Robert Falconer learned was, “I believe in hell.” Practically, I 
mean, it was so; else how should it be that as often as a thought of religious duty arose in his mind, 
it appeared in the form of escaping hell, of fleeing from the wrath to come? For his very nature 
was hell, being not born in sin and brought forth in iniquity, but born sin and brought forth iniqui-
ty.232 
In contrast, MacDonald advocates a theology based on F. D. Maurice’s ‘abyss of love’. 
While accepting that ‘there is an abyss of Death, into which I may sink, and be lost,’ Maurice 
had insisted that: 
Christ’s Gospel reveals an abyss of Love, below that; I am content to be lost in that. I know no 
more, but I am sure that there is a woe on us if we do not preach this Gospel, if we do not proclaim 
the name of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit,—the Eternal Charity.233  
MacDonald, similarly, argues that the deepest in God is not power, ‘for power could not 
make him what we mean when we say God’, but love: ‘In one word, God is Love. Love is the 
deepest depth, the essence of his nature, at the root of all his being.’234 Furthermore, the child, 
carrying the image of the God of love, is the beneficiary of ‘original blessing’ and expresses 
‘the deepest heart of humanity’, the divine heart. The marriage of these two ‘depths’ is a rejec-
tion of the doctrine of original sin. For just as Jesus received the ‘child in the midst’: 
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when we receive the child in the name of Christ, the very childhood that we receive to our arms is 
humanity. We love its humanity in its childhood, for childhood is the deepest heart of humanity—
its divine heart; and so in the name of the child we receive all humanity. Therefore, although the 
lesson is not about humanity, but about childhood, it returns upon our race, and we receive our 
race with wider arms and deeper heart.235 
There is a fusion here of the divine and human centred on childhood, that is, the presence 
of the ‘child-God’ resides in ‘the deepest heart of humanity’. The child, embodying the imago 
Dei as well as the imago hominis, rather than being a barrier to God and cursed with original sin 
becomes a gateway to God and a mediator of God’s presence. It is this that MacDonald explores 
in North Wind.  
3.3 A reading of At the Back of the North Wind 
In At the Back of the North Wind, as in many of his narratives, MacDonald places such an inno-
cent child—here Diamond, an androgynous, fragile, prepubescent boy—in an ambiguous world, 
ambiguous as both benign and hostile. ‘Mother nature’, the nurturing robe of God that is also 
red in tooth and claw, is played by a personified North Wind, who one moment gently caresses 
a flower, the next, sinks a ship. Diamond, in his innocence—that is, sinlessness and faith—
simply accepts her for who she is. When, for example, North Wind warns him to trust her even 
if she should appear in hideous guises such as a bat, a serpent, or a tiger, she asks: ‘Do you un-
derstand?’ He simply replies: ‘Quite well’.236 This ‘insane’ naive trust is interpreted by others as 
just that:237 he has a ‘tile loose’, is nicknamed ‘God’s baby’, and admits himself that he ‘never 
can tell what they call clever from what they call silly’.238 MacDonald’s thesis in North Wind is 
expressed by Diamond’s benefactor, a Mr Raymond: ‘I suspect the child’s a genius […] and 
that’s what makes people think him silly.’239 The genius of true faith, it is proposed, looks like 
madness to those who claim sanity.  
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Published shortly after The Imagination: Its Function and Culture, North Wind illustrates 
that essay’s theology.240 Central is the idea that imagination is the bridge to a transcendent realm 
which defies ‘logic’. It explores the ‘thin door’241 between this world and the next, but rather 
than being adjacent realities, MacDonald is exploring an ontology of intersection—the entwin-
ing of ‘fairyland’ with the grim realities of London. The narrative explores childhood death, 
gender, sexuality, class, education, and social deprivation through the eyes of a child. In light of 
issues highlighted above, it deserves close reading.  
Death is the focus. (MacDonald allows no other reading: Herodotus and Dante are refer-
enced, and at the close of the novel, Diamond dies and goes to the ‘back of the north wind’.)242 
There is, however, no grim reaper; instead, nature herself plays the angel of death. North Wind 
is a shape-shifting feminine being who to those who are ‘good’ appears as a beautiful woman, 
but may incarnate herself as a wolf to the morally depraved;243 a being of immense power but 
nevertheless benign. 
Despite her transcendent role, North Wind is not omniscient. Her work is choreographed 
by an unseen higher power whose song, she says, originates ‘outside this air in which I make 
such a storm’, whose promptings she must obey, but who remains mysterious: 
I am always hearing, through every noise, through all the noise I am making myself even, the 
sound of a far-off song. I do not exactly know where it is, or what it means.244 
Likewise, she is unable to account for her actions: ‘I have to do ten thousand things with-
out being able to tell how’:245 God may be in nature but remains hidden. She, like human mem-
bers of the cast, is mystified by evil and catastrophe. When Diamond asks her, on sinking the 
ship, how such an event is good for those drowned, she points to universal eschatological reso-
lution: 
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“Somehow, I can’t say how, it [the song] tells me that all is right; that it is coming to swallow up 
all cries […]. It wouldn’t be the song it seems to be if it did not swallow up all their fear and pain 
too, and set them singing it themselves with the rest. I am sure it will.”246 
Although she is the doorway to the afterlife (Diamond must walk through her body to ac-
cess the land behind her), she is not permitted to enter it: the north wind, MacDonald reminds 
us, can only blow southwards; death has no place in eternity. 
3.3 (a) Methodology and style 
While North Wind may be appreciated by children as a good yarn, MacDonald has clearly in-
vested effort in a multi-layered narrative, a strong theme of which is doubt.247 Unlike the doubt 
of H. E. Manning, which short-circuits faith, for MacDonald, doubt is the soil in which faith 
grows: 
A man may be haunted with doubts, and only grow thereby in faith. Doubts are the messengers of 
the Living One to rouse the honest. They are the first knock at our door of things that are not yet, 
but have to be, understood; and theirs in general is the inhospitable reception of angels that do not 
come in their own likeness. Doubt must precede every deeper assurance; for uncertainties are what 
we first see when we look into a region hitherto unknown, unexplored, unannexed.248 
God, he argues, would rather have honest doubt that dishonest faith: 
But God is assuredly pleased with those who will neither lie for him, quench their dim vision of 
himself, nor count that his mind which they would despise in a man of his making.249 
So instead of triumphant theological certainty (MacDonald holds the view that ‘the more 
ignorant a man is, the more capable is he of being absolutely certain of many things—with such 
certainty, that is, as consists in the absence of doubt’)250 this narrative embodies ambiguity and 
uncertainty. We are forced to question notions of reality: boundaries are consistently blurred 
leaving the reader disorientated—forced, in fact, to exercise imagination; to find meaning in a 
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narrative that defies logic. MacDonald deliberately leaves questions unanswered and loose ends 
untied: the reader must exercise faith. 
In a literary world where God and his priests were inevitably male, North Wind, a decid-
edly female figure, is God’s prime agent in the narrative. In contrast to stereotypical female 
tropes such as the meek Victorian housewife, she is not only a being of immense power, but a 
powerfully erotic figure who frequently presses Diamond to her ‘bosom’, an eroticism rein-
forced by the sensuous woodcuts of Arthur Hughes (Figure 1). Then there is Diamond him-
self—is he simply trusting and naive, or is he insane? 
       
Fig. 1: Illustrations from At The Back of the North Wind by Arthur Hughes 251 
The first and last sentences of the book underline this uncertainty. It opens with ‘I have 
been asked to tell you about the back of the north wind,’ but—as Colin Manlove remarks—it 
leaves us wondering who is doing the asking.252 
Childhood death was a vexing contemporary issue. It is conceivable that North Wind was 
a response to a Christmas gift book, Home Thoughts and Home Scenes (1865), one scene of 
which concerns the imminent death of a child. If not a specific response to this book, it is cer-
tainly informed by the sentiments expressed. Illustrated by the picture of a mother cradling a 
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dying toddler, surrounded by anxious children and an impotent doctor, the accompanying poem 
reads: 
 How trembling the children gather round, | Startled out of sleep, and scared and crying! 
 ‘Is our merry little sister dying? | Will they come and put her underground 
 As they did poor baby on that May day? | Or will shining angels stoop and take her 
 On their snow-white wings to heaven, and make her | Sit among the stars, as fair as they? 
 ‘But she’ll have no mother there to kiss! | We are sorely frightened’, say the children 
 ‘Thinking of this death, so strange bewildering: | Tell us, only tell us what death is?’253 
So who is the narrator? He is certainly not the standard omniscient narrator of fiction: he 
often ponders himself what certain things could mean, and claims ignorance of others, and yet at 
the same time narrates scenes which can only be the fruit of omniscience. Towards the end of 
the tale he confesses to having befriended Diamond and persuaded him to tell him about the 
back of the north wind. Perhaps Diamond is real? 
When Diamond finally succumbs to death—an event full of ambiguity since he has prac-
tically invited it by leaving windows open so that North Wind can visit him—he is found lying 
white and cold in his room. The closing sentences of the narrator are: 
I walked up the winding stair, and entered his room. A lovely figure, as white and almost as clear 
as alabaster, was lying on the bed. I saw at once how it was. They thought he was dead. I knew 
that he had gone to the back of the north wind.254 
The choice of the word ‘alabaster’ which is ‘almost clear’ is reminiscent of the broken 
box of perfume poured over the feet of Jesus: Diamond’s life has been poured out, not only to 
save his friends, but as an oblation offered to the unseen eternal power behind North Wind’s 
actions. Is he really dead? Or alive somewhere else? The narrator may be confident—‘I saw at 
once how it was’—but the reader is left feeling unsure, wondering instead whether to side with 
those who ‘thought he was dead’. 
Ambiguity is reinforced in the way the fictional real world merges with fantasy. Early in 
the narrative, Diamond is whisked from his bed by North Wind, now at her most powerful, and 
swept across the skies of London. Having blown tiles from the roof above his bed, she ‘lifted 
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him from the roof—up—up into her bosom, and held him there’,255 later winding him in her hair 
for safety. From this vantage point he watches as with her ‘great besom’ she sweeps filth from 
the city, the wind howling down streets and alleyways. The scene again destabilises reality as 
the apparent movement of the streets below is set against the stasis experienced by Diamond. 
Until this point the reader assumes Diamond is dreaming, but abruptly, at his request, North 
Wind sets him down to help a poor crossing-sweeper, Nanny, struggling with her own little be-
som in the rising wind. Diamond eventually has to find his own way home on foot. In another 
scene, Diamond hears two horses having a conversation, one of which claims to be an angel, all 
of which leaves the reader questioning the nature of reality. 
We encounter dream narratives (from Nanny and Diamond) which include dreams within 
dreams and stories within the story: one chapter is devoted to the tale told by a philanthropist 
visiting the children’s hospital, and extended nursery rhymes also provide nested narratives. The 
reader is left bewildered. It has been suggested that this disorientation is because MacDonald 
has over-padded his narrative at the expenses of plot focus,256 but equally it might be read as a 
further destabilising device.257 Is peripheral material as peripheral as it seems? MacDonald is 
saying—‘you, the reader, must decide what is real, what is important’. John Pennington summa-
rises: 
Thus MacDonald creates a highly original and complex work that challenges the reader’s narrative 
assumptions, breaks them, and provides the reader with a higher reality—death—which becomes, 
ironically, peaceful and beautiful.258 
North Wind is conspicuously absent from the middle third of the book as Diamond is por-
trayed as one living by faith fuelled by his earlier experiences. He is clearly capable of logical 
thought, taking very practical steps to provide for the family during his father’s illness, as well 
as rescuing Nanny from almost certain death in the slums. His pragmatic decisions are rational, 
and yet at times his reaction to external forces (such as indifference to name-calling)259 are 
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clearly irrational and not ‘normal’, at which point the narrator repeats the refrain: ‘we must not 
forget that he had been to the back of the north wind’. But had he? If his dream-like visit to the 
back of the north wind early in the narrative is indeed real, then how did he return from death? 
Names are also significant. Manlove notes that alchemical symbolism is woven into the 
tale: that the colours black, red, and white—representing the stages of alchemical transformation 
from base to higher substances—are used to underscore a broad narrative of the power of imag-
ination to transform. Thus Diamond’s father first serves a Mr and Mrs Coleman, and black 
storms fill the London sky paralleling the filth of the streets; then there is the enigmatic angel-
horse named Ruby, and the loan of a ruby ring to Nanny while she is recovering in hospital—
both red, and each representing catalytic materials triggering transformation; and finally Dia-
mond’s white face and his alabaster, semi-translucent end indicate translation to a higher plane 
of existence, a fulfilment of the quest for the Philosopher’s Stone, embodying the prophetic sig-
nificance of his name. Manlove suggests that such alchemical symbolism forces us to look be-
low the ‘surface’ of London to its deeper and more ancient (and more corrupt) roots; that even 
the ‘obvious’ appearance of reality is deceptive.260 
Diamond’s name is significant. Although ostensibly simply named after his father’s fa-
vourite horse, old Diamond,261 this random act is woven into Diamond’s divinely-ordained des-
tiny. He is not only pure white, unchangeable, and immutable despite forces ranged against him, 
but he reflects and refracts eternal light in a dark Victorian town; he is Dia-mond—a citizen of 
both earth and heaven262—and ultimately his light is entirely dependent on its divine source: as 
his earthly life wanes, his face is repeatedly described as white, until on his deathbed he is trans-
lucent alabaster. The implication is that his true nature is only fully realised after death which, in 
MacDonald’s theology, involves being embraced, subsumed, by the fire of God, a positive ex-
perience only for those whose hearts are diamond-pure and transparent: 
The man who loves God, and is not yet pure, courts the burning of God. 
[…] 
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The man whose deeds are evil, fears the burning. But the burning will not come the less that he 
fears it or denies it.263 
The philanthropist who visits the children in hospital and later secures the future of Nan-
ny and Diamond and his family is Mr Raymond—‘light of the world’—though his light is sus-
pect.264 He appears to derive pleasure from testing Diamond’s father to see if he is worthy of 
being lifted from poverty and provided with a position (a test which involves having to care for 
a second horse, Ruby, which turns out to be entirely unsuitable as a cab horse, and is later re-
vealed to be an angel), and is himself incapacitated by illness for a while, revealing that his life, 
too, is being choreographed from elsewhere. He has, however, a certain smugness in the power 
that wealth brings; he may visit the children’s hospital, but most of his time is spent making 
money writing books for children and living comfortably in a fine house. Here again MacDon-
ald introduces doubt: does Mr Raymond know that his horse is lazy and, moreover, an angel? Is 
he blind to the true nature of poverty? Is his philanthropy more about him than the poor of Lon-
don?265 He may be the ‘light of the world,’ but which world? 
This brief overview reveals a multi-layered text aimed as much at those who read to chil-
dren as children themselves. Multiple readings have been offered,266 and are encouraged: ‘If [the 
reader] be a true man, he will imagine true things: what matter whether I meant them or not?’ 
As the truly artistic work employs God-given images, the author ‘cannot help his words and 
figures falling into such combinations in the mind of another as he had himself not foreseen’.267 
That said, we focus here on Diamond as the embodiment of MacDonald’s theology of childlike-
ness.  
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3.3 (b) Interwoven worlds—the fictive setting 
Being the son of a poor coachman, Diamond lives in the stables, and his bedroom is the hayloft 
immediately above his namesake. The two social worlds—the upper and lower classes—live in 
separate spheres, but Diamond, with his angelic face and character, is permitted on occasions to 
visit the house of Mr Coleman, his father’s employer, or play in the garden: in this earthly 
realm, innocent Diamond connects these class spheres, prevenient to his role as bridge between 
the natural and supernatural realms. 
The ‘thin door’268 between Diamond and death is the decaying wall of the stable: 
He had not the least idea that the wind got in at a chink in the wall, and blew about him all night. 
For the back of his bed was only of boards an inch thick, and on the other side of them was the 
north wind […] in many places they were more like tinder than timber.269 
As illustrated in Lilith, MacDonald is suggesting that what we consider to be a robust, 
hermetically-sealed, safe quotidian reality is located within the wider reality of God’s ‘danger-
ous’ presence, and that, although unaware of it, the wind of God’s Spirit gets in through chinks 
in what amount to very flimsy walls, and ‘blows about us all night’. The image of Diamond’s 
vulnerability in a cold world presages his death—the fate of 20,000 children in London annual-
ly270—the direct result of the coldness (that is, sin) of his father’s employer, the ‘black’ (un-
transformed) Mr Coleman who is indifferent to Diamond’s welfare, ignoring the need to repair 
the coach house, forcing his mother to paste paper over the holes.271 
The narrative challenges our notions of what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’. Diamond, 
surrounded by bales of hay (the image of a very temporary shelter, a manger housing this young 
saviour whose father’s name is also Joseph)272 thinks he is inside, but soon he hears North Wind 
whispering on the other side of the thin partition accusing the boy of blocking up her window, a 
knot-hole in the wood, with straw. 
“What window?” asked Diamond.  
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“You stuffed hay into it three times last night. I had to blow it out again three times.”  
“You can’t mean this little hole! It isn’t a window; it’s a hole in my bed.”  
“I did not say it was a window: I said it was my window.”  
“But it can’t be a window, because windows are holes to see out of.”  
“Well, that’s just what I made this window for.”  
“But you are outside: you can’t want a window.”  
“You are quite mistaken. Windows are to see out of, you say. Well, I’m in my house, and I want 
windows to see out of it.”273 
For MacDonald, ‘nature’ (played by North Wind) is closer to the centre of reality than 
our temporary shelters; resonances with the Incarnation reinforce this reading. MacDonald con-
ceives of reality in terms of concentric circles, placing the fire of God at the centre, the land at 
the back of the north wind as a purgatorial foyer, death as the doorway to that realm, and the 
‘real’ Victorian world as located nearer the outer skirt of God’s presence—a dangerous realm 
where the gravitational pull of God is almost matched by that of evil, where God’s presence is 
experienced as a Behmenist dark fire, and where human choice determines trajectory. He 
speaks, for example, of the repentant soul’s journey towards the embrace of God, which contin-
ues— 
until at length the glory of our existence flashes upon us, we face full to the sun that enlightens 
what it sent forth, and know ourselves alive with an infinite life, even the life of the Father; know 
that our existence is not the moonlight of a mere consciousness of being, but the sun-glory of a life 
justified by having become one with its origin, thinking and feeling with the primal Sun of life, 
from whom it was dropped away that it might know and bethink itself, and return to circle for ever 
in exultant harmony around him. Then indeed we are; then indeed we have life; the life of Jesus 
has, through light, become life in us; the glory of God in the face of Jesus, mirrored in our hearts, 
has made us alive; we are one with God for ever and ever.274 
Meanwhile, this liminal outer circle of quotidian reality is punctured by ‘windows’ which 
allow access for divine agents and for the ‘sun-glory’ of God himself to enter human history. 
This text suggests that one of those windows is a child. 
We note again the ambivalence towards death. Just as Diamond’s death borders on sui-
cide, here at the beginning of the novel there is parallel uncertainty. At bedtime, Diamond runs 
to his hayloft, but before climbing into bed, 
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he would creep into the heart of the hay, and lie there thinking how cold it was outside in the wind, 
and how warm it was inside there in his bed, and how he could go to it when he pleased, only he 
wouldn’t just yet; he would get a little colder first.275 
This thin, poorly-clad child appears to be inviting death, a conclusion reinforced when he 
deliberately opens holes in his thin wall so that the cold North Wind can enter. If death is indeed 
the doorway to a better realm, MacDonald is asking, why do we not desire it? 
After Diamond’s visit to the back of the north wind, he becomes a divine agent, signifi-
cantly more effective at bringing about social change than Mr Raymond. He appears impervious 
to evil, which now has no purchase on his saintly soul (he has ‘died, and his life is hid in 
Christ’).276 While Mr Raymond tells stories to children in hospital but still lives in a fine house, 
Diamond is embedded in working-class squalor overcoming darkness with light. The light is not 
‘up there’ in a Platonic spiritual realm, but embedded in quotidian reality; however, the primary 
way that this divine light shines is through the window of a diamond-child. 
We have, then, a fluid narrative with blurred boundaries, questioning notions of reality 
and challenging conventional stereotypes: against this fluid background, Diamond provides the 
focal point. The text is thus a reverse Bildungsroman: rather than the protagonist changing and 
maturing through exposure to life experiences, Diamond is a figure of stasis who dies in the 
same childhood state as in chapter one. He not only represents but mediates God’s ‘unmoving’ 
fire at the centre of reality. As in the narrative of Sir Gibbie, which we consider later, the action 
circles around him; it is others who change. We now consider specific theological implications 
of this text with particular reference to the child at its centre. 
3.3 (c) Good death 
First, there is a rejection of the traditional religious focus on inherent sin leading to harsh 
judgement. On meeting the ‘angel of death’ for the first time, Diamond ‘was not yet frightened, 
for he had not yet learned to be’:277 innocence, not depravity, is the natural state of an uneducat-
ed (‘uncultured’) child, furthermore, fear of death is a false childhood emotion that has to be 
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‘learned’—it is both rational, that is, false because unimaginative, and irrational since it is 
based on false premises. Fear of death comes from a refusal to embrace it. Early in the narrative, 
‘death’ holds out her arms to the child: 
“Will you go with me now, you little Diamond? I am sorry I was forced to be so rough with you,” 
said the lady. 
“I will; yes, I will,” answered Diamond, holding out his arms. 
But this intuitive embrace is checked by a rational thought: Diamond suddenly realises he 
is only wearing his nightgown. North Wind consoles him: 
“Oh, never mind your clothes. You will not be cold. Nobody is cold with the North Wind.” 
“I thought everybody was,” said Diamond.278 
This is a direct challenge to the theology that led to the death-bed angst of children.279 
North Wind, she observes, is known by many names which hide her true nature: ‘Evil Chance, 
sometimes Ruin; and they have another name […] which they think the most dreadful of all’,280 
but death should not be thought of as cold: 
“That is a great mistake. Most people make it, however. They are cold because they are not with 
the North Wind, but without it.”281 
MacDonald stresses that the boy never feels the cold when he is travelling with her: held 
to her breast or wrapped in her hair, he is travelling at her speed, embracing her agenda; the 
wind is felt only when resisted. Clothes which keep out the cold are symbolic—as is the thin 
stable wall—of human denial of death and false comfort in material things:282 the coldness is 
felt only by those who are ‘not with the North Wind, but without it’, and is an adult, learned 
response to death: 
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If Diamond had been a little older, and had supposed himself a good deal wiser, he would have 
thought the lady was joking. But he was not older, and did not fancy himself wiser, and therefore 
understood her well enough. Again he stretched out his arms.283 
The trusting embrace and intuitive understanding of this child with a prophetic name is 
contrasted with the attitude of a preacher who visits the family. The ‘man […] was finding fault 
with [Diamond’s] name’ on the grounds that it was unbiblical. This half-recalled scene from 
Diamond’s early years was a confrontation in which, Diamond remembers, North Wind played 
a role:  
“And the wind—you, ma’am—came in, and blew the bible out of the man’s hands, and the leaves 
went all flutter flutter on the floor, and my mother picked it up and gave it back to him open and 
there—” 
“Was your name in the bible,—the sixth stone in the high-priest’s breastplate.”284 
Aaron’s priestly attire draws attention to Diamond’s priestly role, one lost on the religious 
visitor, and Diamond’s embrace of death (he is never cold because ‘nobody is cold with the 
North Wind’) implies a deeper, intuitive understanding of biblical injunctions to lay down one’s 
life in contrast with the visiting preacher’s preoccupation with biblical formalities which blind 
him to intuitive truth. 
3.3 (d) Childlike imagination and obedience 
The primary childlike values illustrated here are imagination and obedience. Diamond’s practi-
cal, rational action is always imaginative, a response that is never simply driven by expediency 
or convention. When his father is ill, for example, and unable to drive the cab, Diamond looks 
after his baby sister. Although it is a while since North Wind has appeared in person (the impli-
cation being that he is physically healthy) Diamond’s faith in her remains: he amuses the baby 
by singing it a song which he claims ‘baby and I learned out of North Wind’s book’.285 The ref-
erence is to a book that he and his mother had found lying on a beach, a mysterious book left 
there by North Wind with its leaves fluttering in the breeze, containing rambling poems which 
made no sense to his mother, who simply ‘thought it might amuse him, though […] couldn’t 
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find any sense in it’ (rationally meaningless), but which Diamond intuitively understands (imag-
inatively perceived).286 He claims the poems remind him of the land at the back of the North 
Wind, at which point his ‘mother was frightened, for she thought the fever was coming on 
again’.287 The books—the dropped Bible and North Wind’s mysterious volume—imply that 
both the scriptures and nature may only be read truly when their leaves are fluttered by imagina-
tive spiritual discernment—the wind of the Spirit that ‘blows where it will’.288 
So here, in the squalid London lodging, Diamond recites a long poem (‘for he had a won-
derful memory’)289 about the early bird which catches a worm. The next morning, the diminu-
tive child somehow manages to harness old Diamond and make a significant amount of money 
driving (without permission) his father’s cab. The message is that rational action (in this case 
somewhat dangerous and naive) is ‘sensible’—it requires imaginative understanding of North 
Wind’s will, a will that is ‘hidden […] from the wise and prudent’ and ‘revealed […] to 
babes’.290 
In these middle chapters, as Diamond responds to his family’s declining health and 
wealth, he repeatedly takes risks: he drives the cab to a remote and dangerous area of London 
where he is surrounded by a street gang; he walks alone into the dangerous slum to rescue Nan-
ny, despite being warned off by a policeman; intervenes in a case of domestic abuse, and so on. 
In each case the reader is tempted to side with those who consider him insane, and yet in every 
case he experiences miraculous preservation and makes a positive impact on his world. This is 
in marked contrast to those such as Mr Coleman who is financially ruined when North Wind 
sinks the ship in which he had unwisely invested all his capital. 
Diamond, the perfect child, is imaginative and obedient with a trust that precedes or over-
rides risk-assessment. His actions are illogical, naive and unwise, but MacDonald insists that 
North Wind (God) protects those who thus trust her. He is dramatizing Paul’s claim that ‘the 
foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men’, and that 
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‘the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God’; and, as illustrated by the financial ruin of 
Mr Coleman, that ‘He catches the wise in their own craftiness.’291 But is this merely a naive op-
timism? (MacDonald would have been aware of child mortality rates in the growing industrial 
towns, and was predeceased by five of his own children.) Certainly here, as elsewhere, God’s 
perfect protection of the perfect child is implied, but I suggest that primarily MacDonald is ask-
ing: If death is essentially benign, why do we fear it? Is it not better to take risks and die than 
‘save your life and lose it’?292 As he remarks elsewhere: 
Happy he who, as his sun is going down behind the western, is himself ascending the eastern hill, 
returning through old age to the second and better childhood which shall not be taken from him. 
For he who turns his back on the setting sun goes to meet the rising sun; and he who loses his life 
shall find it.293 
The message is that the transcendent realm, and the will of God, can only be perceived 
imaginatively since it lies beyond the world of convention; that only those with a childlike, 
trusting heart, who choose to walk in obedience despite the checks of rationality, have the privi-
lege of walking without fear through the door of death. This message is reinforced as the narra-
tive draws to a close. We find Nanny and her friend Jim, rescued street children, living in Mr 
Raymond’s country residence with Diamond and his family. The house, called The Mound, ris-
es above the surrounding countryside like a newly-dug grave, implying that even Mr Ray-
mond’s philanthropy cannot insulate him from death—in this case not a death to be embraced, 
as evidenced by Diamond’s face which is increasingly beatified as his days grow short, but a 
vain attempt to stave off the fearful death resulting from trusting in money rather than North 
Wind. Death comes to us all: how we experience it depends on our ability to be imaginative. 
This is illustrated in the contrast between Diamond and his old street colleagues. Now 
growing, and secure in their new-found haven, the latter frequently say that Diamond is ‘silly’ 
and has a ‘tile loose’. Whereas earlier in their relationship there were signs of empathy, distance 
is now growing; although still children, they are growing into dull, rationalist adults. This ra-
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tionalism is expressed as an inability to ‘read’ nature and a fear of death. Nanny, talking to Di-
amond, expresses ‘her opinion of the country’: 
“There ain’t nothing in it but the sun and moon, Diamond.” 
“There’s trees and flowers,” said Diamond. 
“Well, they ain’t no count,” returned Nanny. 
“Ain’t they? They’re so beautiful, they make you happy to look at them.” 
“That’s because you’re such a silly.”294 
The silliness here is clearly Nanny’s, not Diamond’s. Her and Jim’s inability to imagina-
tively connect with ‘transcendent’ nature results in a fear of death. Thus when a violent thunder-
storm engulfs the children, the narrator (now present in the tale) reports that ‘Nanny and Jim 
came running up to us, pale with fear. Diamond’s face too was paler than usual, but with de-
light. Some of the glory [of the lightning] seemed to have clung to it, and remained shining.’ 
The transcendent lightning, while evoking fear in Nanny and Jim, has the opposite effect on Di-
amond: 
“You’re not frightened—are you, Diamond?” I said. 
“No. Why should I be?” he answered with his usual question, looking up in my face with calm 
shining eyes. 
“He ain’t got sense to be frightened,” said Nanny, going up to him and giving him a pitying hug.295 
Nanny’s response here reminds us that fear is ‘unnatural’ and has to be learned. In con-
trast to her fear, the ‘glory’ that clings to Diamond’s face is encroaching death brought on by the 
soaking, a glory that grows until he eventually succumbs to a peaceful death in his attic room. 
As the narrative closes, Diamond appears increasingly divorced from quotidian reality: 
now that his practical ministrations are over, he has become an appendage, a child who does not 
need education (since he is now a page boy in the house) and who is increasingly called ‘silly’. 
‘Mr. Raymond advised his father to give him plenty of liberty’296 and soon we find him ‘dressed 
in a suit of blue, from which his pale face and fair hair came out like the loveliest blossom’.297 
His duties in the house are merely nominal, and often, ‘Mrs. Raymond confessed that she often 
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rang her bell just to have once more the pleasure of seeing the lovely stillness of the boy’s face, 
with those blue eyes which’, acting as windows to transcendence, ‘seemed rather made for other 
people to look into than for himself to look out of.’ Even his old friends Nanny and Jim ‘ap-
peared to regard him as a mere toy, except when they found he could minister to the increase of 
their privileges or indulgences, when they made no scruple of using him—generally with suc-
cess’.298 
We have here a child who has outlived his usefulness in the eyes of those he is closest to. 
He is now a toy, kept for decoration and amusement. At the beginning of his life he is consid-
ered ‘simple’ and given little to do except babysitting, now—after a short productive season of 
provision for his family—he once again finds himself unemployed since those around him con-
sider him unemployable. Keeping a child as a ‘toy’ dressed in finery was a growing trend in 
Victorian middle class society, but MacDonald here is painting a picture of a child who is too 
good for this world and will never fit into a conventional role: his true destiny lies beyond 
death.299 
3.3 (e) The implications of MacDonald’s portrayal of childhood imagination and obedience 
Alan Yui’s pronouncement that there are ‘no children in Wordsworth’s poetry’ is, in a sense, 
trivial since no fictive child is ‘real’.300 The next chapter explores this further. Here we simply 
note that characters such as Nanny and Jim (the rescued street children) appear more real than 
Diamond. Their cynicism and worldly wisdom resonates with our experience of real children 
and contrasts with the ‘unreal’ sentimentality of Diamond, but no character is ‘real’. These are 
symbols used to challenge, rather than confirm, conceptions of reality. As we look ‘through’ 
this artwork we find ourselves looking at Diamond’s fictive world through his eyes. We are then 
drawn to view our world as an artwork which mediates divine truth, with sight suspicious of the 
prescriptive pretensions of ‘adulthood’. Diamond, furthermore, embodies those mental states—a 
child mind prone to insanity and dreams—most feared by adult Victorians as they were inher-
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ently unknowable, beyond both rationalisation and control.301 This text proposes that it is ‘adult’ 
certainty that is illusory rather than the ‘insanity’ and dreams of childhood, and thus doubt is to 
be welcomed since it precipitates fresh vision. The reader must decide whether, and on what 
grounds, the immediate, ‘irrational’ obedience exemplified by Diamond is reasonable or advisa-
ble. Is Christian faith ‘reasonable or advisable’? MacDonald is dramatizing fundamental theo-
logical questions concerning the essential unknowability of God, the shortcomings of human 
logic, the problem of evil, and the imprecision of human cognition. There is, nevertheless (as in 
all of MacDonald’s work), profound optimism interwoven with profound doubt—a phrase 
which might summarise Christian faith. 
Is Diamond’s irrational obedience reasonable? To accuse him of irrationality (or insanity) 
is to side with those who call him ‘God’s baby’, an accusation which MacDonald makes clear is 
the result of spiritual insensitivity and an inability to perceive the wider picture. Those who 
think they are wise, such as Mr Raymond who hides from social issues on his own little island, 
The Mound, which ‘stood upon a little steep knoll, so smooth and symmetrical that it showed 
itself at once to be artificial’,302 are the ones who are irrational and live in ‘graves’. Diamond is 
not irrational, but rationalises from a different starting point: he processes data perceived imagi-
natively because he accepts that he is God’s baby. To illuminate this, we turn to The Imagina-
tion, Its Function and Its Culture, a work which takes the opposite view to those such as John 
Haslam who saw the goal of education as subjugating the passions303 and one which we need to 
consider before returning to Diamond. 
Victorian society was bent on educating those fit to be productive. Dickens, in Dombey 
and Son, for example, denounces the educational ‘forcing apparatus’ that crammed children 
prematurely full of facts.304 MacDonald agrees, for after advising a liberal regime for Diamond, 
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Mr Raymond remarks, ‘A boy like that […] ought not to be pushed.’305 ‘Pushing’ is done by 
those who value factual education at the expense of imaginative development, who say: 
“Are there not facts? […] Why forsake them for fancies? Is there not that which may be known? 
Why forsake it for inventions? What God hath made, into that let man inquire.” 
To which he responds: 
We answer: To inquire into what God has made is the main function of the imagination. It is 
aroused by facts, is nourished by facts; seeks for higher and yet higher laws in those facts; but re-
fuses to regard science as the sole interpreter of nature, or the laws of science as the only region of 
discovery.306 
MacDonald is not rejecting rational thought, simply, as he remarks elsewhere, that ‘[f]act 
at best is but a garment of truth, which has ten thousand changes of raiment woven in the same 
loom’.307 After affirming in Coleridgean terms that human imagination is ‘that faculty in man 
which is likest to the prime operation of the power of God’, MacDonald identifies the main on-
tological problem with which North Wind is concerned: 
We must not forget, however, that between creator and poet lies the one unpassable gulf which 
distinguishes—far be it from us to say divides—all that is God’s from all that is man’s; a gulf 
teeming with infinite revelations, but a gulf over which no man can pass to find out God, although 
God needs not to pass over it to find man; the gulf between that which calls, and that which is thus 
called into being; between that which makes in its own image and that which is made in that im-
age.308 
Put simply, God may be ‘beyond’ reason, but not beyond discovery: there are ‘infinite 
revelations’ in nature. However, another kind of cognition is needed; creation should be viewed 
as an artwork: 
[God] begins with the building of the stage itself, and that stage is a world […]. He makes the ac-
tors, and they do not act,—they are their part. He utters them into the visible to work out their 
life—his drama. When he would have an epic, he sends a thinking hero into his drama, and the ep-
ic is the soliloquy of his Hamlet.309 
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In this theatrical analogy, MacDonald is emphasising that ‘[God’s] imagination is one 
with his creative will. The thing that God imagines, that thing exists’;310 ‘God’s fiction […] is 
man’s reality’:311  
As the thoughts move in the mind of a man, so move the worlds of men and women in the mind of 
God, and make no confusion there, for there they had their birth, the offspring of his imagination. 
Man is but a thought of God. […] Indeed, a man is rather being thought than thinking.312 
This Novalis-like vision of God’s ‘dream’ being human reality is central to MacDonald’s 
idealist ontology and is predicated on the necessary condition that God is the source of all 
things, and thus the creative energy—as electric current through a diode—may only flow in one 
direction: ‘a gulf over which no man can pass to find out God, although God needs not to pass 
over it to find man’. The obstacle to knowing God directly is that the gulf between humanity 
and God is ‘teeming with infinite revelations’ which the finite mind will never fully grasp, not 
only because the object of enquiry is infinite, but because the human mind has its source in that 
‘object’—the divine mind. 
Since God is thinking into being his ‘stage’, to know God one must read nature using the 
God-given imagination, for ‘God has made the world that it should thus serve his creature, de-
veloping in the service that imagination whose necessity it meets’.313 Anticipating objections 
that human imagination is peripheral to cognition, he observes: 
if [imagination] be to man what creation is to God, we must expect to find it operative in every 
sphere of human activity. Such is, indeed, the fact, and that to a far greater extent than is common-
ly supposed.314 
But are not our God-given intellectual abilities best suited to investigate creation (the De-
ist position)? MacDonald responds by arguing that it is more reasonable to expect the imagina-
tion of God to partner directly with human imagination rather than condescend to work with its 
lesser correlate, human intellect: ‘The work of the Higher must be discovered by the search of 
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the Lower in degree which is yet similar in kind.’ However, he concludes by echoing the senti-
ment expressed in the Cambridge University Magazine for a more holistic approach to cogni-
tion.315 ‘Intellect’ must not be ignored; it must, however, be led by imagination: 
Let us not be supposed to exclude the intellect from a share in every highest office. Man is not di-
vided when the manifestations of his life are distinguished. The intellect “is all in every part.” 
There were no imagination without intellect, however much it may appear that intellect can exist 
without imagination. What we mean to insist upon is, that in finding out the works of God, the In-
tellect must labour, workman-like, under the direction of the architect, Imagination. 
Returning to Diamond, he is imaginative but we cannot accuse him of irrationality. He 
simply rationalises from an imaginative perspective which is incomprehensible to most of his 
contemporaries, a perspective that refuses to conform to convention, whether social or linguis-
tic.316 
We return to the fundamental question: Is Diamond’s irrational obedience reasonable? 
The answer must be affirmative if we accept MacDonald’s ‘ontology of imagination’ for, 
as an ideal child, Diamond’s imagination is perfect, a pure reflection of its source. His apparent-
ly naive confidence has a divine foundation. Thus when, defying rational logic, he decides to 
rescue Nanny from certain death in a most undesirable part of London and is surrounded by at-
tackers, he is unsurprised when the policeman who had warned him not to carry out his quest 
becomes his rescuer: 
“You had better have let me come with you, little man,” he said, looking down in Diamond’s face, 
which was flushed with his resistance. 
“You came just in the right time, thank you,” returned Diamond. “They’ve done me no harm.” 
“They would have if I hadn’t been at hand, though.” 
“Yes; but you were at hand, you know, so they couldn’t.” 
Perhaps the answer was deeper in purport than either Diamond or the policeman knew.317 
Diamond’s unquestioning obedience to imaginatively perceived divine cues, if taken to 
its logical conclusion, means that whatever happens he is in the hands of God, an omniscient 
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and sovereign God who foresees and protects those who are obedient. It is a theme repeated 
throughout the narrative as Diamond experiences one ‘coincidence’ after another. 
3.3 (f) Three immediate objections to this conclusion 
At this point we will consider three objections to this conclusion, with particular attention to the 
third, since this sheds light on MacDonald’s ontology and methodology. 
The first and most trivial objection is that humans are not ideal. Recognising this, this text 
must be read as an encouragement to live more imaginatively rather than as a demand for un-
questioning obedience to perceived truth. While it could be argued that MacDonald has under-
played the need for rational skills in North Wind, this does not detract from the core message 
that obedience is the main requirement of those who claim faith. Faith cannot remain merely 
theoretical. 
A second, less trivial objection concerns the genuineness of human free will. Does the po-
liceman incident simply reflect an omniscient God’s foreknowledge, or does God ‘pre-
programme’ the destiny of individuals? There is a paradox in that MacDonald’s emphasis on the 
need for individual perception of truth (that the role of art, including God’s artwork nature, is to 
awaken rather than impart meaning) is nevertheless championing a theology that suggests that 
such truth is defined in terms of God’s unique will for that individual, unaffected by individual 
action. (This is not to say that individual action is inconsequential; on the contrary, North 
Wind’s core message is that there are very negative life outcomes for those who choose to ig-
nore God’s will for their life, but such negative outcomes are indicative of ‘kicking against the 
goads’ of a predetermined life trajectory which does not, apparently, modify God’s pre-ordained 
will or ‘truth’ for that person.) One answer might be to remind ourselves that on the divine side 
of the ‘gulf’ is a God ‘teeming with infinite revelations’—that the individual trajectory towards 
God has infinite possibility, but this does not address the issue of divine micro-management. 
While MacDonald is rejecting simplistic predeterminism, it would appear from this narrative 
that the will of a sovereign and omniscient God is nevertheless inexorable and that the best 
course of human response is to discern and obey. How God relates to God’s creation and God’s 




The third objection concerns the validity of MacDonald’s thought experiment. He is ask-
ing: What happens if we place a sinless ideal child in a fallen world? This concept is doubly 
flawed. First, to be human is to be born into an ‘impure’ environment, the word preferred by 
David Kelsey to describe our proximate context, and that the ‘processing’ of impurity—how 
one deals with it—is part of what it means to be fully human. However, such ‘processing’ can-
not be considered simply a reaction to external stimuli: it necessarily involves dealing with in-
ternal impurity consequent upon being embedded in an impure quotidian environment. Just as 
Diamond is androgynous, one could argue he is also morally questionable in having a pre-
Edenic innocence which is no longer an option for those born into the real world. David Kelsey 
argues at length that the quotidian environment is ‘distorted’, evil and sinful, noting that where-
as sin has to do with wilful, culpable human behaviour (moral distortion is not the normative 
state of God’s good creation), the former may simply result from the finitude of a universe with 
limited resources: what we call ‘evil’ may have its source in God who has chosen to work in a 
creation which is finite.318 While MacDonald would counter this objection by insisting that the 
sector of reality in which we live is merely a moment in God’s infinite being, a being to which 
we have full access, the reality is—and this is fully recognised by him—that to all practical in-
tents and purposes our quotidian world appears finite to us. If MacDonald did not support this 
view he would be less fixated on escape, through death, to another realm. In other words, the 
pressure from a finite and impure external world means that even Diamond’s perfect response to 
divine cues may have evil consequences. 
Furthermore, from the ‘internal’ perspective, a pre-Edenic child is an impossibility: ‘im-
purity’ is intrinsic to human nature because of its embeddedness in a distorted world. So while 
MacDonald might try to distinguish between ‘being born in sin and brought forth in iniquity’ 
and ‘being born sin and brought forth iniquity’,319 the distinction is not as black-and-white as he 
imagines but speaks more of theological focus as exemplified by the contrast between Maurice 
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and Manning. It calls into question MacDonald’s supposition that to be made in the image of 
God necessarily implies inherent goodness. 
We may conclude, with Kelsey, that—as biblical Wisdom literature emphasises—the 
normal everyday human being is normative of God’s creation, not some ideal future superman 
(or past state of perfection). Kelsey summarises thus: 
The real human person is God’s good creature precisely in his or her quotidian everydayness and 
finitude, and not because they satisfy some one, universally applicable, ideal of a human person 
completely—that is, “perfectly,” actualized in all respects. The status of “real” human person is 
not constituted by transcending the quotidian, any more than it is a degraded (i.e. “fallen”) version 
of a historically once or future human perfection.320 
This is not to say that moral degradation (sin) is normative of God’s creatures. Rather, the 
objection here is that MacDonald, in his attempt to create the ideal child, has created a child 
which is not ideal since it lacks a fundamental aspect of human nature which would make it ful-
ly human. He has, it could be argued, broken his own guidelines on moral congruence for in 
creating a fantasy world he has forgotten that when it comes to morality, the writer ‘must 
obey—and take [moral] laws with him into his invented world as well’.321 
A second aspect of this third objection concerns Diamond’s premature, prepubescent 
death. Having never reached the age of majority, and therefore not in the eyes of society morally 
accountable, Diamond has never had to deal with adult issues. One must ask, therefore, whether 
he is in any sense ideal, except as an artistic device. 
3.3 (g) Un-idealising the child 
In this discussion of MacDonald’s contribution to the evolution of childhood, we may not leave 
this text without considering other children portrayed here who, ironically, serve to undermine 
the Victorian idealisation of the child, particularly with regard to sexuality. There is an inherent 
dualism within North Wind in that, set against the idealised child Diamond, there are ‘real’ chil-
dren such as Nanny and Jim, as well as comments about childhood, which help us to form a 
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more holistic picture of MacDonald’s views and therefore throw light on his concept of child-
likeness. 
‘Cripple Jim’ is an abused child whose ‘mother broke his leg when he wur a kid’.322 
Crossing-sweeper Nanny is taken with Jim early in the tale: ‘I love Jim dearly,’ she says, ‘I al-
ways keeps off a penny for Jim—leastways as often as I can’,323 and observes that ‘Jim was 
very fond of looking at the man in the moon’324—he is drawn towards transcendence and imagi-
nation325 and understandably, as a disabled and abused slum-dweller, is longing for escape. As 
Nanny is drawn closer to Jim she distances herself from Diamond; eventually the pair of them 
grow more and more critical, ‘often [saying] to each other that Diamond had a tile loose.’326 Jim 
only speaks four words in the narrative. During the thunder storm, as Diamond exults in the 
transcendent experience, Jim comments about the lightning: 
“It might kill you,” said Jim. 
“Oh, no, it mightn’t!” said Diamond.327 
The gravitational pull of nature in the form of the moon—offering escape from poverty, 
disability, and ‘artificiality’—is now ignored. Jim is visionless and earth-bound, and, despite 
being surrounded by nature in his country lodgings with Mr Raymond, can only be factual about 
lightning, and, it seems, under the thumb of Nanny, who elects herself spokesperson for the 
pair. MacDonald is suggesting that environment is of less consequence than orientation (Jim’s 
entrancement with the moon begins in a slum); that Jim’s choice to side with Nanny and focus 
entirely on quotidian reality has robbed him of transcendent vision. And Nanny, whose first ad-
dress in a squalid slum was ‘Paradise Row […] next door to the Adam and Eve’328 is, despite 
the improvement in her lot, still living in a fallen state ‘next door to Adam and Eve’. In her 
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eyes, ‘Jim was a reasonable being, Diamond […] at best only an amiable, over-grown baby, 
whom no amount of expostulation would ever bring to talk sense, not to say think it.’329 
In Nanny and Jim we have a foil for Diamond’s goodness, demonstrating that childlike-
ness is not always an attribute of children. 
We noted earlier the Victorian fear of childhood sexuality. Perhaps Diamond exemplifies 
Plotz’s Child, a splendid being ‘unmarked by time, place, class or gender’ typical of male-
authored fantasy literature.330 Perhaps he reflects, as Helen Sutherland suggests, the Pre-
Raphaelite practice of deliberately painting androgynous other-worldly figures with ambiguous 
expression to underline their ideality. Burne-Jones, for example, remarks: 
I mean by a picture a beautiful, romantic dream of something that never was, never will be—in a 
light better that any light that ever shone—in a land no one can define or remember, only desire—
and the forms are divinely beautiful.331 
Both views might apply to Diamond, but does this mean that MacDonald is uncritical of 
contemporary attitudes to real children? 
It is clear from North Wind and other texts that sexuality is never far from the surface in 
MacDonald’s work. In The Light Princess, for example, the prototype of the story of Little Day-
light in North Wind,332 the princess is cursed with weightlessness and may only experience grav-
ity when swimming; she swims at night, and one night a prince comes upon her naked form in 
the water: 
He soon reached the white object, and found that it was a woman. There was not enough light to 
show that she was a princess, but quite enough to show that she was a lady, for it does not want 
much light to see that.333 
Ruskin objected, prior to publication, that it would ‘not do for the public in its present 
form’ on the grounds that it was ‘too amorous throughout’.334  
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Victorian middle class adult male attitudes to children and sexuality are, certainly to post-
Freudian eyes, questionable. Ruskin was infatuated with the sixteen-year-old Rose La Touche, 
his ‘mouse pet’, an infatuation that the MacDonalds ‘were a little troubled about’,335 and 
Charles Dodgson’s correspondence with the MacDonald family consists mainly of letters to his 
daughters,336 and he frequently took Mary, then ten, to the theatre in London.337 It is tempting to 
read Diamond’s prepubescent state as avoiding the need to confront the disturbing implications 
of sexual awareness. Sally Shuttleworth would probably agree, noting that the Victorian focus 
on childhood innocence exhibited an ambivalence marked by a paranoia that the opposite might 
indeed be the case: 
Was childhood, for the Victorians, less an entity or experience in itself than a gloriously empty 
space, defined pre-eminently by the fact that it did not partake of the sexual feelings which com-
plicated puberty and adult life? Ideas of childhood innocence gained their hold precisely due to 
equally powerful, underlying fears that the very reverse might be true.338 
This ambivalence is expressed in North Wind. 
Despite Diamond’s asexuality, there is, as noted, strong eroticism in his encounters with 
North Wind. Although portrayed as innocent and maternal, the strength of the imagery implies 
something deeper. At the beginning of the storm scene, North Wind lifts him from the roof ‘into 
her bosom […] like an inconsolable child’. He clearly finds consolation as he ‘nestl[es] closer to 
her grand bosom’.339 Soon he is laughing, ‘leaning against her bosom’340 while the storm around 
rages: 
But so sheltered was he by North Wind’s arm and bosom that only at times, in the fiercer on-
slaught of some curl-billowed eddy, did he recognise for a moment how wild was the storm in 
which he was carried, nestling in its very core and formative centre.341 
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Here he is at the ‘core and formative centre’ of ‘mother nature’, and after a brief weaning 
they are reunited: ‘Diamond nestled to her, and murmured into her bosom,—“Why did you 
leave me, dear North Wind?”.’342 
For U. C. Knoepflmacher, this is clear evidence that MacDonald has never fully recon-
ciled himself to being prematurely weaned,343 but, perhaps more significantly and certainly 
more positively, a firm rejection of the ‘hideous emblems of maternity’ found in the Alice 
books, and the gynophobia implied by the all-male cast of Ruskin’s King of the Golden River.344 
Whereas Ruskin and his peers preferred female passivity, MacDonald’s celebration of female 
sexual power may be read as a rebuttal of the gynophobia of Carroll and Ruskin and of the mid-
dle class attitudes that they represented. This is most strikingly revealed in the short story Little 
Daylight (Chapter XXVIII) which Mr Raymond tries out on the children of (presumably) Great 
Ormond Street, a story freighted with sexual meaning. 
Mr Raymond, whose somewhat remote philanthropy is eclipsed by his desire to make 
money as a children’s author, reads his new ‘fairy story’ to the sick children, perhaps motivated 
by market research more than compassion.345 Prefacing the chapter with the comment ‘I do not 
know how much of Mr. Raymond’s story the smaller children understood’, the story is a re-
working of The Light Princess, and concerns a beautiful princess ‘with the sunniest hair and the 
loveliest eyes of heavenly blue’ who has been cursed by a bad fairy to wake only at night; the 
curse will only be broken when she is kissed by a prince. Her beauty waxes and wanes with the 
phases of the moon. Contrasted with her beauty, ‘so much more painful and sad was the change 
as her bad time came on. The more beautiful she was in the full moon, the more withered and 
worn did she become as the moon waned.’ A voyeuristic prince, who comes upon the radiant 
girl dancing in the full moon, is entranced by her beauty, but in the power of her ‘waxing’ state, 
she despises his approaches and he is left to wander the forest, disconsolate. One moonless night 
he stumbles upon an old hag, moaning in the darkness. He finds her repulsive, but, fearing she is 
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about to die, instinctively kisses her, at which point she is resurrected as the beautiful princess, 
now free from the curse. 
Mr Raymond, an amalgam of Ruskin and Carroll,346 is telling a tale which reveals his 
(and therefore their) revulsion of menstrual women, an aversion which must be overcome and 
which ‘repudiates the hankering for ever-pure little girls harboured by his two fellow-
fantasists’347 or the reduction of femininity to ‘aestheticized female shapes gazed from afar’. 
Knoepflmacher further observes that: 
Princess Daylight’s story has much to do with Lewis Carroll’s wishful constructions of perennially 
young dream-children and with Ruskin’s confession to MacDonald about the shattering discovery 
that Effie Gray had become a menstrual woman. 348 
This thinly-coded critique of contemporary attitudes to menstrual women,349 with its im-
plied criticism of those such as Dodgson who preferred the company of MacDonald’s ten-year-
old daughter to adult females350 set within a narrative which portrays divine power as primarily 
female, erotic, and anything but passive, throws light on the character of Diamond and Mac-
Donald’s conception of childhood. If nothing else, MacDonald cannot be accused of turning a 
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blind eye to puberty, with the implication that Diamond’s asexuality is not a disapprobation of 
sexuality, but a conscious literary choice. 
What are the implications for MacDonald’s contribution to the concept of childhood and 
attitudes to children?  
The erotic relationship between North Wind and Diamond can be read as a plea for a 
more tolerant attitude towards childhood sexuality, and that growing sexual awareness in the 
prepubescent child is divine rather than demonic. Theologically it is a rejection of crude concep-
tions of original sin that equate the Fall with sexual activity.351 This is most evident in The Light 
Princess, which concerns a princess cursed with weightlessness and therefore unable to ‘fall’. 
She is also unable to cry, with a ‘pre-Fall’ shallow personality having never had to face moral 
choice, and is, by implication, on the verge of puberty and therefore not yet an adult. In this tale, 
MacDonald makes much of her nocturnal liaisons with the prince who, as he embraces her (im-
plied) naked body, enables her to ‘fall’ into the lake where they swim together. In Romantic 
symbolism, water was associated with femininity, and MacDonald is clearly equating her fall 
into the lake with growing sexual awareness, if not union (a fact not lost on Ruskin, precipitat-
ing his objections), but what is missing is any negative judgment from MacDonald; rather the 
opposite as he equates growing sexual awareness with the couple’s increasing joy and maturity. 
The negative judgment is reserved for the princess’s parents, the king and queen, who despite 
their maturity are portrayed as sexually naive (at the beginning of the tale the king asks his wife 
for a child, apparently unaware of his role in the matter) and unconnected with reality. The nar-
rative thus challenges the common Victorian equation of sex with sin.352 It may, however, also 
indicate a wider rejection of Victorian assumptions about the child-mind: that the mystery of the 
child-mind should be equated with the mystery of divinity rather than with incipient insanity or 
hidden evil. It also stresses that God is not male. 
Little Daylight is a plea for the re-evaluation of male attitudes to femininity, no doubt 
fuelled by the attentions paid by Dodgson to MacDonald’s own daughters. Of particular note is 
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the appearance of the princess after the princely kiss. In her hag-like state after the ‘change’ had 
come upon her, the prince carries the emaciated form towards shelter and help: 
“Mother, mother!” he said. “Poor mother!” and kissed her on the withered lips. 
She started; and what eyes they were that opened upon him! […] she stood upright on her feet. Her 
hood had dropped, and her hair fell about her. The first gleam of the morning was caught on her 
face: that face was bright as the never-aging Dawn, and her eyes were lovely as the sky of darkest 
blue. The prince recoiled in overmastering wonder. It was Daylight herself whom he had brought 
from the forest! He fell at her feet, nor dared to look up until she laid her hand upon his head. He 
rose then. 
“You kissed me when I was an old woman: there! I kiss you when I am a young princess,” mur-
mured Daylight.—“Is that the sun coming?”353 
Nocturnal voyeurism has been transformed into the diurnal worship of a female deity of 
immense power whose face is not only ‘bright as the never-aging Dawn,’ but whose eyes—like 
North Wind’s354 and Diamond’s—are windows to eternity, ‘lovely as the sky of darkest blue’, 
and who is no longer at a distance but, using imagery from Saint John’s encounter with the risen 
Christ,355 kisses her male worshipper. The nocturnal dancer may be read as a projection of male 
fantasy—an unattainable phantasm—a marked contrast with the transfigured woman, now rec-
ognised by the prostrate prince as the product of divine ‘fantasy’ and, unlike his own fantasies, 
eminently real. 
Many readings are possible relating to the clandestine, distant, dysfunctional, immature 
(and so on) attitudes of males towards female sexuality, but from a theological perspective there 
is a clear message—that mature girls and women are ‘divine’; that is, not idealised objects for 
male worship, but creatures also made in the image of God. The male response, as illustrated by 
the prince who ‘recoiled in overmastering wonder [… and] fell at her feet’356 should be pure 
worship, recognising that ‘[t]he deepest, purest love of a woman has its well-spring in him’:357 
that only the recognition of female ‘divinity’ can be the basis for genuine relationship between 
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the sexes, with the corollary that, as male and female are made in God’s image, God is both 
‘male’ and ‘female’. 
The narrative insists that adult femininity, particularly menstruation, is not to be feared or 
considered impure but is part of what it means to be truly human. The quest for childlikeness 
does not imply a negation of sexuality, despite Diamond’s androgyny. If, as Judith Plotz re-
marks, the ‘separation of adult from child defines the Wordsworthian [Romantic] child’,358 this 
narrative goes some way to healing that divorce. Furthermore, the transformation of this prin-
cess going through puberty into a ‘goddess’ precludes a reading of MacDonald’s notion of 
childhood as a negation of adulthood. 
3.4 Redeeming the child 
MacDonald’s project is to redeem the child and make the child the mediator of redemption. His 
fictional children dramatize the rejection of original sin; instead, the imago Dei is the image of a 
loving father and mother. The child is, therefore, a theological concept challenging the founda-
tions of contemporary anthropology.  
In North Wind, MacDonald proposes six attributes that characterise the true child. The 
first is imagination: that a childlike imagination is needed not just to perceive the ‘afterlife’, but 
also this life. It is not a rejection of intellection, but a plea for intellect to be led by imagination, 
a Coleridgean affirmation that humanity is made in the image of an imaginative God. The child 
embodies a pre-adult, almost prelapsarian, state of human development which is closer to the 
divine image than that displayed by an adult who has falsely ‘learned’ mistrust and fear—the 
fruit of decontextualized logic and unthinking convention. But, as the discussion of Little Day-
light has shown, this should not be read as a trivial denial of adulthood. 
The second is trust evidenced by obedience, a proposal that implies God is worthy of 
such trust. This informs a rejection of conceptions of God that imply moral uncertainty, and 
proposes that unquestioning obedience is always rewarded and, if necessary, corrected. That 
such unquestioning obedience, based as it is on subjective imaginative cues, might be misguided 
is explored as we consider Diamond’s ‘unwise’ choices. Diamond’s perfect intuition of God’s 
                                                




will, allied with God’s perfect benevolence and foreknowledge, always results in his vindica-
tion: the ‘what if’ questions concerning imperfect cognition or the place of human will are left 
for the reader to ponder, but the implication is that—even in the last resort—should death result 
it is not to be feared. 
The third is the humanity of the child—it is already fully human and made in God’s im-
age. Diamond’s premature death—his failure to reach earthly adulthood—should not be viewed 
as failure. In a society that valued children for what they would become, MacDonald is celebrat-
ing the child for what it already is, a complete human being, acceptable as such in God’s sight 
and representative of the race, but furthermore, that the imaginative, trusting, obedient child is 
closer to God’s image than the potentially misguided but confident adult. 
The fourth is priesthood; the child in some sense mediates redemption. Diamond func-
tions not as a saviour, but as a mediator between heaven and earth, a role emphasised by his 
name, ‘Dia-mond’. Like the jewel in Aaron’s priestly robe, Diamond is a prism refracting heav-
enly light. Makman has noted that for his Victorian contemporaries, the name would also bring 
to mind those who worked in the mining industry, ‘diamond crackers’ who worked coal, ‘black 
diamond’.359 Diamond carries a priestly name which bridges the heights of heaven and the 
depths of the earth, exposing the darkness of the latter to the light of the former. He is a ‘win-
dow’ to transcendence. 
The fifth is innocence—sinlessness. In a culture obsessed with childhood depravity re-
sulting from either original sin or simian ancestry, where those such as Henry Maudsley, using 
words not dissimilar to Ruskin’s, accused Romantics like MacDonald of ‘poetical idealism and 
willing hypocrisy by which a man ignores realities’,360 MacDonald portrays this ideal child as 
being sinless and as having a direct, intuitive connection with God. All these childhood attrib-
utes reflect back on the God in whose image humanity is made, notably the perfect imago Dei, 
Christ. 
The final and sixth attribute is doubt: evidence of the lack of ‘adult’ pride—the false se-
curity of second-hand, conventional faith. The child accepts the provisionality of its vision and 
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understanding of the world. Those humbly trying to make sense of the world—Diamond, his 
mother, and even God’s agent North Wind—all express doubt. It is those that have no doubts—
such as Nanny and Jim, convinced of Diamond’s insanity—that are lacking discernment. Doubt 
is a positive force, ‘the first knock at our door of things that are not yet, but have to be, under-
stood’;361 an awareness of limitation and a goad to positive action rather than nascent apostasy. 
Doubt is the valid obverse of faith, the latter reflecting childlike trust despite the former. 
God’s child North Wind (‘mother nature’) is also feeling her way subjectively in this de-
ceptive world where evil claims to be good and goodness sometimes wears the mask of evil. 
Conscience must be her guide: ‘when I do [what the ‘far-off song’ requires] I feel all right, and 
when I don’t I feel all wrong’. That ‘nature’ sometimes ‘gets it wrong’ or misinterprets divine 
intention is worrying, implying that God is not so sovereign after all and an ineffective commu-
nicator. As for the origin of that song, North Wind notes that according to rumours spread by 
East Wind (an unreliable source since ‘one does not exactly know how much to believe of what 
she says, for she is very naughty sometimes’), ‘it is all managed by a baby’.362  
This last phrase indicates the centrality of the child in MacDonald’s theology: even God 
is, in some sense, ‘a baby’. But before (in Chapter 5) outlining this theology, it will be helpful to 
explore MacDonald’s more realist fiction and its theological proposals. 
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Chapter 4 The child in MacDonald’s realist fiction 
4.1 Approaching MacDonald’s realist fiction 
T. S. Eliot observed that: 
The more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and 
the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which 
are its material.363 
Perhaps C. S. Lewis’s observation that in literature MacDonald has ‘no place in its first 
rank—perhaps not even its second’364 stems primarily from his inability to achieve this separa-
tion, particularly in his realist fiction, as evidenced by regular authorial intrusions and didacti-
cism. One might also mention poor plot development, stereotypical characters, prolixity, and 
implausibility (even by the standards of fairyland). However forgivingly one reads many of his 
novels, the words ‘good art’ seldom come to mind. But this does not mean he has nothing im-
portant to say. This chapter explores what that might be. 
Without committing the intentional fallacy—evaluating a work on the basis of supposed 
authorial intent rather than the actual work—we may, nevertheless, legitimately draw conclu-
sions that MacDonald may not have intended. First, he himself encouraged this on the basis that 
images, symbols, and words carry divine meaning opaque to the writer, concluding: ‘A genuine 
work of art must mean many things; the truer its art, the more things it will mean.’365 Second, as 
Schleiermacher observed, the artist is often oblivious to his or her own processes and context, 
leading to the observation that as critics, ‘We understand the artful discourses of others better 
than they do themselves.’366 MacDonald’s prose should not, therefore, simply be viewed as il-
lustrating an underlying stratum of bedrock theology. As Hans Frei notes, we should not ask 
whether the subject matter or the narrative itself is the most meaningful: 
The question is illegitimate or redundant. For whatever the situation that may obtain in other types 
of texts, in narrative of the sort in which character, verbal communications, and circumstances are 
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each determinate of the other and hence of the theme itself, the text, the verbal sense, and not a 
profound, buried stratum underneath constitutes or determines the subject matter itself.367 
Fiction, Frei stresses, is not illustrative of what someone thinks, but constitutive of it.368 
We must not, therefore, be overly simplistic in our critical evaluation of MacDonald’s narra-
tives, prematurely dismissing them as bad art: they are not just illustrative of his theology as he 
sees it, but constitutive of it in a manner which even he may not be aware. 
‘Few of his novels are good and none is very good’, remarked Lewis, but he does allow 
that ‘[w]hat he does best is fantasy’. In similar vein, Chesterton remarked that MacDonald gave 
us jewels in a ‘somewhat uneven setting’.369 Lewis’s anthology is a collection of such jewels—
aphorisms mined from MacDonald’s prolixity (primarily his theological essays), a task which 
Lewis described as ‘one of exhumation’.370 Such jewels are no doubt valuable, but the critic 
must also consider that ‘uneven setting’, his fictive ontology. Context is as important as content.  
Genre is also an issue. North Wind is typical of many of MacDonald’s novels that focus 
on idealised children or child-like protagonists who seem curiously impervious to the corrosive-
ness of life and untouched by its squalor.371 They appear singled out by God for special favours, 
smile when abused, commune with nature, and precociously indulge in ‘metaphysics’.372 In-
spired by such as Novalis,373 such novels appear at first sight to be Bildungsromane, a genre 
focusing on the maturation of the protagonist through his or her life journey. To speak of a ‘re-
alist Bildungsroman’, however, is an oxymoron. Stern observes that the Bildungsroman—a 
style initiated by Goethe and which Frei notes ‘was to reach its apex in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meis-
ter’374—is essentially unreal and rooted in the practices of pietistic confessionary tracts ‘which 
cling to the genre throughout its history’; also identified is its didactic nature, noting that it is 
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‘designed to let the hero “eat up the background” and to fill the foreground’.375 The social truth 
of an interdependent self is barely relevant. Instead, as often in MacDonald’s fiction, we are 
faced with individuals such as Diamond who appear disconnected from quotidian reality. ‘The 
genre’, Stern concludes, ‘is solipsistic and unrealistic.’376 The distance from realism perhaps 
accounts for our lack of sympathy for many of MacDonald’s idealised child characters, feeling 
that if not deserving of abuse they are at least in some measure inviting it. We feel little sympa-
thy because they appear unreal. 
In contrast, the realist author, Stern insists, must be ‘unambiguously committed to the 
world’. This clearly does not apply to MacDonald, committed as he is to the afterlife (and fairy-
land). Furthermore, if we accept Stern’s definition of realism as ‘connoting a way of depicting, 
describing a situation in a faithful, accurate, “life-like” manner [… which] necessarily means in 
some sense faithfully representing the real world’,377 then clearly MacDonald’s realist novels 
should not be labelled as such. As we approach his ‘realist’ novels, therefore, it is important not 
to prematurely dismiss them as ‘unreal’ on the basis of faulty classification. Lewis observed that 
MacDonald’s novels are at their best when they ‘depart most from the canons of novel-writing, 
and that in two directions’: 
Sometimes they depart in order to come nearer to fantasy, as in the whole character of the hero in 
Sir Gibbie or the opening chapters of Wilfrid Cumbermede. Sometimes they diverge into direct 
and prolonged preachments which would be intolerable if a man were reading for the story, but 
which are in fact welcome because the author, though a poor novelist, is a supreme preacher.378 
With this in mind we first turn to Sir Gibbie and then to Wilfrid Cumbermede. 
4.2 The innocent child 
If Diamond is a prophet, Gibbie—the hero of Sir Gibbie (1879)—is a type of Christ, fundamen-
tally innocent and untainted by sin. Mute, he is ‘as a sheep before its shearers […] silent’379 and 
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carries a cross on his back—scars cut by the gamekeeper’s whip as a result of muteness being 
misinterpreted as guilt. In some sense he is carrying the sin of humanity.380 
We first meet eight-year-old Gibbie crouched in a ‘narrow dirty lane’ in Aberdeen (‘the 
grey city’) sifting the gutter for a lost earring. Implausibly but triumphantly successful, he 
‘sucked it to clear it from the last of the gutter’ and, after thumping through ‘street after street’ 
on bare feet, returns it to the grateful baker’s daughter, receiving no reward for his trouble.381 
The child, it is proposed, will always find what it seeks. Gibbie also confirms the thesis in North 
Wind: that exercising faith provides immunity from evil—even the filth of a Victorian gutter. 
MacDonald explicitly states his thesis thus: ‘In proportion to the falsehood in us are we exposed 
to the falsehood of others.’382 So despite his starvation diet, ‘Gibbie’s health was splendid. His 
senses were also marvellously acute’,383 and, although both whipped and later shot by his neme-
sis the gamekeeper, appears little troubled by his experiences. It is theology which minimises 
Jesus’s observation that ‘in the world you will have trouble’384—trouble that has real negative 
consequences.385 Here, as elsewhere, MacDonald’s portrayal of evil is unconvincing (unlike, 
say, Dostoevsky’s abused children):386 he seems to have an authorial disinclination to face its 
true horror. 
Gibbie is an idea, not a child. He has ‘notable eyes [… of] a deep blue’ that are windows 
to a transcendent realm.387 In contrast to his muteness, in his eyes ‘diffused meaning seemed in 
them to deepen almost to speech’. His face is ‘luminous’ and surrounded by ‘hair which stuck 
out from his head in every direction’,388 reminiscent of Wordsworth’s daisy, that— 
Sweet silent creature! 
That breath’st with me in sun and air, 
Do thou, as thou art wont, repair 
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My heart with gladness, and a share 
Of thy meek nature!389 
Gibbie’s ‘meek nature’ also ‘repairs the heart’ of others, and MacDonald’s Wordsworth 
essay, which quotes these lines, concludes by reinforcing the view, central in Sir Gibbie, that 
nature is the expression of God’s imagination, an expression that is ‘certainly higher than mere 
intellectual teaching’: 
If the world proceeded from the imagination of God, and man proceeded from the love of God, it 
is easy to believe that that which proceeded from the imagination of God should rouse the best 
thoughts in the mind of a being who proceeded from the love of God. This I think is the relation 
between man and the world.390 
Gibbie, the perfect imago Dei, exhibits these attributes: he ‘proceeds from the love of 
God’ exhibiting Christ-like perfection, and in his affinity with nature, engages ‘the imagination 
of God’. He and nature are the narrative’s windows on eternity. Like ‘Dia-mond’, he mediates 
between heaven and earth.391 
Such affinity with nature is demonstrated, for example, when Gibbie finds sanctuary with 
an old hill shepherd and his wife. The former accedes to Gibbie being trialled with the sheepdog 
despite his obvious concern that mute Gibbie ‘canna speyk to the dog’.392 Happily, however, at 
their first meeting: 
The dog looked up into his face, noting every glance and gesture, and, partly from sympathetic in-
stinct, that gift lying so near the very essence of life, partly from observation of the state of affairs 
in respect of the sheep, divined with certainty what the duty required of him was, and was off like 
a shot. 
“The twa dumb craturs un’erstan’ ane anither better nor I un’erstan’ aither o’ them,” said Robert to 
his wife when they came home.393 
This last sentence reflects the Romantic view that ‘the more schooling, the less child-
hood’;394 that real human childhood is ‘natural’ and includes ‘sympathetic instinct, that gift ly-
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ing so near the very essence of life’, in marked contrast to the affectations of ‘culture’. The lat-
ter is exemplified in this text by Rev Clement Sclater’s preoccupation with appearances.395 
Here, both schooled by nature, Gibbie and the dog have a natural affinity.396 
However, such scenes are unconvincing and appear to trouble MacDonald. For example, 
at one point Gibbie finds refuge in a seedy waterfront bar, however, ‘Evil language and coarse 
behaviour alike passed over him, without leaving the smallest stain upon heart or conscience, 
desire or will.’397 This unlikely state of affairs leads MacDonald to remark: 
If anyone thinks I am unfaithful to human fact, and over-charge the description of this child, I on 
my side doubt the experience of that man or woman. I admit the child a rarity, but a rarity in the 
right direction, and therefore a being with whom humanity has the greater need to be acquaint-
ed.398 
That MacDonald believes he has been ‘faithful to human fact’ is, I suggest, doubtful: like 
the Little Ones in Lilith,399 Gibbie’s innocence is not merely sinlessness but an impossible pre-
lapsarian naivety. Rather, this is a ‘making-strange’400 in order to challenge concepts of reality. 
Gibbie, like Diamond, is considered an ‘innocent’, ‘a born idiot’, an ‘odd-looking lad [… a] 
strange-looking creature […] a mad-like object’ by many,401 yet is brought before us as the ex-
emplary ‘child in the midst’ who has chosen to be obedient to Christ (for his devotion to ‘the 
Presence’ in nature is synonymous with such obedience).402 However, unlike Jesus who brings 
before us an ordinary child, MacDonald brings before us ‘Jesus’ in Gibbie, described and per-
ceived as ‘a rarity’. This ‘divine idiot’ (as the narrator calls him)403 suggests that godly sanity is 
perceived as idiocy by the ungodly. But is this ‘innocent’ (that is, sinless and naive) child truly 
‘a being with whom humanity has the greater need to be acquainted’ or simply a deceptive and 
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unattainable ideal? Phrasing this question theologically: does this idealised ‘true child’ reflect 
the biblical call to become ‘like children’? 
MacDonald’s narrative is not realist. It must be considered as either ‘fairy story’, hagiog-
raphy, or iconography: fantasy that gives us a new perspective on reality, a legendary (semi-
fictional) account of a real saintly character (the child is ‘a rarity’ but—he maintains—based on 
reality), or a sacramental stylised icon pointing beyond itself to transcendent reality. In some 
measure it is all of these. Either way, we are dealing with art that evokes an aesthetic response, 
an issue we will consider later, but two theological proposals are clear: first, that it is possible to 
live ‘innocently’ in the quotidian context, and second, that those who make such a choice are 
immune from the consequences of evil. We now consider a third proposition: that ‘children’ are 
not only immune from the consequences of evil, but help to neutralise it. 
Sir Gibbie suggests that all evil is God’s blunt instrument to bring about repentance. As a 
consequence, MacDonald inadvertently champions the doctrine of election (something he ex-
plicitly renounces)404 for the only explanation for Gibbie’s superhuman ability to resist and 
overcome evil is that although ‘he knew not the Presence’, ‘The Presence, indeed, was with him 
[…] Yea, the Presence was in his very soul.’405 Indeed, in perhaps an unfortunate choice of 
words, ‘Gibbie was one of those few elect natures to whom obedience is a delight.’406  
Thus a widespread flood, that some consider a second Genesis deluge, is not ‘natural evil’ 
but ‘natural good’.407 It is one of God’s ‘evil’ sheepdogs that worry the wanderer back to the 
fold (for the good shepherd commands ‘a terrible set of sheep-dogs’, including ‘pain, fear, anxi-
ety, and shame […] sacred creatures [that] work[ed] the will of the Father’).408 Ignoring the 
wider devastation, MacDonald’s focus is uniquely on the cathartic effect of this major incident 
on a small, impotent group huddled for shelter in a Noah’s ark of a farmhouse which becomes 
an island in a sea of floodwater. They are morally challenged: some respond positively, others 
                                                
404 See for example US2, p. 244. 
405 Gibbie, p. 88. 
406 Ibid., p. 139 (emphasis mine). 
407 Ibid., pp. 192–233. 
408 ‘Sermon by Dr. George Macdonald (Reprinted Courtesy of the Huntly Express from their September 21, 1889 
Issue)’, Wingfold, 89 (2015), 29–30 (p. 30). On returning to the city, Gibbie observes that ‘The Master was in its 
streets as certainly as on the rocks of Glashgar [the upland pasture]. Not one sheep did he lose sight of, though he 
could not do so much for those that would not follow, and had to have the dog sent after them!’ (Gibbie, p. 249; cf. 




do not. It is God’s mercy on them; good which helps to shape their moral character and there-
fore eternal destiny. Only Gibbie is empowered to leave the island and rescue others. 
The picture is one of a divine puppet-master ensuring that ‘all things work together for 
good’ for the faithful and the reprobate, protecting the former from harm and using the negative 
responses of the latter to contribute to their eventual reformation. Unlike Eliot’s flood in The 
Mill on the Floss, there are no well-meaning Maggies who rescue Toms (convinced God is with 
them) only to be embraced by a watery death.409 It is a Genesis deluge without judgement on the 
wicked. 
Sir Gibbie suggests that all suffering is purgatorial—a ‘necessary evil’ to bring about 
moral reform—but MacDonald makes a more profound theological proposal: he suggests that 
the suffering of children such as Gibbie, ‘a copy in small of the good shepherd’, 410 absorbs evil 
on behalf of others; that children suffer vicariously by sharing Christ’s suffering, a curious pro-
posal from one who explicitly rejects substitutionary atonement theories. In The Hope of the 
Gospel he makes this clear: 
Very different are the good news Jesus brings us from certain prevalent representations of the gos-
pel, founded on the pagan notion that suffering is an offset for sin, and culminating in the vile as-
sertion that the suffering of an innocent man, just because he is innocent, yea perfect, is a satisfac-
tion to the holy Father for the evil deeds of his children.411  
This reveals a paradox. On the one hand, MacDonald’s focus is very much on sin—evil 
as human immorality—yet, on the other, Gibbie’s suffering is somehow dealing with ‘evil’ on 
another level, as if it were a substance divorced from agency. For example, after being cut by 
the gamekeeper’s whip, Gibbie instinctively staggers to the upland pasture to find refuge. He 
approaches the cottage of the old shepherd and his wife. As she stands in the doorway, like John 
before the glorified Christ, he ‘fell on his face at her feet like one dead’;412 however, here the 
roles are reversed: it is ‘Christ’ who has fallen at the feet of his disciple. On seeing the cross cut 
into his back, she wonders: 
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Could it be that the Lord was still, child and man, suffering for his race, to deliver his brothers and 
sisters from their sins?—wandering, enduring, beaten, blessing still? accepting the evil, slaying it, 
and returning none? his patience the one rock where evil word finds no echo; his heart the one gulf 
into which the dead-sea wave rushes with no recoil; the one abyss of destroying love, into which 
all wrong tumbles, and finding no reaction, is lost, ceases for evermore?413 
John Pridmore notes that the words ‘the one abyss of destroying love’ are ‘rewritten, al-
most as an afterthought, in the margin of a manuscript repeatedly scored and written across’: 
Something more is being claimed here than that [sic] the notion, that MacDonald more than once 
entertains, that every child comes to us as Jesus born anew.414  
This is certainly Gibbie’s posture: he ‘accepts evil, slays it, and returns none’. He is not 
so much like Christ as part of Christ. In other words, just as natural evil such as floods catharti-
cally purge the landscape and those within it, the suffering of the child purges the world of evil. 
Pridmore concludes that MacDonald is indeed suggesting that childhood suffering has atoning 
value. 
The old shepherdess, however, reflects on Paul’s enigmatic words in Colossians 1.24. Do 
those such as Gibbie really make the world ‘less like hell’?— 
Were there always innocents in the world, who in their own persons, by the will of God, and un-
known to themselves, carried on the work of Christ, filling up that which was left behind of the 
sufferings of their Master—women, children, infants, idiots—creatures of sufferance, with souls 
open to the world to receive wrong, that it might pass and cease?415 
Dostoevsky (or at least Ivan Karamazov) would no doubt question the divine morality of 
using such innocents as channels ‘unknown to themselves’ to purge the world of evil.416 Never-
theless, here MacDonald is expressing this belief: inasmuch as such ‘innocents’ are part of 
Christ’s earthly body, the community of saints, so they share in this absorbing purgatorial of-
fice. In Janet’s words: ‘little furnaces they, of the consuming fire, to swallow up and destroy by 
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uncomplaining endurance—the divine destruction!’.417 In other words, childlike innocence is 
not only impervious to evil, but opposes and destroys it. 
However, one must distinguish between childhood suffering being contributive to the 
‘fire’ that helps others to turn from their sin, and suffering being a vicarious offset somehow 
balancing the universal scales. It is this distinction that MacDonald makes in his criticism of 
popular atonement theories, and one which perhaps Pridmore does not. 
That ‘evil’ is essentially a divine purgatorial fire leads to the view that evil has no pur-
chase on the innocent child since it has no need of reform. The radiating ‘energy’ of God 
traverses the diamond-child perfectly; no ‘heat’ is generated as there is no sinful resistance—no 
‘dark matter’.418 Instead, the child itself becomes a coal in that fire, or rather, a window to the 
divine furnace, as it embraces God. The fire only burns the unchildlike—a fire of which quotid-
ian ‘evil’ (such as floods) are an expression. It is a perennial theme. In A Rough Shaking, for 
example, we meet a similarly disadvantaged child, Clare Skymer, whose earliest memory is of 
(perhaps) the Lisbon earthquake, the ‘Auschwitz of the eighteenth century’ when thousands 
died while worshipping on All Saints’ Day in 1755.419 It is, however, a sanitised ‘Auschwitz’ in 
that despite his mother being killed and him being separated from his father, no serious harm 
befalls Clare since he is the embodiment of ‘pure righteousness’.420 Destitute Clare, like Gibbie, 
is fostered and fed by various surrogate parents and nature until, years later, he is miraculously 
reunited with his father through a series of improbable ‘coincidences’. God is working hard be-
hind the scenes, once again implying a measure of election. 
MacDonald’s choice to focus on the positive outcome for this one child, rather than those 
maimed and killed, is, at best, a lesson that each individual is precious in God’s sight, and that it 
is that individual’s response to God that counts. At worst, though, it is a caricature of lived reali-
ty that strongly suggests MacDonald’s theology of evil is flawed. Leaving to one side the issue 
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that (if he has Lisbon in mind) thousands died in agony while trusting in God as collapsing 
churches buried them, Clare’s smiles in response to abuse421 mean that some, as in the cases of 
both Gibbie and Diamond, ‘imagined the boy a simpleton’.422 In short, both fictively and in ‘re-
ality’, one must conclude something is not quite ‘right’ with this child or MacDonald’s doctrine 
of evil. 
More worryingly, perhaps, is the idealisation of social deprivation. The narrator remarks: 
He was often cold and always hungry, but his life was anything but dull. The man who does not 
know where his next meal is to come from, is seldom afflicted with ennui. That is the monopoly of 
the enviable with nothing to do, and everything money can get them. A foolish west-end life has 
immeasurably more discomfort in it than that of a street Arab. The ordinary beggar, while in toler-
able health, finds far more enjoyment than most fashionable ladies.423 
The ‘ordinary beggar’ here, I suggest, is not the fruit of MacDonald’s imagination but of 
his fancy.424 MacDonald could not have been completely blind to the suffering and death of so 
many ‘street Arabs’.425 Neither, having worked in Bolton in 1855, would he have been unaware 
that, having survived childbirth, numerous children only lived a few short poverty-stricken and 
exploitative years. Few ‘street Arabs’ would have been in ‘tolerable health’, and although ‘sel-
dom afflicted with ennui’ were no doubt afflicted in worse ways. Yet MacDonald says of 
Skymer: ‘Not once yet had he lost heart. In very virtue of unselfishness and lack of resentment, 
he was strong. Not once had he shed a tear for himself, not once had he pitied his own condi-
tion.’426 We must conclude that this child is not human or, more to the point, not symbolic of 
true humanity. 
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4.3 The abused and disturbed child 
4.3 (a) Annie in Alec Forbes of Howglen 
A more genuine image of child suffering is found in Annie who plays opposite (and eventually 
marries) Alec in Alec Forbes, one of MacDonald’s most autobiographical Scottish novels.427 
Small-town education centres around the sadistic schoolmaster Murdoch Malison, a violent 
tawse-wielder who ‘had nothing of the childlike in himself, and consequently never saw the 
mind of the child whose person he was assailing’; a master with a ‘savage sense of duty’ and the 
belief that ‘[j]ustice […] consisted in vengeance’.428 He is the antithesis of the child: an unimag-
inative rationalist who ‘never saw beyond the symptoms [surface]’.429 When children come 
home covered in weals (and one permanently disabled by a shattered kneecap), parents, it 
seems—like MacDonald—turn a blind eye to evil.430 Having suffered such education them-
selves, there is resigned parental acceptance of the status quo. Convention is not challenged. 
Malison is only once confronted by a brave parent (Alec’s mother). 
Likewise, there is tacit acceptance of Malison’s divine counterpart who presides over 
small-town religion capriciously choosing some for favour and others for damnation. The pic-
ture is one of denial: the children suffer stoically and when released from school do their best to 
enjoy life. At weekends, adults are harangued by hellfire preachers in the ‘Missionar-kirk’ or 
attempt to find solace in the ‘muckle kirk’, 431 but likewise, when released, most do their best to 
forget God midweek. The spiritual and material worlds are strangely discontiguous, particularly, 
it appears, in the moral realm where two standards appear to operate. For example, when Alec 
meets Malison out of school—the former the victim of the latter’s sadism—they have a disturb-
ingly pleasant conversation concluding with Alec inviting his tormentor to dinner. The narrator 
paints an unlikely schizophrenic picture of the master: 
I shall not have to show much more than half of Mr. Malison’s life—the school half, which, both 
inwardly and outwardly, was very different from the other. The moment he was out of the school, 
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the moment, that is, that he ceased for the day to be responsible for the moral and intellectual con-
dition of his turbulent subjects, the whole character—certainly the whole deportment of the man 
changed. He was now as meek and gentle in speech and behaviour as any mother could have de-
sired.432 
Through the reader’s disquiet at Alec’s civility to his tormenter, MacDonald is challeng-
ing unthinking ‘civility’ towards the God that Malison represents. He is asking: would you in-
vite this ‘God’ back to your home? It is one of the novels that prompted Samuel Law Wilson to 
complain about MacDonald’s caricaturing of Calvinism.433 Here, Malison’s divine counterpart 
presides over a religion of darkness whose worshippers are misguided and lack sense. In one 
scene, for example, recently orphaned Annie visits the honest but over-zealous dissenting 
stonemason, Thomas Cramm. The image is of drawing towards darkness: 
For Thomas had been sitting in the dark till he could see in it (which, however, is not an invariable 
result), while out of the little light Annie had come into none at all. But she obeyed the voice, and 
went straight forward into the dark […]: 
“Noo, my lass, ye’ll ken what faith means. Whan God tells ye to gang into the mirk, gang!” 
“But I dinna like the mirk,” said Annie. 
“No human sowl can,” responded Thomas. “Jean, fess a can’le direckly.”434 
Cramm is sitting in the darkness of Calvinism trying to ‘see in the dark’, but it is Annie, 
the ‘candle’ entering from the world of nature, who carries light. ‘Mirk’ could equally be ‘Kirk’ 
since, through the blunt character of Cramm, MacDonald is just as critical of the Kirk whose 
aged and ineffective minister is in the pay of the local laird.435  
Cramm is an honest, uneducated soul trapped within his religion, unable to converse 
without trying to convert, often speaking in religious jargon.436 His cynical friend the carpenter, 
for example, sighs that ‘it’s a weary warl’’ as they pat down the earth on Annie’s father’s fresh-
ly-dug grave, to which Thomas responds: 
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“Ye hae no richt to say sae, George […] for ye hae never met it, an’ foughten wi’ ’t. Ye hae never 
draan the soord o’ the Lord and o’ Gideon. Ye hae never broken the pitcher, to lat the lamp shine 
out, an’ I doubt ye hae smo’red it [and you’d probably have smothered it] by this time. And sae, 
whan the bridegroom comes, ye’ll be ill-aff for a licht.”437 
But it is Thomas who is trapped in lightless religion. However, he is one whose ‘genuine 
religious feeling and experience […] will now and then crack the prisoning pitcher, and let 
some brilliant ray of the indwelling glory out, to discomfit the beleaguering hosts of troublous 
thoughts’.438 He is, in other words, a believer in spite of the ‘prisoning pitcher’ of Calvinism, 
and those ‘troublous thoughts’ primarily concern whether he and his friends are among the 
elect—a subject mentioned twenty-four times, often by Annie. 
Annie is a vulnerable child who genuinely suffers. After the death of her father she is 
lodged with avaricious shopkeeper Robert Bruce, the snake in this dubious Eden, a man more 
concerned to bank her modest dowry than look after her. Bruce, in Thomas’s opinion, ‘wadna 
fling a bane till a dog, afore he had ta’en a pyke at it himsel’,439 and Annie finds herself little 
more than a slave, forced to sleep in a rat-infested attic, kept on a starvation diet, taunted by 
Bruce’s sons, and has her luxurious hair cut off by Bruce’s wife to sell to the barber to make a 
few more pennies for the till. 
There is much scope here for—and indulgence in—Victorian sentimentality, however the 
abuse is real. MacDonald is exploring the suffering of an innocent and God’s response. Terri-
fied of rats, she cries out: ‘O God, tak care o’ me frae the rottans.’ The instant reply ‘from heav-
en in answer to this little one’s prayer: the cat’ sets the tone for the story.440 God has all under 
control. Annie, however, unaware that she is ‘elect’, is tormented by angst about her standing 
with God, compounded, rather than ameliorated, by hellfire sermons and Thomas’s well-
meaning attempts to get her ‘convertit’. This scenario, where children are subjected to weekday 
abuse at school, weekend abuse by the church, and, in Annie’s case, ongoing abuse at home, 
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prompts a Dostoevskian question from MacDonald: ‘A man ought to be able to endure grief 
suffering wrongfully, and be none the worse; but who dares demand that of a child?’441 
The answer in this narrative is: those who believe that God is like Murdoch Malison. In 
other words, humans are responsible for suffering, not God. But unlike Dostoevsky’s indigna-
tion about childhood suffering, or Christ’s anger at injustice, MacDonald here offers a very 
lame response. Noting the destructiveness of a northern winter on ‘the old and sickly, in poor 
homes, with scanty food and firing’, he remarks: ‘Little children suffer too, though the gift of 
forgetfulness does for them what the gift of faith does for their parents.’442 MacDonald, then, 
focuses on God’s ability to help God’s children to endure and forget suffering rather than face 
the possibility that genuinely destructive evil exists which should be addressed. 
The message is that God always responds to innocents like Annie. She finally has an 
epiphany, realising that: 
“He has been wi’ me a’ the time, my God! He gied me my father, and sent Broonie [her favourite 
cow] to tak’ care o’ me […] And he sent the cat whan I gaed till him aboot the rottans. An’ he ’s 
been wi’ me I kenna hoo lang, and he’s wi’ me noo. […] And I’ll try sair to be a gude bairn. Eh 
me! It’s jist wonnerfu! And God’s jist … naething but God himsel’.”443 
That Annie simply decides to be ‘a gude bairn’ is a ‘conversion’ that offends those such 
as Wilson as it bypasses the ‘moral appliances of Evangelical religion’.444 It is the Spirit work-
ing through nature that draws humanity. 
There is, in my view, a flaw in this work that reveals a weakness in MacDonald’s anthro-
pology; it concerns the relationship between Murdoch Malison (‘murder, son of evil’) and his 
pupils. So far, with large doses of temporary ‘willing suspension of disbelief’, the idealised 
children we have met are believable, if only as recognisable symbols pointing towards an aspect 
of childhood or Christlikeness. Gibbie, as noted, is described as ‘a rarity’: at minimum he is 
that; more plausibly he is an impossibility used to illustrate an idea. The problem in Alec Forbes 
is that—apart from Robert Bruce’s fairly ‘normal’ taunting sons—the other children appear too 
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nice. Yes, they (especially the boys) get up to childhood pranks and are called ‘loons’, but their 
collective reaction to Malison’s abuse raises questions. It begins with the egregious account of 
Truffy (possibly modelled on MacDonald’s own brother),445 the boy ‘kneecapped’ by Malison. 
This emaciated child had been deposited at school by a grandfather whose parting words 
were: ‘Noo ye jist gie them their whups weel, Maister Mailison, for ye ken that he that spareth 
the rod, blaudeth the bairn.’446 Malison does not disappoint. The problem is that after a vicious 
assault and a long convalescence, the child returns to school, disabled, with ‘a smile on his worn 
face, which shone’, only too ready to shake hands with his torturer and let bygones be by-
gones.447 The smile and demeanour imply that suffering has done the child good: he is trans-
formed. We might just accept this as somehow typological, but it gets worse. 
Malison, a licensed minister, has designs on the living at the Kirk, and, in a quest to se-
cure the position, preaches a sermon. It goes disastrously wrong. The congregation splutters 
with suppressed laughter and Malison leaves in disgrace. Truffy, however, mortified that his 
new-found father-figure has failed, stumps after him to see him safely home, and the following 
morning ‘laid a splendid bunch of cottage flowers on [the master’s] desk, and the next morning 
it was so crowded with offerings of the same sort that he had quite a screen behind which to 
conceal his emotion’. MacDonald declares: ‘Wonderful […] is the divine revenge!’ The chil-
dren ‘would wipe away the humiliation of their tyrant’; that despite years of suffering, they 
‘loved the man beneath whose lashes they had writhed in torture’. 448 
However forgivingly one reads this, it seems—as F. R. Leavis once remarked of one of 
George Eliot’s more inferior works—to be ‘the work of a very gifted mind, but of a mind mis-
using itself’.449 Here we have a conflation of the Romantic child icon with real children: a pro-
jection of inherent innocence and moral integrity onto children as a class resulting in absurdity. 
The intended message is that childhood suffering is never wasted, however this account under-
mines any meaningful understanding of that proposal. It implies that the answer to MacDon-
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ald’s question—‘who dares demand [suffering] of a child?’—must be ‘God’, for in order to re-
form one sadistic man, God has allowed a class of children to suffer terribly. That children as a 
class are undamaged by evil and have the innate ability to make profound moral choices—in 
this case to unconditionally forgive and love a sadist—is more than simply a rejection of the 
doctrine of original sin. It is, again, the claim that the child is impervious to surrounding quotid-
ian corruption and absorbs evil on behalf of humanity. 
4.3 (b) Charley Osbourne in Wilfrid Cumbermede 
In an era when Marx, Engels, Dickens, and others were passionately addressing social ills and 
social philosophy, Ruskin was probably right to accuse MacDonald of unreality. He writes, for 
example, of the first volume of Unspoken Sermons that: 
They are the best sermons—beyond all compare—that I have ever read, and if ever sermons did 
good, these will. […] If they were but true […]. But I feel so strongly that it is only the image of 
your own mind that you see in the sky!450  
These words might well have given some impetus to the writing of Wilfrid Cumbermede, 
which, four years later, explored the nature of such mental images ‘in the sky’.  
Significantly darker than narratives discussed so far, Cumbermede explores the life of a 
disturbed ‘child’ which ends in suicide. The Spectator described the plot as ‘uncommonly good’ 
notwithstanding the ‘tendency to religious or rather spiritual speculation and exposition’.451 
Lengthy dialogues explore whether one can trust one’s senses to correctly ‘decode’ nature’s 
cues and discern God. Nature, ‘the robe of Deity’,452 is, in this novel, often distorted, muted, 
ignored, or misunderstood. This dark mental landscape, if taken in isolation, would firmly con-
tradict Gabelman’s and Lewis’s insistence that MacDonald was a sunny and playful man,453 a 
narrative testing MacDonald’s own theses that all things work together for good (all the time) 
and that death itself is a good. Here, the abuse is psychological rather than physical, but still 
religiously motivated. It explores depression, repression, domination, madness, evil, death and 
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suicide, focused on the question: ‘Are not the forms of madness most frequently those of love 
and religion?’454 
As a work ‘shadowing out […] my present condition of mind’, as the ‘autobiographical’ 
narrator, Cumbermede, puts it,455 it expresses MacDonald’s radical idealism; objective physical-
ity becomes increasingly peripheral. After the suicide of his friend, Cumbermede remarks: ‘At 
this time I had no outer life at all. Whatever bore to me the look of existence was within me.’ 
And as he becomes more reflective than active, wonders what would happen ‘if thought, lording 
it alone, should assume a reality beyond its right?’456 In this text, nature is veiled by convention; 
each character is self-focused, blind to the divine presence within and without as a result of self 
(and, by implication, rationalism) ‘lording it alone’. 
The novel portrays a web of mutually dependent yet, ultimately, self-centred destructive 
relationships. Fathers are corrupt, domineering, inept, scheming or—in the case of the main pro-
tagonist, Cumbermede—missing. Unlike those discussed above, this narrative comes closest to 
facing the reality of a corrupt world. Questioning his own proposal that those who seek good 
will always find it, MacDonald asks: is it really possible for a child to find God when all the 
evidence points to the contrary? A striking passage, when the ‘true hearted’ Cumbermede is 
reflecting on the suicide of his best friend (also portrayed as true-hearted child), brings this 
question into focus: 
To say that the world had grown black to me is as nothing: I ceased—I will not say to believe in 
God […]—but I ceased to hope in God. The universe had grown a negation which yet forced its 
presence upon me—a death that bred worms. If there were a God anywhere, this universe could be 
nothing more than his forsaken moth-eaten garment. He was a God who did not care.457 
Echoing Darwin, if nature is the ‘robe of God’ then it is a discarded robe, perhaps picked 
up by a demon, or—as one contemporary sceptic put it—nature is a ‘fierce schoolmistress who 
circles the brow of her children with fire instead of filling their brains with light’.458 
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The plot centres around Wilfrid Cumbermede’s friendship with Charley. The former, un-
aware that he is heir to the estate on which he lives (the earth), is searching for the truth about 
his missing father (God). At the outset, MacDonald introduces doubt as to whether we can trust 
our senses. The child Wilfrid observes that the trees in the distance always move when the wind 
blows and concludes that they are the source of the wind: ‘I used my natural senses and this is 
what they told me.’459 Similarly, Charley continually misinterprets cues from nature, people, 
and God, concluding eventually that life is pointless and that suicide is the only reasonable re-
sponse. The narrator concurs: suicide is a rejection of worldly evil; an intuitive act of fleeing to 
the presence of God: 
Whenever the thought arose that God might have given him a fairer chance in this world, I was 
able to reflect that apparently God does not care for this world save as a part of the whole; and on 
that whole I had yet to discover that he could have given him a fairer chance.460 
Here, as in Alec Forbes, the abuse is attributed to distorted religion. Charley’s minister 
father is a dogmatic zealot, convinced his sensitive son is damned. However, there is a deeper, 
sinister aspect to the father’s abusive behaviour, an evil, repressive demeanour—a madness—
that is the cause of the son’s eventual death: 
I can hardly doubt, however, that [Charley] inherited a strain of madness from his father, a mad-
ness which that father had developed by forcing upon him the false forms of a true religion.461 
Like honest stonemason Thomas Cramm, locked in the ‘pitcher’ of Calvinism, MacDon-
ald is suggesting that the father’s religion is ‘true’ but encased or expressed in ‘false forms’. 
This somewhat disingenuous phrase implies that it is possible to distinguish between the content 
of religion and its ‘form’—its outward expression. But equally—as MacDonald often argues in 
his sermons (and narratives such as Phantastes)—false forms might simply be considered the 
visible expression of false religion. I suggest this reluctance simply to denounce this misguided 
Protestantism as false is indicative of the continued hold of childhood faith, as well as a failure 
to accept that ‘form’ is always expressive of ‘content’. 
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Mr Osbourne, Charley’s father, haunts the narrative like an evil spirit, coming between 
him and divine revelation. On the journey to start their schooling in Switzerland, Cumbermede 
notes that the father was ‘ever blocking up our horizon, whether he sat with his broad back in 
front of us on the coach-box, or paced the deck of a vessel, or perched with us under the hood 
on the top of a diligence’.462 The damage wrought on Charley’s young mind through his father’s 
psychological abuse is extensive—abuse which continues into adulthood as the son, now a law-
yer, continues to suffer domination and criticism. He is not even allowed home without his fa-
ther being there: ‘He does not wish me to be there without his presence to counteract my evil 
influences. He seems to regard my mere proximity as dangerous.’ Stressing once more that the 
root of madness is religion, Charley continues: ‘I sometimes wonder whether the severity of his 
religion may not have affected his mind.’463 The narrator later remarks: ‘It is a terrible thing 
when the father is the cloud, and not the sun, of his child’s life.’464 It is Charley’s father, not 
Charley himself, who is held responsible for the latter’s suicide as a result of having corrupted 
Christianity—of having ‘brand[ed] the truth of the kingdom with the private mark of opin-
ion’.465 If the father had truly loved his son: 
Doubtless, if in the mind so sadly unhinged, the sense of a holy presence could be developed—the 
sense of a love that loves through all vagaries—of a hiding-place from forms of evil the most fan-
tastic—of a fatherly care that not only holds its insane child in its arms, but enters into the chaos of 
his imagination, and sees every wildest horror with which it swarms; if, I say, the conviction of 
such a love dawned on the disordered mind, the man would live in spite of his imaginary foes.466 
The message is that God, the perfect father, is the shelter for an otherwise insane humani-
ty, the place of refuge, healing, and identity. Cumbermede finds this refuge by centring himself 
in the self that is ‘everlasting eternal giving’.467 His friend is denied the opportunity. 
Doubt, in this convincing sketch of depression and suicide, rather than being a positive 
catalyst for faith, produces despair. Even Cumbermede confesses that he had contemplated sui-
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cide.468 All characters have mental issues, particularly Charley whose dysfunctional mind is un-
able to access the healing power of nature, unable to see light beyond the darkness. When visit-
ing a glacial ice cave, for example, whereas Cumbermede rejoices in the numinous aestheticism 
of the blue, seemingly infinite light analogous to an encounter with God, Charley cannot cope. 
For him it is an encounter with death: 
‘O Charley!’ I exclaimed, looking round in my transport for sympathy. It was now my turn to cry 
out, for Charley’s face was that of a corpse. 
[…] 
‘It’s an awful place, Wilfrid. I don’t like it. Don’t go in again. I should stand waiting to see you 
come out in a winding-sheet. I think there’s something wrong with my brain. […] I see everything 
horribly dead.’469 
This scene dramatizes MacDonald’s insistence that for God to condemn the mentally dis-
turbed, those unable to respond positively to God in this life, is morally reprehensible: 
[T]he notion that a creature born imperfect, nay, born with impulses to evil not of his own generat-
ing, and which he could not help having, a creature to whom the true face of God was never pre-
sented, and by whom it never could have been seen, should be thus condemned, is as loathsome a 
lie against God as could find place in heart too undeveloped to understand what justice is, and too 
low to look up into the face of Jesus.470 
Post-mortem salvation must be a possibility if human free will is to make any sense. It is 
an inevitability if the loss of a soul amounts to defeat for God, that is, that for God to destroy the 
‘streams of life’ flowing from Godself—such as the incapacitated Charley—equates not to the 
defeat of evil, but the destruction of something of the essence of God, for ‘[i]s he not defeated 
every time that one of those lost souls defies him?’.471 
This narrative, therefore, questions the nature of reality. If what humans conceive as reali-
ty is a mental construct, what hope do humans have of finding truth when their minds distort 
and misinterpret received cues? Even when Cumbermede has a ‘spiritual’ encounter, he ques-
tions its validity: 
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I fear to build any definite conclusions upon it, from the dread of fanaticism and the danger of at-
tributing a merely physical effect to a spiritual cause. But are matter and spirit so far asunder?472 
We will consider the latter ontological question in due course. Here, with certain parallels 
with Murdoch Malison, MacDonald questions the character of God through the character of 
Charley Osbourne. If Mr Osbourne senior—a man who ‘puts the evil foremost in his creed and 
exhortations’— genuinely worships God, the implication is that God is either evil, or ‘very in-
different to what his creatures think of him’. 473 
The theological principles offered here are that God ‘will not force himself on [people], 
but help them to grow into the true knowledge of him’, and that those who claim to worship the 
true God may ‘have only a little of that knowledge’.474 However, in MacDonald’s view, God is 
continually orchestrating events to draw people to God: 
I do not believe we notice half of the coincidences that float past us on the stream of events. 
Things which would fill us with astonishment, and probably with foreboding, look us in the face 
and pass us by, and we know nothing of them.475 
Humanity is thus culpable, through negligence, of failing to discern truth. Charley, how-
ever, illustrates that this trite response is inadequate. In his case, the sins of the father are being 
visited on the child; however willing, he is mentally unable to decode the cues from either God 
or nature. 
Having conceded—at least theoretically—that his father might possibly have some good 
in him, he and Wilfred observe one of nature’s cues, a beautiful moonlit evening: 
‘I wish I could let it into me, Wilfrid,’ said Charley […]. 
‘Let what into you, Charley?’ 
‘The night and the blue and the stars.’ 
‘Why don’t you, then?’ 
‘I hate being taken in. The more pleasant a self-deception, the less I choose to submit to it.’476 
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The blue of the night, like the blue light in the ice cave of childhood, represents the infi-
nite presence of God—a presence inaccessible to the mentally disturbed Charley. While conced-
ing that God might be behind the beauty of nature, his fear of deception rejects this possibility. 
Even in adulthood the father’s hold is strong, a father who had told him ‘that the love of nature 
is not only a delusion, but a snare’. Charley summarises: ‘Of all miseries—to believe in a lovely 
thing and find it not true—that must be the worst.’477 
Charley’s suicide is precipitated by an unfortunate coincidence (seeing his beloved inno-
cently kiss his best friend, which he interprets as her rejection of him) which—since MacDon-
ald insists that events are orchestrated by God—means that God, as well as the father, is culpa-
ble. The logic of this can only be reconciled by MacDonald’s rejection of ‘the tree lies where it 
falls’ theology:478 
That my Charley, whose suicide came of misery that the painful flutterings of his half-born wings 
would not bear him aloft into the empyrean, should appear to my Athanasia [his beloved] lost in 
an abyss of irrecoverable woe; that she should think of God as sending forth his spirit to sustain 
endless wickedness for endless torture;—it was too frightful.479  
Suicide has, instead, ushered the disturbed man into God’s presence. Although buried in 
unconsecrated ground, Cumbermede observes that: 
I saw the body of Charley laid in the holy earth. For the earth is the Lord’s—and none the less ho-
ly that the voice of the priest may have left it without his consecration. Surely if ever the Lord 
laughs in derision, as the Psalmist says, it must be when the voice of a man would in his name ex-
clude his fellows from their birthright.480 
And, speaking through the voice of Cumbermede, MacDonald has to conclude that, ulti-
mately, one may rejoice over suicide: 
When the crystal shrine has grown dim, and the fair forms of nature […] are contorted hideously 
[by the tormented mind …;] when the body is no longer a mediator between the soul and the 
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world, but the prison-house of a lying gaoler and torturer—how can I but rejoice to hear that the 
tormented captive has at length forced his way out into freedom?481 
This narrative illustrates the thesis that childlike obedience to perceived truth, however 
mistaken, is of more value to God than belief which does not lead to obedience. For the mental-
ly ill, perception is necessarily skewed, but all are, to some extent, ‘lunatics’ for, as Cum-
bermede’s confession above shows, even he has been deluded about his worship which now he 
realises to be that of self. It leads to the question: ‘who can tell how often this may be the fact—
how often the lunatic also lives by faith?’.482 This is a question explored, for example, in the 
characters of the mad laird in Malcolm, or the ‘fool’ in The Wow O’ Rivven,483 individuals who 
exhibit more faith than most and find post-mortem rest in the arms of a loving God. As Hans 
Urs von Balthasar remarks: 
there is a gleam of unconscious, unintended sanctity about the real fool. He is the unprotected 
man, essentially transcendent, open to what is above him […]. Since he is never quite ‘in his right 
mind’, never quite ‘all there’, he lacks the ponderousness that would tie him down to earth. He 
stands nearest to the saint, often nearer than the morally successful man preoccupied with his per-
fection.484 
It is a narrative that blurs the distinction between wilfulness and weakness: is Mr Os-
bourne senior, for example, culpable or simply deluded? 
This narrative therefore rejects any simplistic notion of post-mortem judgement, relying 
instead on a purgatorial entrance to the afterlife. It is an extension of MacDonald’s belief that all 
evil is ultimately used by God for good: like Truffy’s abuse, Charley’s illness after the ice-cave 
incident results in him being ‘more cheerful than […] before’ and him ‘grow[ing] a good 
deal’.485 Suffering is the rain of God that creates springs in the human heart.486 It is the only way 
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he can reconcile the evil he sees in the created order with the belief in God as ‘the causing 
goodness’.487 
Finally, the focus here is almost exclusively on nature as being God’s vehicle for com-
munication to humanity. The Bible, like nature, is primarily considered as a book for ‘the rous-
ing of a man’s conscience’ rather than imparting any concrete information,488 and nature itself is 
seen as the main influence in Cumbermede’s awareness of God: 
The fact is I was coming in for my share in the spiritual influences of Nature, so largely poured on 
the heart and mind of my generation. […] I was under the same spell as [Wordsworth and Cole-
ridge]. Nature was a power upon me. I was filled with the vague recognition of a present soul in 
Nature. 489 
4.4 A realist fairyland 
An immediate judgement as to which of these narratives is the more realist might favour Cum-
bermede: it appears to offer a more ‘real’ (and depressing) world. However, on reflection it is 
evident that whether innocent or disturbed, MacDonald’s children inhabit the same world—a 
fantasy world. In my view, Lewis was right to suggest that the opening chapters of Cum-
bermede are especially ‘fantastic’:490 one feels that the tale is more like a dream (or a nightmare) 
than a picture of reality. But equally, Gibbie’s pastoral Eden—where honest (male) peasants 
read poetry to each other and play pan-pipes while submissive females dutifully listen and are 
instructed491—is just as fantastic, and, like the art of the period, devoid of steam engines or in-
dustry.492 Such a disconnect between lived reality and the MacDonaldian ideal led a frustrated 
Ruskin, who favoured ‘stern facts’, to complain: 
I suppose it is quite impossible for you dear good people, who think it your duty to believe what-
ever you like—and to expect always to get whatever is good for you, to enter into the minds of us 
poor wicked people, who sternly think it our duty to believe nothing but what we know to be fact, 
and to expect nothing but what we’ve been used to get.493 
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Perhaps he had failed to appreciate that even fantasy can shed light on the nature of reali-
ty. 
I have suggested also that, unlike the traditional Bildungsroman where the protagonist is 
shaped by external forces, MacDonald’s innocent children achieve the opposite—it is their 
world, not they, who change. But this also would be a misreading: it is rather (as we will con-
sider more fully later) an issue of perception. As we look through the eyes of these children (and 
those playing opposite them) we see different perspectives on an essentially idealist ‘fairy’ uni-
verse. Gibbie (and to a lesser extent Diamond), being the perfect imago, is almost unable to see 
or experience evil; his pure vision sees the numinous glow of nature; evil has no purchase on his 
innocent soul. Annie, however, is less perfect, but once the ‘pitcher of Calvinism’ is broken, she 
too is able to clearly perceive the divine glow. It is Charley’s and Cumbermede’s vision that is 
the most distorted, the former never able to see clearly, blinded as he is by, as it were, inopera-
ble (at least in this life) religious cataracts. 
All these, though, are children, or perhaps one should say firmly on the road to childhood. 
Even Charley is a child; he is simply a blind child, unable, for that reason, to be an obedient 
child, however willing. Murdoch Malison, likewise, is blind to the true nature of his abuse: it 
takes the ministrations of his charges to begin to open his eyes, just as Annie becomes a ‘can-
dle’ to Thomas Cramm. It is a theology that stresses orientation rather than position or status: 
that those who turn in God’s direction are on the road to salvation, not those who claim to be 
‘elect’ or ‘convertit’. It is ‘adults’ such as shopkeeper Robert Bruce (who becomes an elder in 
the Missionar-kirk for business reasons), or the zealot Mr Osbourne—those of whom Jesus said, 
‘If you were blind, you would have no sin; but now you say, “We see.” Therefore your sin re-
mains’494—who will experience the full force of God’s purgatorial fire. 
In these fantasy worlds, evil is also considered primarily a matter of perception—an erro-
neous vision of God—and this aspect of MacDonald’s theology has implications that will need 
to be explored more fully. We now turn to an outline of that theology. 
                                                




Chapter 5 An overview of George MacDonald’s theology 
5.1 MacDonald’s view of cognition and epistemology 
This chapter provides an overview of MacDonald’s theology. Specific theological propositions 
already identified are located in a wider theological context by paying closer attention to Mac-
Donald’s direct voice in essays and letters, as well as additional narrative sources. This over-
view will provide the foundation for a more nuanced and critical reading of his work—
especially his fantasy literature. 
First, some comments regarding MacDonald’s view of cognition and epistemology. 
John Henry Newman wrote of MacDonald’s age that it was a time when faith had be-
come stereotyped: 
Its doctrines are not so much facts, as stereotyped aspects of facts; and it is afraid, so to say, of 
walking around them. It induces its followers to be content with this meagre view of revealed 
truth.495  
MacDonald, however, dissatisfied with ‘meagre views of received truth’ was unafraid of 
‘walking around them’. His is a Maurician emphasis on holistic truth (that is, ‘organic’ truth 
perceived ‘symbolically’)496 on the basis that truth in Christianity is fundamentally related to a 
person, not to propositions. ‘To know’ is not savoir but connaître: ‘vous connaîtrez la vérité et 
la vérité vous rendra libres’.497 He, like Newman, disdained ‘[l]ogicians […] more set upon 
concluding rightly, than on drawing right conclusions’.498 His Romantic privileging of imagina-
tion is a reaction to the perceived sterility of conventional faith—belief in dead concepts buried 
in ‘graves of convention’.499 The imagination must lead its plodding brother, reason.500 Only 
imagination, he argues, can disinter faith from certain death. As noted, it puts him on a collision 
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course with Calvin, who famously valued ‘solid enquiry’ above ‘vain speculation’501—perhaps 
more so with Calvin’s successors for whom their master’s thought had, in like fashion, become 
divorced from context.502 
There were, however, critics. In George Eliot’s view, for example, Romantics were 
dreamers, poor poets whose grandiloquence stemmed from ‘the want of taking for a criterion 
the true qualities of the object described, or the emotion expressed’, subsequently ‘float[ing] 
away into utter inanity without meeting any criterion to arrest [them]’.503 For John Ruskin, irra-
tionality led such as MacDonald to believe that ‘the primrose is anything else than a primrose: a 
star, or a sun, or a fairy’s shield, or a forsaken maiden’;504 Romantics were ‘unhinged’ from re-
ality and ‘too weak to deal fully with what is before them’—they may ‘feel strongly’ but have 
lost the ability to ‘think strongly’.505 
How might one defend MacDonald against such charges? 
The issue is cognitive approach: the ‘logician’ constructs reality based on deductive or 
inductive principles. MacDonald’s approach fits a third category, abduction, which recognises 
that many human theories about reality (and, as Newman underlined, firmly held beliefs)506 are 
posited on the basis of a more intuitive approach to presenting states of affairs that lead to con-
clusions that cannot (at least initially, often never) be formally verified, and are inevitably af-
fected by the choice of ‘lens’ through which one looks. Without infinite a priori knowledge, 
finite individuals, of necessity, must choose a model by which to view the world, a choice 
which then affects what is seen. Psychologist Iain McGilchrist puts it like this: 
How we think about our selves and our relationship with the world is already revealed in the met-
aphors we unconsciously choose to talk about it. That choice further entrenches our partial view of 
the subject. Paradoxically we seem to be obliged to understand something—including ourselves—
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well enough to choose the appropriate model before we can understand it. Our first leap deter-
mines where we land.507  
It is a principle developed at length by Newman for whom ‘real assent’ to any proposition 
is inevitably based on a working model rather than objective facts: 
let us not by our words imply that we are appealing to experience, when really we are only ac-
counting, and that by hypothesis, for the absence of experience. The confusion is a fact, the rea-
soning processes are not facts.508 
Using the term ‘abduction’, Newman’s ‘hypothesis’ was formulated by C. S. Peirce as 
‘the process of forming explanatory hypotheses […] the only logical operation which introduces 
any new idea’, and that abduction encompasses ‘all the operations by which theories and con-
ceptions are engendered’.509 As a cognitive process, it precedes deduction or induction. The 
problem for Ruskin is not that MacDonald and his ‘dreaming’ friends are imaginative (in his 
view, imagination is ‘the source of all that is great in the poetic arts’)510 but that they are pre-
senting hypotheses that are not subsequently open to deductive or inductive verification. 
MacDonald’s starting point is that God rewards the honest seeker,511 and his ‘lens’ is 
Christocentric. A childlike attitude is relevant here, for, inasmuch as divine revelation is neces-
sarily beyond logical analysis and therefore limited (reflecting Ruskin’s conclusion that to know 
anything must be to know it partially),512 one has to abductively choose the ‘best fit’ to explain 
the presenting phenomena and trust that this is either (a) valid on the basis that God does not 
intentionally deceive God’s children or (b) if invalid, that this will become clear, since God is 
committed to leading God’s children into truth. This, in short, is MacDonald’s ‘fiduciary her-
meneutic’, the choice to view the world from the perspective of faith. 
The child is proposed as a model to account for the dynamics and content of the human–
divine relationship; MacDonald’s fiction then explores this hypothesis in ‘real’ life. The unreali-
ty of his ‘realist’ novels is not an inability to write, rather a sense that the hypothesis does not 
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completely match or account for human experience—or relates to only one aspect of it. His im-
aginative fantasies, which have much looser moorings to perceived reality, are, for this reason, 
significantly more effective. (But, as David Reynolds discusses, they may be exemplary of the 
tendency among ‘liberal’ authors, according to their Calvinist accusers, of disguising what they 
really mean so that they can slip heresy under the radar.)513 
MacDonald follows Coleridge in positing that the Spirit’s drawing of the human imagina-
tion is not the result of human effort, but of divine initiative,514 perhaps absolving him of the 
charge of Pelagianism. Grace is needed. In other words, abduction (not that Coleridge or Mac-
Donald used the word) is not just human cognition reaching out into the void and coming up 
with an imaginative ‘best fit’, but is the active drawing by God of human consciousness towards 
Godself: it is the confidence that ‘[t]he child sees things as the Father means him to see 
them’.515 God draws the divine ‘spark’ in humans, the imagination, back to its source. Empha-
sising that the concept is more than simply another form of reasoning but involves divine initia-
tive, Daniel Hardy reflects that for Coleridge, it was ‘“the being drawn towards the true center” 
of all, the Logos and the Spirit’.516 For MacDonald, it is the ‘gravitational’ pull of the Spirit urg-
ing union with God, the fire-core of existence around which the human being orbits: 
It is but that the deeper soul that willed and wills our souls, rises up, the infinite Life, into the self 
we call I and me, but which lives immediately from him, and is his very own property and na-
ture—unspeakably more his than ours: this deeper creative soul, working on and with his creation 
upon higher levels, makes the I and me more and more his, and himself more and more ours; until 
at length the glory of our existence flashes upon us, we face full to the sun that enlightens what it 
sent forth, and know ourselves alive with an infinite life, even the life of the Father.517 
Daniel Hardy’s articulation of abduction seems to summarise MacDonald’s view. In both 
the individual life and in human social history, the Spirit is drawing humanity from beyond the 
horizons of cognition towards eschatological consummation, demanding that faith reach out 
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imaginatively beyond the known towards the becoming—‘allowing our imaginations to be 
drawn forward by divine attraction: an ongoing process of envisioning and re-envisioning, so 
that we are stretched forward by the divine purposes’.518 It is an iterative process that reaches 
for truth but never possesses it, and explains MacDonald’s suspicion of systems claiming to ful-
ly contain truth, including his own aversion to producing or subscribing to one. He makes this 
very clear: 
We are far too anxious to be definite, & have finished, well-polished, sharp-edged systems—
forgetting that the more perfect a theory about the infinite, the surer it is to be wrong, the more im-
possible it is to be right. I am neither Arminian nor Calvinist—to no system could I subscribe. 519 
He also notes: ‘Our Lord had no design of constructing a system of truth in intellectual 
forms.’520 Instead, he prefers to conceive of faith as a journey towards the infinite heart of God, 
reminiscent of Gregory of Nyssa’s epektasis, with the soul growing younger and more embrac-
ing of the fire of God with increasing proximity to the divine heart. 
Finally, we note that MacDonald’s theology is primarily pastoral; he aims to lead people 
‘to the living Truth, to the Master himself’.521 He appears to have two audiences in view: those 
who fear, and those who despise, the ‘headmaster’ God and, whether anxious believers or in-
formed ‘cultured despisers’, are familiar with Christianity. This is most evident in his narrow 
treatment of evil where the tacit assumption is made that his ‘congregation’ would like to escape 
from hell and (re)connect with God, and that the problem of evil is sited in human rebellion. As 
our narrative readings have revealed, his focus on moral evil is arguably at the expense of a 
broader and more adequate account. As a pastoral theologian, his main concern is to elicit per-
sonal response, not produce watertight theoretical frameworks—he wants to foster ‘children’. 
The emphasis on personal revelation leads to the focus on being an obedient child—obedient to 
truth as perceived. If that perception is flawed, he argues—reflecting the comments above re-
garding the iterative nature of revelation—God will soon, through obedience, lead his child 
                                                
518 Wording a Radiance, p. 77. 
519 ‘To His Father’, Arundel, April 15th 1851, in Letters GM, p. 51. 
520 US1, p. 66. 




back to the right path.522 ‘Faith’, he insists, ‘can have no existence except in obedience’;523 
‘[o]bedience is the soul of knowledge’.524 
We now turn to a summary MacDonald’s theology. 
5.2 Doctrine of God 
The title of Jesus’s discourse about the child, and that of MacDonald’s first Unspoken Sermon, 
sums up MacDonald’s doctrine of God: God is both ‘a child’ and ‘in the midst’. We begin with 
the latter. 
5.2 (a) The central fire of God—creating and consuming 
God, for MacDonald, is absolute Being, the ‘fire-core of the universe’525 that is both creative 
and destructive, heaven and hell. It is a Behmenist vision of creation emanating from God, but 
God is also the ‘consuming fire which is essential love’,526 sustaining what is good and consum-
ing evil. God is hell: ‘It is a fearful thing to fall [unworthily] into the hands of the living 
God.’527 As David Bentley Hart writes, from an Eastern Orthodox perspective, ‘the kingdom is 
also an event of discrimination, a condemnation of all the falsehoods that enslave creation. The 
kingdom wears the aspect of damnation, as well as redemption, and the language of hell enters 
Christian discourse alongside the evangel of peace.’ 
Hart continues: 
Hell is with us at all times, a phantom kingdom perpetuating itself in the wastes of sinful hearts, 
but only becomes visible to us as hell because the true kingdom has shed its light upon history. In 
theological tradition, most particularly in the East, there is that school of thought that wisely 
makes no distinction, essentially, between the fire of hell and the light of God’s glory, and that in-
terprets damnation as the soul’s resistance to the beauty of God’s glory.528 
From a Western perspective, Hans Urs von Balthasar concurs: for an unrepentant sinner, 
‘the fiery torrent of eternal love that flows around and through him would remain a torrent of 
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eternal wrath’.529 This is MacDonald’s view. Thus evil ‘alone is consumable’,530 and, in a phrase 
rejecting popular ideas of hell, remarks: ‘Death alone can die everlastingly’. This comment is 
made in Alec Forbes as spring begins to thaw winter’s chill. When God shines fully in the 
spring of the eschaton, evil will finally end: 
[T]he winter, old and weary, was halting away before the sweet approaches of the spring—a sym-
bol of that eternal spring before whose slow footsteps Death itself, “the winter of our discontent,” 
shall vanish. Death alone can die everlastingly.531 
This divine emanation is not impersonal power or an involuntary ‘shining’: it is an aes-
thetic model that views creation as God’s willed artwork, ‘an expression of the thought, the 
feeling, the heart of God himself’, 532 or, as he put it to his future wife: ‘The beautiful things 
round about you are the expression of God’s face […] the garment whereby we see the deity.’533 
It is a rejection of the Newtonian universe with its absentee God: ‘This world is not merely a 
thing which God hath made, subjecting it to laws.’534 Instead, God is intimately present in all 
God has made (which begs the question how we account for the things that are not beautiful, 
something which will be considered later). 
With God, creative thoughts are synonymous with creative acts, thus creation is the 
‘boundless free giving of the original Thought’.535 It is a panentheistic cosmology; that is, crea-
tion emanates from, and is sustained by, God: God is fully invested and present in creation but 
creation does not equate to God (pantheism). Our reality is not, as it were, the sum of God’s 
thoughts: there exists a realm behind the ‘back of the north wind’ to which humans have no ac-
cess at present; that realm is God’s infinite being, the final consummate destiny of all crea-
tion.536 The glacial ice-cave in Wilfrid Cumbermede, where ‘streams, ever creeping into the day 
of vision from the unlike and the unknown, unrolling themselves like the fronds of a fern out of 
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the infinite of God’, illustrates this.537 The picture is of a fractal reality emerging from a pro-
found divine source, the implication being that beyond the visible world with its door of death, 
the infinite and eternal being of God is—if God should permit—inviting further encounter. 
Rather than speculate ontologically,538 MacDonald emphasises that practically, ‘in him 
we live and move and have our being’: 
Do you not believe […] that there is all about us, and in us, an infinite thought; that the atmos-
phere in which we live and breathe […] is thought, and that thought is the thought of One, and that 
One is the thought whence we came—that is, the thinking God, thinking always?539 
It is an idealist theocentric model. Human selfhood is entirely generated and sustained by 
God: ‘God thinks you out of himself, and you live because he lives; you have no independent 
existence at all’,540 a phrase which at first sight appears to deny the divine gift of autonomous 
selfhood. 
MacDonald, however, insists that free will is genuine. Selfhood may existentially be fully 
dependent on God’s sustenance, but this does not imply determinism. Human being is con-
ceived as God, who is at the moral gravitational centre of this universe, allowing God’s 
‘thoughts’ to think for themselves: that from a remote orbit of gravitational weakness, human 
will has the power to choose to return to the heart of love, or, in rejecting that love, experience 
the hell of ‘outer darkness’ where the fire of God is most destructive: 
The fire of God, which is his essential being, his love, his creative power, is a fire unlike its earthly 
symbol in this, that it is only at a distance it burns—that the farther from him, it burns the worse, 
and that when we turn and begin to approach him, the burning begins to change to comfort, which 
comfort will grow to such bliss that the heart at length cries out with a gladness no other gladness 
can reach.541 
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‘God has, as it were,’ he summarises, ‘put us just so far away from Him that we can exer-
cise the divine thing in us, our own will, in returning towards our source.’542 
That God’s power is essentially love is a refusal of the sadistic schoolmaster God of the 
Reformers: who ‘yield the idea of the Ancient of Days, “the glad creator,” and put in its stead a 
miserable, puritanical martinet of a God’. It is in this context that MacDonald turns with loath-
ing ‘[f]rom all copies of Jonathan Edwards’s portrait of God’543 (perhaps having read ‘Sinners 
in the Hands of an Angry God’), a comment that particularly irks contemporary neo-Reformed 
critics John Piper and Timothy Keller who conclude that MacDonald is ‘not really a Chris-
tian’.544 
5.2 (b) The divine father–child: ‘To us a God, to himself a child’545 
The image of God as power (albeit loving) is contrasted with God’s kenotic choice to be power-
less, central to which is the image of the divine father–child relationship. Expounding ‘The 
Child in the Midst’, MacDonald begins by emphasising that God is not ‘childish’, but ‘child-
like’: 
One of the saddest and not least common sights in the world is the face of a child whose mind is so 
brimful of worldly wisdom that the human childishness has vanished from it, as well as the divine 
childlikeness. For the childlike is the divine, and the very word “marshals me the way that I was 
going.”546 
Jesus chose an ordinary child because he was drawing attention to something essential in 
childhood which we are to emulate: ‘the essential childhood was meant, and not a blurred and 
half-obliterated childhood’.547 That essence is not innocence, but divine childlikeness, ‘spiritual 
childhood’: the welcome of the child ‘in my name’ does not merely mean ‘because I will it’ but 
‘means as representing me; and, therefore, as being like me’. He continues: 
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In my name […] involves a revelation from resemblance, from fitness to represent and so reveal. 
He who receives a child, then, in the name of Jesus, does so, perceiving wherein Jesus and the 
child are one, what is common to them.548 
The common denominator between child, Son, and Father is childlikeness. 
A reasonable objection to this argument is that what is endearing in a child might not be 
so attractive in a God:549 one may accept that a child carries the imago Dei, but this does not 
imply that all childhood characteristics (such as throwing tantrums) can be found in God. But 
MacDonald is not suggesting this; he is simply insisting that since Christ identified with a child, 
the latter must, in some fundamental sense, represent the deity in whose image it is made. 
The point is that in the context of a discourse about power (which disciple would be the 
greatest in the kingdom) the use of a child is significant, for a child knows, deep down, that it 
does not rule in an adult world. God, likewise, is ‘powerless’—a child—which leads to a con-
cise articulation of his doctrine of God: 
For it is his childlikeness that makes him our God and Father. The perfection of his relation to us 
swallows up all our imperfections, all our defects, all our evils; for our childhood is born of his fa-
therhood.550 
That God is a powerless child is not so much a divine choice as an expression of the di-
vine nature: perfect love never coerces; that ‘perfection of relation’ that ‘swallows our imperfec-
tions’ is love; the ‘fire-core’ is ‘love […] a radiant perfection. Love and not self-love is lord of 
the universe’.551 Here the (divine) child is father to the man and the imago Dei is, above all else, 
the image of the childlike God. 
This loving ‘relation of the Father and the Son contains the idea of the universe. […] The 
child-relation is the one eternal, ever enduring, never changing relation.’552 It is the hallmark of 
a reality where individual identity can only be found in relationship with the divine other, and 
where human identity is only real if it reflects the divine purpose—the divine idea. ‘The child’ 
is, therefore, a metaphor which does not simply speak of submissiveness (or any other specific 
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attribute) but one which is at the root of reality because it is intrinsic to the nature of the triune 
God. 
MacDonald’s view of the Trinity, however, reflects the nineteenth century Western ten-
dency to speak of the Spirit as the bond of love between Father and Son and this, as Hart ob-
serves, can ‘give the appearance that the Spirit is not as irreducibly “personal” as Father and 
Son’.553 This is reflected in MacDonald’s preference for the term ‘Spirit of Christ’554 rather than 
Holy Spirit. He encourages openness to the Spirit, writing, for example, that ‘God gives the 
spirit of his son, the spirit of himself, to be in him [who is obedient], and lead him to the under-
standing of all truth’,555 and laments the lack of awareness of the Spirit in the church, but he is 
very much the sort of a philosophical idealist that regards reality as primarily a mental construc-
tion: in his view, the Spirit is God’s ‘mind’ or the ‘mind of Christ’ that the child may share.556  
Despite this period leaning towards dualist terminology, MacDonald, by placing this 
‘idea of the universe’ at the heart of his theology, is stressing the mutual love within the Trinity 
which Hart terms the ‘triune coinherence’ of God, at the heart of which is perichoretic joy; a 
dance as each ‘person’ of the Trinity rejoices in, and affirms, the ‘others’. The implication, ac-
cording to Hart, is that each ‘person’ of the Trinity necessarily embraces the ‘others’ such that, 
for example, ‘The Father’s entire being, which he possesses in his paternal depth, is always also 
both filial […] and spiritual.’ It is this insight which, I believe, MacDonald is expressing: that 
humans are made in the image of a deity who is essentially relational and filial. 
5.2 (c) Christology 
The filiality of the Father is reciprocated by the Son being the perfect imago:557 
He has never lost his childhood, the very essence of childhood being nearness to the Father and the 
outgoing of his creative love; whence, with that insight of his eternal childhood of which the in-
sight of the little ones here is a fainter repetition, he must see everywhere as the Father means it.558 
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Jesus perfectly reflects the childhood and the light of the Father,559 in contrast, for exam-
ple, to the moral separation implied by Scottish divine Samuel Rutherford, for whom ‘[t]he 
Lord the Creditor, and Christ the Cautioner did strike hands together’,560 the one taking unilat-
eral action to satisfy the other. Father and Son are not morally divided: soteriological schemes 
that imply the Son must protect humans from the wrath of the Father are false.561  
MacDonald, like Karl Barth, views Christ as the only perfect imago Dei.562 Humans are a 
‘fainter repetition’ of ‘his eternal childhood’, ‘little child Gods’: 
For the finite that dwells in the infinite, and in which the infinite dwells, is finite no longer. Those 
who are thus children indeed, are little Gods, the divine brood of the infinite Father.563 
‘The Word’, MacDonald insists, ‘is that by which we live, namely, Jesus himself’;564 the 
Bible is not the Word of God but a word of God.565 Iain McGilchrist wryly notes that in the 
Reformation ‘the Flesh is made Word’;566 in MacDonald’s words: ‘All reading of the Book is 
not reading of the Word.’567 Personal revelation is both valid and necessary; ‘[t]he Word is the 
Lord’: 
Every man must read the Word for himself. One may read it in one shape, another in another: all 
will be right if it be indeed the Word they read, and they read it by the lamp of obedience. He who 
is willing to do the will of the Father shall know the truth of the teaching of Jesus. The spirit is 
‘given to them that obey him.’568 
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Obedience results in, not from, the filling of the Spirit. MacDonald is probably thinking 
of John’s words (also A. J. Scott’s epitaph): ‘If any man will do His Will, he shall know of the 
doctrine’569—a text explicitly linked to imaginative discipleship:  
As he that is willing to do the will of the Father, shall know of the doctrine, so, we doubt not, he 
that will do the will of THE POET, shall behold the Beautiful.570 
The Johannine priority for the child to ‘obey his commands’ is a ubiquitous theme con-
stantly reminding his readers to act on the truth; that ‘faith by itself, if it does not have works, is 
dead’.571 The starting point is Christ’s example: Christ came ‘clothed in the garb of humanity, 
the armour that can be pierced, to take all the consequences of being the god of obedience 
among the children of disobedience’.572 Christ not only demands, but perfectly demonstrates the 
self-denying, other-affirming, perichoretic ‘dance’ of the Trinity: obedience is not a duty to be 
commanded, but a response of love. Expanding on the notion that Christ came ‘clothed in the 
garb of humanity’ rather than becoming human, he writes: 
He took on him the form of man: he was man already. And he was, is, and ever shall be divinely 
childlike. He could never have been a child if he would ever have ceased to be a child, for in him 
the transient found nothing. Childhood belongs to the divine nature. Obedience, then, is as divine 
as Will, Service as divine as Rule.573 
Christ’s incarnation, his earthly ‘childhood’, therefore, expressed his eternal childhood. In 
particular, childlike obedience is set over against notions of power and control—‘empire’: ‘It 
was empire he rejected when he ordered Satan behind him like a dog to his heel.’574 
5.2 (d) The ‘morality’ of God 
MacDonald’s theodicy refutes Calvin’s voluntarist position, that ‘everything which [God] wills 
must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it’575—such as choosing some for 
damnation. This assertion in se cannot be refuted for God is ‘constrained’ by God’s own good-
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ness, but problems arise when God’s actions violate the human understanding of moral recti-
tude, begging the question as to whether God and humanity share the same moral ‘space’—a 
question that arose when we considered the apparent moral schizophrenia of schoolmaster Mur-
doch Malison.576 
To give a recent example, John Piper believes (citing Matt. 24.46 and Rev. 14.11) that 
‘judgment is not remedial or temporary but punitive and everlasting’ (views rejected by F. D. 
Maurice that led to his expulsion from his Chair at King’s College London in 1854). In this 
‘light’ he considers the fate of his three sons, concluding in voluntarist tones: 
But I am not ignorant that God may not have chosen my sons for his sons. And—, though I think I 
would give my life for their salvation, if they should be lost to me, I would not rail against the Al-
mighty. He is God. I am but a man. The potter has absolute rights over the clay. Mine is to bow 
before his unimpeachable character and believe that the Judge of all the earth has ever and always 
will do right.577 
MacDonald, agreeing with Spencer’s polemic against similar glosses in his time on the 
‘unimpeachable character’ which tortures eternally,578 describes it as ‘paganism’: 
One of my earliest recollections is of beginning to be at strife with the false system here assailed. 
Such paganism I scorn as heartily in the name of Christ, as I scorn it in the name of righteous-
ness.579 
Such views are ‘an insult’ to God, and ‘a dishonour to his creature, to hold concerning 
him’ and to believe that those like Charley in Wilfrid Cumbermede, who may have had little 
chance in this life to ‘accept Christ’, are forever damned— 
is as loathsome a lie against God as could find place in heart too undeveloped to understand what 
justice is, and too low to look up into the face of Jesus. It never in truth found place in any heart, 
though in many a pettifogging brain. There is but one thing lower than deliberately to believe such 
a lie, and that is to worship the God of whom it is believed.580 
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The lines here are clearly drawn. MacDonald holds that, since all being—including hell—
is sustained by God, all morality is ‘in’ God: apparent anomalies must be down to the limita-
tions of human perspective. But whereas Piper is prepared to accept a discontinuous morality, 
MacDonald is not. He argues that God and humanity must be morally alike—not in terms of 
scope or application, but certainly in terms of ethical norms: 
To say that what our deepest conscience calls darkness may be light to God, is blasphemy; to say 
light in God and light in man are of differing kinds, is to speak against the spirit of light.581 
This issue is exemplified by Piper’s focus on the potter/clay duality, an analogy which 
stresses not only the otherness of God but could be read as absolute unlikeness (reminiscent of 
Chesterton’s remark regarding the futility of comparing a hare with an isosceles triangle).582 
MacDonald, in contrast, recognising that at some level we are made in the image of God (that 
the materials the potter works with are not simply unlike and inert) argues that likeness includes 
moral values: 
To say on the authority of the Bible that God does a thing no honourable man would do, is to lie 
against God; to say that it is therefore right, is to lie against the very spirit of God. To uphold a lie 
for God’s sake is to be against God, not for him. God cannot be lied for. He is the truth. The truth 
alone is on his side.583 
Moral confusion stems from a lack of childlike vision. Discussing Jesus’s contrast of the 
‘wise and prudent’ with ‘babes’584 he argues that the former, with their myopic preoccupation 
with self-preservation, are unable to perceive the truth of the kingdom: ‘in proportion to our 
care about our own well-being, is our incapability of understanding and welcoming the care of 
the Father’.585 He observes, in a criticism that would certainly apply to the zealous father of 
Charley Osbourne, that: 
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All those evil doctrines about God that work misery and madness, have their origin in the brains of 
the wise and prudent, not in the hearts of the children.586 
It is not wisdom per se that is objected to, but the danger that it separates ‘babe’ from Fa-
ther, especially if wielded by those claiming the institutional authority of church or synagogue. 
‘Terribly has his gospel suffered in the mouths of the wise and prudent.’587 In contrast, the ‘Ro-
mantic’ child is uncorrupted by culture: 
The Father, then, revealed his things to babes, because the babes were his own little ones, uncor-
rupted by the wisdom or the care of this world, and therefore able to receive them.588 
Still trailing clouds of glory, the child intuitively understands ‘a little how things go in the 
presence of their father in heaven, and thereby to interpret the words of the Son’.589 In this inno-
cent state, children understand the morality of heaven: 
The babes were the prophets in heaven, and the angels were glad to find it was to be so upon the 
earth also; they rejoiced to see that what was bound in heaven, was bound on earth; that the same 
principle held in each.590 
It is the world’s distorted morality which gives rise to ‘one dull miserable human system 
after another usurping [the gospel’s] place’.591 God and humans share the same moral space; to 
punish eternally is as morally wrong in heaven as on earth. Only the child understands the moral 
implications of the pervading ‘ideal relation’ of Father to Son at the heart of reality: 
No wisdom of the wise can find out God; no words of the God-loving can reveal him. The simplic-
ity of the whole natural relation is too deep for the philosopher. The Son alone can reveal God; the 
child alone understand him.592 
5.2 (e) The justice and mercy of God 
MacDonald’s aim was to dismantle the ‘dull miserable human system’ constructed by ‘the wise 
and prudent’ based on the Westminster Confession. Calvin, for example—having insisted that 
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‘[g]uilt is from nature’ and having Christian parents was no antidote for ‘the primary and uni-
versal curse’ affecting children’s lives593—inspired Samuel Rutherford. His was a ruthlessly 
forensic approach to faith and view of God as harsh law-giver.594 Infants would go to hell on the 
grounds that ‘being without the Covenant [they] cannot be chosen and predestinate in Christ to 
salvation’.595 As T. F. Torrance observes, Scottish voices such as Rutherford’s played a signifi-
cant role in drafting the Confession, a document with a ‘very legalistic and constitutional char-
acter in which theological statements were formalised at times with an almost “frigidly logical 
definition”’596 that would result in ‘persistent problems’ for Scottish theology.597 Torrance ob-
serves that Rutherford’s nineteenth century successors, such as George Hill, were equally foren-
sic, labelling the latter’s theology as ‘methodologically erroneous and inadequate [and] strictly 
not a fully Christian doctrine of God’.598 
Kirk intransigence—putting the Confession above the Bible599—led to John McLeod 
Campbell’s dismissal.600 Erskine of Linlathen considered it: 
[the] cast[ing] out from the Church of his fathers one of the saintliest of her sons. […] He never 
ceased to regard it as the stoning by the Church of Scotland of her best prophet, the deliberate re-
jection of the highest light vouchsafed to her in his time.601 
Torrance identifies the main issue: 
The question had to be asked, therefore […] what kind of God does this imply? That was the great 
question with which the General Assembly was faced in 1830, with McLeod Campbell’s revolt 
against the idea of God that lay behind the doctrine of predestination and limited atonement in 
what George Hill regularly referred to as ‘the Calvinistic System’ that prevailed in the Kirk.602 
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It was this question that motivated MacDonald’s quest for his ‘true father’ (the plot of 
many of his novels)—what was God really like? The problem was that this ‘strictly not fully 
Christian doctrine of God’ implied a schizophrenic Miltonian deity who was one minute ‘just’ 
and the next minute ‘merciful’: 
He thundereth these words into their eares. 
You guilty souls where are you? Have you thus 
Transgrest? See now how you are like to us! 
. . . Thus spake God’s Justice; then his Mercy brake 
A deeper silence and him thus bespake. 
Where art thou Adam? 
Is that Face of thine 
Muffled in Clouds that was so like to mine? 
Where art thou? lost! O sad! 
As William Poole remarks: ‘Thus the thin end of the wedge of dualism is inserted into the 
Godhead.’603 
MacDonald objects strongly to this division. Following Erskine, who had written, ‘In 
God mercy and justice are one and the same thing’,604 MacDonald states: 
There is no opposition, no strife whatever, between mercy and justice. Those who say justice 
means the punishing of sin, and mercy the not punishing of sin, and attribute both to God, would 
make a schism in the very idea of God. 
[…] 
In God shall we imagine a distinction of office and character [magistrate and father]? God is one; 
and the depth of foolishness is reached by that theology which talks of God as if he held different 
offices, and differed in each. It sets a contradiction in the very nature of God himself.605 
In this sermon, ‘Justice’, MacDonald declares that the doctrine of substitutionary atone-
ment is ‘an evil thing, to be cast out of intellect and heart’; Christ’s passion was not a ‘satisfac-
tion’ of God’s justice, a sacrifice of appeasement.606 Erskine had already stated unequivocally: 
‘I am aware that the doctrine of expiation through the vicarious death of Christ is sacred and 
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precious to the hearts of many, nevertheless I am compelled to regard it as a human invention 
opposed to the character of God.’607 MacDonald, in less measured tones, declares: 
From such and their false teaching I would gladly help to deliver the true-hearted. Let the dead 
bury their dead, but I would do what I may to keep them from burying the living.608 
Christ deals with the power, not the penalty, of sin; sin was the cause of the abuse of 
Christ, not a requirement for satisfaction by the Father of lights. Rejecting the caricature of 
Christ submitting to the wrathful blows of the Father on behalf of the elect, he writes: ‘I declare 
my utter and absolute repudiation of the idea in any form whatever’, concluding: ‘The whole 
device is a piece of spiritual charlatanry—fit only for a fraudulent jail-delivery.’609 
The polemic continues in the sermon ‘Righteousness’ denouncing the ‘rubbish heap of 
legal fiction called vicarious sacrifice, or its shadow called imputed righteousness’,610 describ-
ing it as ‘this most contemptible of false doctrines’, ‘falsehood’, ‘a mean, nauseous invention, 
false and productive of falsehood’, ‘an embodiment of untruth’. ‘It is the meagre misshapen off-
spring of the legalism of a poverty-stricken mechanical fancy, unlighted by a gleam of divine 
imagination.’611 He repeats: ‘only the child with the child-heart, so far ahead of and so different 
from the wise and prudent’612 will see through the deception. The issue is not the tension be-
tween divine justice and mercy, but that between divine and human justice. 
The refusal to separate God’s justice from God’s mercy underlines the conviction that 
love and light are divine moral attributes which cannot survive such separation. God the Father 
cannot co-exist with God the schoolmaster. This does not, however, imply a marginalisation of 
the gravity of sin or its offense to a holy God. The ‘outer skirts’ of God’s presence will, to the 
unrepentant, be experienced as wrath, but this is not wrathful retribution; it is God’s mercy 
which even in the judgement of sin loves the sinner and is working for that sinner’s deliverance. 
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The cosmos is the sum of God’s creative thought. Not only is ‘[t]he thought of God the truth of 
everything’,613 humans specifically are ‘but a thought of God’.614 He does not speculate on its 
ontic nature, simply that ‘matter is the result of mind, spirit, thought. The relation between them 
is […] simply too close, too near for us to understand.’615 Rather, he focuses on perception, dis-
tinguishing between the ‘philosopher […] who lives in the thought of things, [and] the Christian 
[…] who lives in the things themselves’616—those who merely observe and those who engage. 
Although one would imagine a philosopher being in his element in an idealist universe, the dis-
tinction concerns failing to discern the true, divine meaning behind natural phenomena. We 
‘circle’ God at an ‘epistemic distance’ where human moral choice is genuine.617 
To explore these issues, we consider the short story The Broken Swords (1864). The plot 
concerns a fatherless and sensitive young man who, on receiving an army commission, is sent to 
war. On showing signs of mental breakdown prior to a military assault, he has his sword broken 
over his head and is dismissed in disgrace from the army. Subsequently his regiment is de-
stroyed by a land mine. Returning to England, mortified by his failure, the Bildungsroman 
tracks his journey through the margins of society as he tries to avoid recognition and find abso-
lution. After casual and industrial labour (in between which nature works her healing) he re-
enlists with the army, dying a hero’s death. 
It is an exitus-reditus parable: like the ‘prodigal son’, human existence involves being 
sent from the father’s presence into a distant soul-forming world where destiny hinges on the 
decision to return. Equating this to the metanarrative of the Bible, he proposes: 
Every tragedy of higher order, constructed in Christian times, will correspond to the grand drama 
of the Bible; wherein the first act opens with a brilliant sunset vision of Paradise, in which childish 
sense and need are served with all the profusion of the indulgent nurse. But the glory fades off into 
grey and black, and night settles down upon the heart which, rightly uncontent with the childish, 
and not having yet learned the childlike [emphasis mine], seeks knowledge and manhood as a 
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thing denied by the Maker, and yet to be gained by the creature; so sets forth alone to climb the 
heavens, and instead of climbing, falls into the abyss. Then follows the long dismal night of fever-
ish efforts and delirious visions, or, it may be, helpless despair; till at length a deeper stratum of 
the soul is heaved to the surface; and amid the first dawn of morning, the youth says within him, “I 
have sinned against my Maker— I will arise and go to my Father [emphasis in original].”618 
This succinct summary of MacDonald’s soul-making theology (also a précis of this story) 
equates prelapsarian innocence with childishness and human destiny with childlikeness, sin be-
ing a misguided self-centred quest for ‘manhood’. This present reality is the pigsty of the prodi-
gal; childlikeness may be achieved by the decisive act of returning from the wasteland to the 
father. 
The story opens with two sorrowing sisters sitting with their newly-uniformed brother the 
night before his departure from ‘paradise’. The light of the moon pales the red army coat: ‘In 
her thoughtful light the whole group seemed more like a meeting in the land of shadows, than a 
parting in the substantial earth.’ The implication is that the earth is insubstantial, prompting a 
Kantian question: 
But which should be called the land of realities?—the region where appearance, and space, and 
time drive between, and stop the flowing currents of the soul’s speech? or that region where heart 
meets heart, and appearance has become the slave to utterance, and space and time are forgot-
ten?619  
The implication is the latter, but the negative view of materiality here is revealing, a 
jaundiced view at odds with what Gabelman claims is MacDonald’s ‘wholly orthodox’ view of 
the cosmos and celebration of materiality.620 Here, space-time is an obstacle impeding the 
‘flowing currents of the soul’s speech’; it is divisive, preventing ‘heart from meeting heart’. 
Perhaps the key is found in Jacob Boehme, a mystic who influenced MacDonald directly, 
and possibly indirectly through F. D. Maurice,621 especially in his proposal that God’s presence 
is experienced as both light and dark fire. Boehme’s use of Renaissance alchemical terms and 
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creative metaphor to discuss what amounts to transcendental philosophy is, more often than not, 
baffling, nevertheless a picture emerges of quotidian reality as the fall-out (that is, in some sense 
the contaminated matter) from a primeval divinely-inspired explosion, now orbiting a divine 
‘sun’. Matter emerges out of ‘nothing’:622 ‘for the forms of nature are awakened [by an ‘ethereal 
blaze’ analogous to a lightning-strike], and are as a turning wheel, and so they carry their spirit 
the wind’.623 For Boehme, also, God is ‘fire’ at the centre of this ‘turning wheel’: 
the Father’s fiery property makes itself in the divine essence of the eternal love in a mercury of 
joyfulness; for the Father’s property is the fire-source […].624  
Both writers equate God’s ‘fiery property’ with ‘the eternal love’, and emphasise that 
‘outward nature’—since God is the hypostasis, the ground, of all being—glows with God’s fire: 
for God is a spirit, and as subtle as a thought or will, and nature is his corporeal essence, under-
stand the eternal nature; and the outward nature of this visible comprehensible (footnote, ‘palpa-
ble’) world is a manifestation or external birth of the inward spirit and essence of evil and good, 
that is, a representation, resemblance, and typical similitude of the dark fire and light world.625 
Without claiming any nuanced understanding of Boehme’s impenetrable philosophy, two 
things are evident: first, that the ‘sun-God’ of love is central to created reality; second, that in 
‘outward nature’ (the cosmos), God is manifest as a ‘light world’ which coexists with ‘dark 
fire’, which in some sense is ‘the essence of evil and good’. Created being is therefore a place 
where all is not light, where shadows fall, and where ‘dark fire’ burns. It is an ambiguous onto-
logical model (‘the essence of evil and good’) complexified by MacDonald proposing a dualist 
perceptive model. In other words, what one sees—whether good or evil—depends not only on 
the ‘object’ in view, but the nature of perception—particularly its moral nature: if one looks 
with the eyes of a child—or if one is transparent, like Diamond—the dark fire does not burn. 
Robert Paslick, who notes resonances between Boehme and Zen Buddhism, observes that 
both hold that ‘after the Fall […] the material world is still a mirror of the paradise of the divine 
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nature’,626 revealing two important shared principles. The first concerns the sacrality of creation. 
It is the visible aspect of the interpenetration of two universes that coexist and intertwine: from 
a Buddhist perspective, ‘there is no complete separation of worlds, as if nature were all darkness 
and paradise were some transcendent’, leading Paslick to an image that MacDonald uses in the 
novel Lilith: ‘The tree outside my window in my so-called real world is also the tree standing in 
paradise.’627 In Lilith, Mr Vane (‘Mr Self-Centred’) is taken outside of his normal self-focused 
reality into a parallel universe. Being disorientated and disturbed, not least because his guide 
also appears as both raven and man, the latter consoles him with the words: 
‘Perhaps it may comfort you,’ said the raven, ‘to be told that you have not yet left your house, nei-
ther has your house left you. At the same time it cannot contain you, or you inhabit it!’628 
We explore this narrative in detail later, but the point here is that the ‘house’ of personal 
consciousness is situated within a larger reality. He is, the raven tells him, ‘in the region of the 
seven dimensions’, and pointing out a tree in the surrounding pine forest, remarks: ‘That tree 
stands on the hearth of your kitchen, and grows nearly straight up its chimney.’629 
This emphasis on the role, and limitations, of perception leads to a second principle: that 
the problem (sin, conceived as self-centredness) and the solution (becoming God-centred) to the 
human condition are found in human consciousness. This is not to say the latter is located in 
individual human consciousness, simply that becoming a child (‘salvation’) is appropriated sub-
jectively as a conscious moral choice. 630 Evil equates to selfish moral choice. For such choice to 
be genuine, true vision is needed: the self-centred, such as Vane, must learn to see properly in 
order to make wise choices. Nature is radiant with God’s light, but human consciousness may, 
in rebellion, be drawn towards the ‘dark fire’, unaware that this is also an aspect of God—the 
hell of God’s burning outer garments. However, those with a true childlike heart will be able to 
experience the light of God and the purging dark fire of God in the here and now without being 
burned. 
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Paslick notes, negatively, that in Keiji Nishitani’s understanding of Zen Buddhism, ‘the 
more fully self-reflective the subjectivity of the self becomes, the more it becomes aware of the 
presence of nihility at the ground of its existence’, leading to despair,631 or, in Bonhoeffer’s lan-
guage in Act and Being, the sinful ‘narcissism of the human will’ leads to an awareness that ‘I 
myself am Adam’,632 a self-awareness akin to Charley Osbourne’s conclusion, ‘I am a devil’.633 
In contrast, positively, Nishitani finds peace and identity in the ‘paradoxical realm of […] seri-
ous play where nonaction is genuine action and where nonthinking is genuine thinking’. It is the 
place of surrender, echoing Christ’s words, ‘he who loses his life for My sake will find it’.634 
True self-identity is only found in a conscious, unselfish turning towards the Other, which Bon-
hoeffer suggests is ‘[n]ot a self-losing to oneself, but a self-finding in Christ’;635 true peace, the 
region where conscience is redundant,636 is only to be found in the willing embrace of God’s 
purgatorial fire—the return to the ‘primal Sun of life’.637 
MacDonald’s positive view of materiality is, then, ambiguous. Ontological ambiguity 
(that the cosmos is ‘the essence of evil and good’) and perceptive duality (that there are child-
like and unchildlike ways of seeing) lead to a very ambivalent view of the perceived world. 
However satisfying the above model may be, it is clear that it falls into the category of an ab-
ductive hypothesis: it may be a good ‘fit’ and account for subjective experience, but clearly 
there are thorny issues, the most intractable being the perennial problem of locating the source 
of evil in the divine nature. MacDonald’s answer to this appears to be, after Boehme, to posit 
that much of what we call evil is not really evil but erroneous perception of God’s dark fire. 
In MacDonald’s universe, there is no destructive evil that is contrary to God’s will, no 
event that does not (eventually) mediate God’s presence, nothing that does not short-circuit the 
inevitable decision to return to the father. Evil is solely down to human moral failure, and right 
relationship with the world is reduced to a moral choice: to be a ‘philosopher’ or a ‘Chris-
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tian’,638 a rebellious or a submissive child. To choose the latter is to begin the return journey to 
the place where ‘heart meets heart’, but—in the light of the above comments—involves turning 
away from the ‘pigsty’, or at minimum, turning a blind eye to aspects of reality as if it was un-
holy rather than numinous. MacDonald, in other words, ignores evil rather than accounting for 
it. 
The Broken Swords makes it clear that honourable death is preferable to dishonourable 
life. On his return to England, ‘the youth’ (who is never named and appears to represent ‘eve-
ryman’) travels northwards. Sleeping rough, nature works her office, ‘For the face of nature is 
the face of God, and must bear expressions that can influence, though unconsciously to them, 
the most ignorant and hopeless of His children.’639 In contrast, the negative aspects of ‘reality’ 
are marginalised. 
Unusually for a MacDonald story, the protagonist finds work in a cotton mill. Despite 
‘windows so coated by dust that they looked like frosted glass; showing, as it passed through 
the air to fall on the dirty floor, how the breath of life was thick with dust of iron and wood, and 
films of cotton’,640 one does not feel the grinding degradation of slave labour, and despite the 
plague being in the city, one does not sense danger. There is much sentimentality, and, just as 
unreal children seem impervious to evil in other narratives, so factories lack toxicity, neither are 
children’s arms torn off by machines. Instead, the emphasis is on the factory being devoid of 
‘“divine air” and the open heavens, whose sunlight only reached him in an afternoon, as he 
stood at his loom’.641 The factory, as a human construct, blocks divine light: evil is privation 
rather than depravation. The implication is that factories—and, in this narrative, war—represent 
human rebellion, but that God uses both to save his child from eternal death, earthly death being 
virtually inconsequential. 
In this narrative, the ‘deep infinite skies’ of God’s immutable presence ‘contain’ quotidi-
an reality: 
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For above every cloud, above every storm, rise up, calm, clear, divine, the deep infinite skies; they 
embrace the tempest even as the sunshine; by their permission it exists within their boundless 
peace: therefore it cannot hurt, and must pass away, while there they stand as ever, domed up eter-
nally, lasting, strong, and pure.642 
On this view, ‘the deep infinite skies’ give permission for both good and evil to co-exist 
within ‘their boundless peace’. That evil ‘cannot hurt, and must pass away’ reflects MacDon-
ald’s pastoral focus on believers who will benefit from eschatological resolution, but also im-
plies that evil, ultimately, like death, is of no consequence. 
However one views reality (we should perhaps heed his advice that it is ‘too near for us 
to understand’), of most concern to MacDonald is the function of human will: the environment 
in which humans are placed with its light and dark fire demands that a choice be made, but 
whatever the choice, humans remain the progeny of the Father.643 
With a better understanding of MacDonald’s view of reality, we now turn to its human 
occupants. 
5.4 Anthropology 
5.4 (a) The human creature 
MacDonald’s cosmology leads to an anthropology more concerned with morality than mechan-
ics, one that prioritises original blessing (the imago Dei) over original sin (topics covered more 
fully below). For example, he finds meaning in Wordsworth’s proposition that humans come 
into the world ‘trailing clouds of glory’, and that the exitus-reditus trajectory (paradise–vale of 
soul-making–heaven) is recapitulated in the life of each individual. As Christ, the perfect child, 
was continually aware of his divine pre-natal existence (a questionable thesis),644 all humans are 
aware of their divine origin. After quoting with approbation Wordsworth’s Intimations of Im-
mortality and Henry Vaughan’s reminiscences of ‘those early dayes, when I | Shin’d in my an-
gell-infancy!’, he writes: 
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Whoever has thus gazed on flower or cloud; whoever can recall poorest memory of the trail of glo-
ry that hung about his childhood, must have some faint idea how his father’s house and the things 
in it always looked, and must still look to the Lord. With him there is no fading into the light of 
common day. 645 
Likewise, he is open to the ‘mechanics’ of evolution, but only inasmuch as this can be co-
opted to serve his core thesis that God’s sole aim is to create children: 
For this vision of truth God has been working for ages of ages. For this simple condition, this apex 
of life, upon which a man wonders like a child that he cannot make other men see as he sees, the 
whole labour of God’s science, history, poetry—from the time when the earth gathered itself into a 
lonely drop of fire from the red rim of the driving sun-wheel to the time when Alexander John 
Scott worshipped him from its face—was evolving truth upon truth in lovely vision, in torturing 
law, never lying, never repenting; and for this will the patience of God labour while there is yet a 
human soul whose eyes have not been opened, whose child-heart has not yet been born in him.646 
The view of ‘science’ is secondary, therefore, to the imaginative discernment of meaning. 
That this evolutionary vision contradicts the idea that the child has some kind of pre-natal heav-
enly existence is immaterial: rather, he is replacing negative views of childhood with positive 
ones. Simian savagery and original sin are replaced by evolutionary truth (‘evolving truth upon 
truth in lovely vision’) and the imago Dei. Whatever the ‘mechanics’, the goal of God’s creation 
is that ‘child hearts’ might be brought to birth. 
MacDonald’s idealism leads to a focus on the mind, notably the roles of imagination and 
will. Regarding the former, this is simply a world where logic alone will not suffice: 
We are here in a region far above that commonly claimed for science, open only to the heart of the 
child and the childlike man and woman […]. For things as they are, not as science deals with 
them, are the revelation of God to his children.647 
Whatever the nuances of MacDonald’s ontology, practically speaking ‘nature’ mediates 
God. It offers ‘Posterns […] to the supernal; […] | Loopholes to the Infinite’.648 Nature’s true 
meaning is transcendent and must be perceived imaginatively: 
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The truth of a thing, then, is the blossom of it, the thing it is made for, the topmost stone set on 
with rejoicing; truth in a man’s imagination is the power to recognize this truth of a thing; and 
wherever, in anything that God has made, in the glory of it, be it sky or flower or human face, we 
see the glory of God, there a true imagination is beholding a truth of God.649 
We find corresponding ideas in Boehme. The secrets of the universe are only open to the 
imaginative child. In his terminology, God will only give the pearl of the philosopher’s stone to 
a true magus—one who will ‘walk in the person of Christ […] that he may have magical 
sight’.650 God does not give wisdom to the unchildlike (he who is ‘not in this birth of restora-
tion, and walks not himself in the way wherein Christ walked upon the earth’), but—with ech-
oes of Wisdom playing at God’s side during the creative act651 —gives it to his children: ‘for the 
pearl of which I write is paradisical, which God does not cast before swine, but gives it to his 
children for their play and delight’.652 
Both writers emphasise that the imaginative child is loved by, not alienated from, God, 
but there remains a moral imperative to choose wisely. Human will is the prime faculty used to 
obtain ‘salvation’, the choice not only to turn to God for forgiveness, but to live obediently. 
‘Man’s first business is,’ MacDonald writes, ‘“What does God want me to do?” not “What will 
God do if I do so and so?”’653 
God’s will is perceived imaginatively through the abductive drawing of the Spirit towards 
Godself from beyond the horizons of consciousness. The response must be obedience:  
I can find no words strong enough to serve for the weight of this necessity—this obedience. It is 
the one terrible heresy of the church, that it has always been presenting something else than obedi-
ence as faith in Christ.654 
Obedience, furthermore, is not simply a temporal demand: since mutual submission is intrinsic 
to the Father–Son ‘idea of the universe’ it is the eternal orientation of the child of God. ‘Obedi-
ence is the grandest thing in the world to begin with. Yes, and we shall end with it too.’655 
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5.4 (b) Selfhood and identity 
If a true child is one that, having imaginatively discerned, chooses wisely, an evil child is unim-
aginative (or wilful) and chooses unwisely. This essential dichotomy drives MacDonald’s doc-
trine of evil: the choice concerns whether to accept or reject one’s God-given, and therefore on-
ly true, identity. The cor curvum in se leads to false identity, is the essence of sin, and—if we 
are to believe ‘The Lost Soul’—results in destruction.656 In contrast, ‘The man who does not 
house self, has room to be his real self—God’s eternal idea of him.’657  
Three implications are apparent. First, that ‘self’ and ‘identity’ primarily have meaning 
with reference to the divine ‘other’ who not only gives life but as Father remains intrinsically 
connected to, invested in, and sustaining of, that life which shares the divine nature. Second, 
that each person is uniquely made in the image of God; that is, each person is, to use David Kel-
sey’s terminology, an ‘unsubstitutable’ self whose true identity is a very specific ‘eternal idea’. 
Third, since true selfhood is the opposite of destructive self-reflexivity, there is an implicit so-
cial dimension. A man’s ‘consciousness of himself’, he writes, ‘is the reflex from those about 
him, not the result of his own turning in of his regard upon himself’.658 At first sight, this ap-
pears a recognition that selfhood is not monadic but socially forged, however this is not the 
case: a person’s correct evaluation of their consciousness or identity is found through interac-
tion with others, not that it is so forged. True identity, he insists, inheres in ‘God’s eternal idea’. 
The human self is gifted with will and imagination. MacDonald considers the former to 
be free: that human beings are orbiting the divine sun at an ‘epistemic distance’,659 that is, the 
place where human choice is genuine and determines trajectory—towards or away from God. 
While acknowledging God’s sovereignty, MacDonald stresses that the gift of human free will 
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would not be free if it could be somehow overridden: ‘That,’ he argues, ‘would be to make a 
will in order that it might be no will’: 
The whole labour of God is that the will of man should be free as his will is free—in the same way 
that his will is free—by the perfect love of the man for that which is true, harmonious, lawful, cre-
ative. If a man say, “But might not the will of God make my will with the intent of over-riding and 
enslaving it?” I answer, such a Will could not create, could not be God, for it involves the false 
and contrarious.660 
So human choice is genuine (although I will challenge this conclusion). God is, neverthe-
less, sovereign: God is still God despite those in God’s image being described as ‘little Gods’, a 
phrase underlining the dangerous human potential to become self-centred. Without this being a 
real danger, the notion of sacrifice—offering one’s ‘self’ back to God in worship661—would 
have no meaning. ‘God gives his children selves, with wishes and choices, that they might have 
the true offering to lay upon the altar; for on that altar nothing will burn but selves.’662 If such 
offering is not made voluntarily, self is, paradoxically, self-destructive: it is ‘the one all-potent 
annihilator of individuality’.663 Reflecting on Jesus’s discourse about denying self,664 he empha-
sises that the child must choose the path of obedience, of total submission: 
We must become as little children, and Christ must be born in us; we must learn of him, and the 
one lesson he has to give is himself: he does first all he wants us to do; he is first all he wants us to 
be. […] we must take the will of God as the very life of our being.665 
All persons are made in God’s image in a general sense; all are, and never cease to be, 
children of their divine Father. Original sin is not the issue—he seems to concur with Novalis 
that this is an ‘ancient, heavy guilt-illusion’ that breeds ‘death and misery’:666 the issue, rather, 
is present sin. The reditus leg of the journey often begins with a person’s awareness of ‘what in 
himself is despicable, disappointing, unworthy […] what sometimes he calls the old Adam, 
sometimes the flesh, sometimes his lower nature, sometimes his evil self’, defined in the nega-
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tive as ‘that part of his being where God is not’.667 Recognition of this, and then setting one’s 
will to being reunited with God, is the beginning of sharing the divine nature: 
When a man wills that his being be conformed to the being of his origin, […] thus receiving God, 
he becomes, in the act, a partaker of the divine nature, a true son of the living God, and an heir of 
all he possesses: by the obedience of a son, he receives into himself the very life of the Father.668 
This seems to reflect the early Church Fathers’ distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ 
in Genesis 1:26. The latter equates to being a ‘true (obedient) son’; the former—since the per-
son is aware of the need to be conformed—equates to an ‘untrue’ (disobedient) child. Being 
made in God’s image, therefore, has to do with potentiality rather than status, a potential realis-
able through Christ’s death: not that Christ made humans acceptable in God’s sight, but that 
Christ defeated the forces of evil preventing a response. Christ dealt with the power, not the 
penalty, of sin, re-gifting humans with free will such that the choice to return to the Father is 
genuine. 
In MacDonald’s soteriology, however, that power is not—as Wilson laments—mere hu-
man effort aided by a vague all-pervading natural force:669 it is the presence of Christ in his 
child. Although MacDonald seems allergic to the term ‘grace’ because of its ‘atonement’ over-
tones,670 essentially he describes grace working in individuals to draw them towards childhood. 
In fact, ‘grace and truth [are,] in a word, childlikeness’.671 There must be divine–human co-
operation, however: ‘He has made us, but we have to be.’ Discussing John’s account of Christ’s 
role in creation, he distinguishes between things that were made through Christ, and those made 
in Christ; only the latter, he argues—when it comes to human beings—are, through obedience, 
children of the Father of lights: 
He has made us, but we have to be. All things were made through the Word, but that which was 
made in the Word was life, and that life is the light of men: they who live by this light, that is, live 
as Jesus lived—by obedience, namely, to the Father, have a share in their own making; the light 
becomes life in them; they are, in their lower way, alive with the life that was first born in Jesus, 
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and through him has been born in them—by obedience they become one with the godhead: ‘As 
many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God.’ He does not make them 
the sons of God, but he gives them power to become the sons of God: in choosing and obeying the 
truth, man becomes the true son of the Father of lights.672 
This soteriology reflects the Protestant emphasis on the need for a personal response to 
God’s grace, but is based on the premise that the individual must avail itself of Christ’s univer-
sal provision rather than salvation inhering in the sovereign God’s ‘election’ to save by the im-
putation of righteousness to an otherwise guilty soul. 
The proposal, therefore, that the problem and the solution to the human condition is lo-
cated in human consciousness673 is not to challenge the objectiveness of the Christ event, but to 
take account of the fact that becoming a child involves subjective human processes. Put differ-
ently: if the imago Dei primarily reflects will and imagination, ‘salvation’ is primarily mental. 
The words of Keiji Nishitani are perhaps helpful here, for from a Zen Buddhist perspective, any 
vision of resolution to the human condition remains merely theoretical unless it is subjectively 
appropriated by an ‘obedient’ individual. Logical assent is not enough: the Word must become 
flesh, truth must become ‘embodied’ in the person. Writing concerning the appropriation of 
‘philosophical and religious truths at a higher level’, Nishitani explains: 
This means that we have come to know them by means of our body instead of our head—that is, 
by becoming a human being as a whole. It is not until we acquire knowledge in this way that we 
come to appropriate it truly, that is, to embody it in our body—or rather, I should say, if the term 
“body” leads to some misunderstanding, in the whole of us, including body and mind. The phrase 
“to embody something in one’s body” means that it is first of all given life in such a manner that it 
comes to be realized in one’s way of living. When we gain knowledge in this way, something 
makes its appearance in one way or another in our everyday life.674 
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This is a restatement of MacDonald’s distinction between observed ‘scientific’ fact and 
subjectively appropriated imaginative truth.675 The latter, inasmuch as it is a genuine encounter 
with Christ, the truth, must be acted upon and become an ‘indwelling presence and power’: 
Our Lord had no design of constructing a system of truth in intellectual forms. The truth of the 
moment in its relation to him, The Truth, was what he spoke. He spoke out of a region of realities 
which he knew could only be suggested—not represented—in the forms of intellect and speech. 
With vivid flashes of life and truth his words invade our darkness, rousing us with sharp stings of 
light to will our awaking, to arise from the dead and cry for the light which he can give, not in the 
lightning of words only, but in indwelling presence and power.676 
It is a theology which stresses the incarnational nature of truth: ‘The Truth’ must ‘invade 
our darkness’, ‘the Word must become flesh’ in the life of an individual. 
5.5 The problem of evil 
5.5 (a) The nature of evil 
As noted, MacDonald focuses, first, on sin (human selfishness) rather than evil—on the nega-
tive effects of individual wilfulness at the expense of a wider perspective. Second, he considers 
evil to be privation rather than depravation. In this idealist universe, evil exists where God is 
prevented from ‘shining’ by wills that oppose God’s. Although both human and ‘demonic’ (as 
we will explore in our reading of Lilith), the barrier of human will is the focus: sin lives in ‘that 
part of [a person’s] being where God is not’.677 
Sin as ‘culpable privation’ (as self-caused) is articulated in the novel Castle Warlock. 
Cosmo, an archetypal child, the devoted son of the waning laird, is on the roof of a coach, ‘his 
heart swelling at the thought of being so soon in his father’s arms’, when he observes shadows 
cast by the sun and becomes philosophical: 
How dark were the shadows the sun was casting! 
Absurd! the sun casts no shadows—only light. 
How so? Were the sun not shining, would there be one single shadow? 
Yes; there would be just one single shadow; all would be shadow. 
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There would be none of those things we call shadows. 
True; all would be shade; there would be no shadows. 
Evil would not be visible if God didn’t ‘shine’. Cosmo then understands why— 
the Jews came to assign evil to the hand of God as well as good, and what St. Paul meant when he 
said that the law gave life to sin; for by the sun is the shadow; where no light is, there is no dark-
ness, where no life, no death. 
He concludes that if God were to shine unimpeded, no ‘object’ (will) would be able to 
prevent God’s shining; all would be transparent. In which case, he wonders, ‘where there is no 
longer anything covered or hid, shall sin be able to live?’.678 The image implies that God tempo-
rally (that is, in this present life) allows sin to exist, but will shine fully, and ‘destructively’, in 
the eschaton—that is, God’s light will destroy the shadows in individuals (not the individuals 
themselves), and renew creation. As Novalis had put it: 
The external world is a world of shadows, which casts its shadows onto the realm of light. At pre-
sent, it is true, that the inner world seems to us so dark, lonely and without form, but how different 
will it appear when this darkness has gone, and those shadowy forms have been removed. We will 
be able to enjoy the world more than ever, for our spirit has become ethereal.679 
This highlights a central theological question that preoccupied MacDonald: that of the re-
lationship between the ‘realm of light’ and the ‘external world of shadows’. Is God responsible 
for the shadows? Here, MacDonald suggests that the Jews assigned evil to the hand of God, in 
other words, that God was apparently the source of evil, but that the appearance was deceptive. 
God allowing Godself to be thus implicated is instead evidence of divine forbearance regarding 
temporal rebellion (sin), but also hints at MacDonald’s more radical view that all evil not only 
works for good, but is a good.680 The world is a ‘vale of probation’ (Novalis),681 or, as John 
Keats put it, a ‘system of Soul-making’, a ‘School instituted for the purpose of teaching little 
children to read’, an unpleasant but necessary experience: 
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Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make 
it a soul? A place where the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse ways?682 
Or as MacDonald put it: 
What is the whole system of things for, but our education? Does God care for suns and planets and 
satellites, for divine mathematics and ordered harmonies, more than for his children?683 
This ‘World of Pains’ always brings positive results, and is controlled by God. Those 
passages that do speak of widespread, apparently meaningless, suffering, such as animals ‘ev-
ermore issuing from the fountain of life, daily born into evil things’, inevitably focus on escha-
tological resolution; in this case, the view that animals, too, will be resurrected.684 Without this 
perspective, MacDonald is forced to concur with Darwin that God would have to be considered 
a demon: 
To believe that God made many of the lower creatures merely for prey, or to be the slaves of a 
slave, and writhe under the tyrannies of a cruel master who will not serve his own master; that he 
created an endless succession of them to reap little or no good of life but its cessation […] is to be-
lieve in a God who, so far as one portion of his creation is concerned, is a demon.685 
In this life, then, God is ensuring that all things work to the end of creating children. For 
example, the storm caused by North Wind which sinks a ship is justified on the basis that for 
every individual on that ship it will work for their good, and secondly, that she is merely obey-
ing the orders of a higher power—a restatement that all ‘natural’ evil is God’s will. The floods 
in Alec Forbes and Sir Gibbie, we noted, had a positive, cathartic effect on the unchildlike, as 
did Truffy’s beating at the hands of Malison which disabled him. For Gibbie, who had no need 
of correction, the flood simply proved his mettle.  
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5.5 (b) Evil sheepdogs and wicked fairies 
‘Sorrow herself will reveal one day that she was only the beneficent shadow of Joy’, writes 
MacDonald, but then ponders: ‘Will Evil ever show herself the beneficent shadow of Good?’686 
That evil, like Milton’s Satan, is the (albeit unwitting) servant of good is a perennial re-
frain, expressed thus, for example, in Little Daylight: ‘But I never knew of any interference on 
the part of a wicked fairy that did not turn out a good thing in the end.’687 Or, in a letter to the 
wife of A. J. Scott: ‘But you must not be too much disappointed if he should not get [the job], 
for you know nothing can go wrong, or be really a misfortune.’688 
Evil, however, is not only the servant of good, but is a good, as illustrated by Gibbie’s 
view that the Good Shepherd has ‘evil sheepdogs’ at his command.689 These dogs are not mere-
ly ‘around and about’ the shepherd: MacDonald believes these ‘strong, sharp-toothed sheep-
dogs’ are specifically there because the great shepherd sent them to worry the recalcitrant rebel 
until s/he repents;690 but are these ‘sacred creatures’—‘pain, fear, anxiety, and shame’691—
necessarily evil? All are human responses to some external stimulus rather than ‘evil’ in them-
selves, and are in the same category as doubts, ‘the messengers of the Living One to rouse the 
honest’.692 
That what we name ‘evil’ may not be so is evident. Kelsey, for example, remarks that the 
food chain is part of God’s creation that was called ‘good’.693 MacDonald, however, needs to go 
further: since all humans are God’s children, whether currently rebellious or submissive, all evil 
must be God’s tool for reform, ‘For whom the Lord loves He chastens, | And scourges every son 
whom He receives.’694 So the ‘dogs of the great shepherd’ are targeted at unbelievers, the ‘un-
childlike soul’ characterised by ‘arrogance and ignorance’ who feels it has ‘rights against God’; 
despite operating in ‘the will of the flesh’, it is still a child—one in whom God’s ‘candle still 
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burns’, albeit dimly.695 The dogs, then, are not evil but ‘angels in disguise’ sent by the Good 
Shepherd who leaves the ninety-nine to search for the lost one.696 
So what about the wicked fairies? We find more information about them in Little Day-
light. 
Now wicked fairies will not be bound by the laws which the good fairies obey […]. But it is all of 
no consequence, for they never succeed [in gaining their ends]; nay, in the end it brings about the 
very thing they are trying to prevent. So you see […] wicked fairies are dreadfully stupid, although 
from the beginning of the world they have really helped instead of thwarted the good fairies, not 
one of them is a bit wiser for it.697 
This echoes Milton’s view of Satan who is God’s unwitting servant: 
That with reiterated crimes he might 
Heap on himself damnation, while he sought 
Evil to others, and enrag’d might see 
How all his malice serv’d but to bring forth 
Infinite goodness, grace and mercy shewn 
On Man by him seduc’t698 
Unlike the angelic dogs, ‘wicked fairies’, it appears—who have been trying to undermine 
things ‘from the beginning of the world’—are morally evil. That moral evil is essentially wilful 
(is not a ‘substance’ that can be divorced from will) is admissible; that ‘wicked fairies’ have 
always ‘really helped […] the good fairies’ is more problematic. It implies that wilful moral evil 
is part of God’s design. Since God cannot be held responsible for moral evil, we must conclude 
that the ‘wicked fairies’ do not really have free will (that God is the puppet-master behind the 
scenes) and this moral evil is really a good. This appears to be the message of the narratives we 
have explored. 
5.5 (c) The ministry of pain 
The theme is developed in relation to pain and suffering. In the novel What’s Mine’s Mine, 
where an honest Scots clan is pitched against a whisky-brewing English interloper, MacDonald 
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speaks of the ‘ministry of pain’. Alister, the young (honest peasant) laird is ploughing with two 
bulls in harness. When the animals start an altercation, he ‘took the reigns, and administering a 
blow each to the animals, made them stand still’.699 In the following monologue, aimed at en-
lightening one of the Englishman’s daughters horrified by the gratuitous violence, he explains: 
There are tender-hearted people who virtually object to the whole scheme of creation; they would 
neither have force used nor pain suffered […]. Millions of human beings but for suffering would 
never develop an atom of affection. The man who would spare due suffering is not wise. It is folly 
to conclude a thing ought not to be done because it hurts. There are powers to be born, creations to 
be perfected, sinners to be redeemed, through the ministry of pain, that could be born, perfected, 
redeemed, in no other way.700 
This may be a fictive voice, but MacDonald is clearly exploring the Keatsian view that 
suffering is a ‘necessary evil’ intrinsic to ‘the whole scheme of creation’ without which ‘mil-
lions’ would never be born, perfected, or—significantly—redeemed. The phrase ‘due pain’ im-
plies ‘you asked for it’: that wilful behaviour has negative consequences. In Mary Marston, for 
example, after the death of their baby, both parents (the father responsible for the death through 
neglect) become ill. It is the beginning of the father’s reformation: 
Whatever the effect of illness may be upon the temper of some, it is most certainly an ally of the 
conscience. All pains, indeed, and all sorrows, all demons, yea, and all sins themselves, under the 
suffering care of the highest minister, are but the ministers of truth and righteousness.701 
But are ‘all demons’ and ‘all sins themselves’—even if under ‘the care of the highest 
minister’—really ‘ministers of truth and righteousness’? This is a strong claim.702 One might 
justifiably conclude: ‘It is by the prince of demons that he drives out demons.’703 MacDonald 
appears unable to accept that undeserved, destructive evil exists. Here, for example, he suggests 
that such affliction must be caused by ‘exceptional faultiness of character’ rather than that, as 
Jesus once observed, ‘neither this man nor his parents sinned’,704 or, if this is not the case, that it 
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is given ‘for the greatness of good’ it would bring. In short, symptoms such as ‘pain, fear, anx-
iety, and shame’ are always evidence of sin (or the Good Shepherd’s remedial response to it), 
ignoring the fact that many sinners live very happy and healthy lives, and many saints are tor-
mented to faithlessness. 
The problem is that ‘millions of human beings’705 suffer the consequences of evil whose 
‘ministry’ results in the exact opposite of ‘developing affection’. MacDonald seems to have 
backed himself into a corner: his universalism implies that God is morally bound to make ‘all 
things work together for good’ for all.706 This contributes to the inadequacy and unbelievability 
of many of his fictive portrayals, especially of children exposed to evil.  
In mitigation, one must note that MacDonald was not writing in a vacuum. Like many 
Victorians, life was not easy. He was predeceased by five of his eleven children, and throughout 
his life battled with tuberculosis, often coming near to death and experiencing chronic pain. He 
expresses a personal view of suffering and the possibility of death in The Diary of an Old Soul: 
Yestereve, Death came, and knocked at my thin door, 
I from the window looked: the thing I saw, 
The shape uncouth, I had not seen before. 
I was disturbed—with fear, in sooth, not awe; 
Whereof ashamed, I instantly did rouse 
My will to seek thee—only to fear the more; 
Alas! I could not find thee in the house. 
 
I was like Peter when he began to sink. 
To thee a new prayer therefore I have got—  
That, when death comes in earnest to my door, 
Thou wouldst thyself go, when the latch doth clink, 
And lead him to my room, up to my cot; 
Then hold thy child’s hand, hold and leave him not, 
Till Death has done with him for evermore.707 
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These stanzas are, perhaps, more realistic than much of his fiction: approaching death 
‘disturbs’, engenders fear, and then shame about being afraid. However, the reference to the 
‘cot’ and the prayer to ‘hold thy child’s hand’ indicate that even at this point of personal doubt 
he is confident of being a child. But he is writing as a believer: our question here concerns those 
who are not ‘children’. A believer may be able accept MacDonald’s assertion: 
It is worth all suffering—yes that suffering that springs from vacancy, abortiveness & futility—to 
be at length one with God. 708 
However, evidence regarding the impact of evil on unbelievers does not support this 
claim unless one accepts the tenuous claim that the suffering of those such as the suicide Char-
ley Osbourne, or the sensitive soldier in The Broken Swords who dies a futile premature death, 
is of benefit. 
5.6 Soteriology 
In the same way that God may be perceived falsely by the unrepentant, MacDonald is suggest-
ing that the experience and perception of ‘evil’ comes down to how one sees and experiences, 
rather than what one is seeing and experiencing. We begin, therefore, by considering further 
how both ‘hell’ and ‘salvation’ are aspects of God’s being. 
5.6 (a) Hell and salvation 
The abiding post-Reformation question, ‘How do I know I am one of the elect?’, led to the more 
practical concern, ‘How do I escape from hell?’, a concern also to MacDonald, for despite con-
sidering hell as dark fire, the skirt of God’s being, he does not minimise its severity or imply its 
non-existence. Writing in the preface to a contemporary dramatization, Letters from Hell, he 
warns against assuming that moral objections to caricatures of hell or questions about its eternal 
duration imply its non-existence: 
In these days has arisen another falsehood—less, yet very perilous: thousands of half-thinkers im-
agine that, since it is declared with such authority that hell is not everlasting, there is then no hell 
at all.709 
                                                




MacDonald does object, though, to medieval images of the ‘hell of Exhausted Mercy’—
‘a hell the smoke of whose torments would arise and choke the elect themselves about the 
throne of God’710 (he suggests that Dante’s mind was ‘lowered’ by his narrative)711—which im-
ply that God’s creative power must sustain life in a state of eternal destruction such that ‘the 
breath still breathed into the soul of man by his Maker is no longer the breath of life, but the 
breath of infinite death’.712 
We need to be clear here about MacDonald’s cosmology. At the centre of his universe is 
the ‘burning’ love of God, at the other extreme is ‘outer darkness’. This is the realm of ‘The 
Lost Soul’ (see below) where, as it asymptotically approaches nihility (MacDonald seems to 
imply that sentience is never quite extinguished) God’s presence nevertheless sustains life. This 
place of outer darkness is MacDonald’s hell. It is not the place where the fire of God as a purga-
torial force is felt most keenly (which he often refers to as ‘hell’);713 that moment of purgatorial 
mercy has already been rejected. It is an ‘outer darkness’ reserved for those who have ‘hate[d] 
the fire of God’. A time when: 
God withdraws from a man as far as that can be without the man’s ceasing to be; when the man 
feels himself abandoned, hanging in a ceaseless vertigo of existence upon the verge of the gulf of 
his being, without support, without refuge, without aim, without end—for the soul has no weapons 
wherewith to destroy herself—with no inbreathing of joy, with nothing to make life good.714 
It is a place, though, where the fire of God burns, but where human perception is dulled, 
and divine manifestation is more ominous: 
The outer darkness is but the most dreadful form of the consuming fire—the fire without light—
the darkness visible, the black flame. God hath withdrawn himself, but not lost his hold. His face 
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is turned away, but his hand is laid upon him still. His heart has ceased to beat into the man's heart, 
but he keeps him alive by his fire.715 
The fire of God’s presence, therefore, all-pervasive and sustaining of life, is equally pre-
sent at heart and skirt of a universe of which this material, created order is but one aspect. But to 
speak of a ‘created order’ is misleading, for in this idealist universe ‘creation’ is more a mo-
ment, an aspect of (conscious) being, rather than an ontic reality. The continuum of God’s pres-
ence is perceived ‘morally’: the child perceives God as love, and its location as being at the 
heart of this loving universe in the embrace of God; the rebel perceives God as the dark fire of 
‘hate’, and its location as being in exile at the periphery of existence. 
This leads to a broadly universalist position on the basis that it is unlikely that those expe-
riencing the hellfire of God will resist God’s love for ever, yet does nevertheless appear to admit 
the possibility of annihilation as the final end of the unrepentant. However, the above sermon 
ends on a note of hope: 
But at length, O God, wilt thou not cast Death and Hell into the lake of Fire—even into thine own 
consuming self? Death shall then die everlastingly, 
   And Hell itself will pass away, 
   And leave her dolorous mansions to the peering day.716 
Elsewhere, using an image from Burns, he says: ‘All the snow that fell on [the river] van-
ished, as death and hell shall one day vanish in the fire of God.’717 He summarises thus: 
Hell is God’s and not the devil’s. Hell is on the side of God and man, to free the child of God from 
the corruption of death. Not one soul will ever be redeemed from hell but by being saved from his 
sins, from the evil in him. If hell be needful to save him, hell will blaze […] until he takes refuge 
in the will of the Father.718 
In an important respect, he argues, the biblical ‘messengers of the good tidings’ have 
been misunderstood. We are not threatened punishment for the sins we have committed; the 
message ‘is of forgiveness, not of vengeance; of deliverance, not of evil to come,’ continuing: 
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Not for anything he has committed do they threaten a man with the outer darkness. Not for any or 
all of his sins that are past shall a man be condemned; not for the worst of them needs he dread 
remaining unforgiven. The sin he dwells in, the sin he will not come out of, is the sole ruin of a 
man.719 
While MacDonald’s universalism is generally accepted (he suggests Judas and Satan will 
find refuge in God)720 it does not equate, as some have complained, to a naive view that God 
simply hugs everyone, no matter what:721 suffering is sometimes necessary to deliver humans 
from sin. If a sinner does not respond to this therapy, with perhaps a nod to Jonathan Edwards 
he concludes: ‘There would, I presume, be nothing left for God but to set his foot upon him and 
crush him, as we would crush a noxious insect.’722 It will result in the ‘destruction of the sinner’, 
although he regards this a defeat for God: 
We need look for no more hell, but for the destruction of sin by the destruction of the sinner. That, 
however, would, it appears to me, be for God to suffer defeat, blameless indeed, but defeat.723 
The somewhat macabre poem ‘The Lost Soul’, for example, appears to countenance an-
nihilation. A shrivelled soul, once a self-wise philosopher, lies in ‘insensate gloom’. Another 
soul, watching this ‘death’, empathetically senses destruction: 
As if I lay in thy grave, 
I feel the Infinite sucking back 
The individual life it gave. 
Thy spring died to a pool, deep, black, 
Which the sun from its pit did lave.724 
The ‘Infinite sucking back [of] individual life’ is a strong metaphor for annihilation, and 
the poem includes the lines: 
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It lies alone in its lifeless world, 
As a frozen bud on the earth lies curled 
Sightless and soundless, without a cry, 
On the flat of its own vacuity. 
In the 1893 version, these lines are rendered: 
Like a frost-killed bud on a tombstone curled, 
Crumbling it lies on its crumbling world, 
Sightless and deaf, with never a cry, 
In the hell of its own vacuity!725 
The words ‘insensate’, ‘tombstone’, ‘frost-killed bud’ and ‘vacuity’ strongly imply anni-
hilation, so despite a strong consensus regarding MacDonald’s universalism726 I believe the jury 
is out. His views echo those of Maurice, summarised by Geoffrey Rowell thus: 
It would be wrong to describe Maurice as a universalist, for universalism states as a dogmatic cer-
tainty that all men will be eventually saved, and Maurice suspected the certainty of system. There 
is no doubt, however, that his understanding of God led him to hope that all men would eventually 
be saved.727 
Maurice, like MacDonald after him, was suspicious of systems but full of hope: 
We do not want theories of Universalism; they are as cold, hard, unsatisfactory, as all other theo-
ries. But we want that clear, broad assertion of the Divine Charity which the Bible makes, and 
which carries us immeasurably beyond all that we can ask or think.728  
Such ‘larger hope’ had been expressed by Erskine in 1827—‘that loving support to all 
who dared preach universal redemption’729—and his words sum up the prevailing mood among 
subscribers: 
I have a hope (which I would not willingly think contrary to the revelation of mercy) of the ulti-
mate salvation of all. I trust that He who came to bruise the serpent’s head will not cease His work 
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of compassion until He has expelled the fatal poison from every individual of our race. I humbly 
think that the promise bears this wide interpretation.730 
It is clear, however, that MacDonald does not believe in anything approaching the doc-
trine of eternal punishment. We find many illustrations of this. For example, in Alec Forbes, 
Annie has just witnessed the death of her uncle. She then leaves the house, following the river 
to the old churchyard where her father lies buried: 
There was no church: its memory even had vanished. It seemed as if the churchyard had swal-
lowed the church as the heavenly light shall one day swallow the sun and the moon; and the lake 
of divine fire shall swallow death and hell.731 
Against this backdrop, human salvation is conceived in terms of orientation (whether one 
is facing or rejecting the fire of God) rather than position or status (resulting from entering into 
a contractual agreement or subscribing to a ‘plan of salvation’), the latter exemplary of a peren-
nial danger he highlights in his work—of believing things about Christ rather than believing in 
Christ. Rather than accepting ‘the paltry contrivance of a juggling morality, which they attribute 
to God and his Christ, imagining it the atonement, and “the plan of salvation,”’ the question he 
wants answered is: ‘Do you put faith in him, […] or in the doctrines and commandments of 
men?’732 
Without minimising the import of this-life choice, the focus on ‘orientation’ recognises 
that the epektasis of the soul is a trajectory which intersects with, and punctures, death. (Tolkien 
rightly observed that MacDonald was obsessed with death, but this does not necessarily imply a 
morbidity, rather a celebration of death as the doorway to the divine embrace.)733 Post-mortem 
salvation is a possibility, as is the need for a purgatorial ‘clearing up’ operation on those who 
call themselves Christians but are addicted to ‘things’—‘fetters of gold’.734 But of particular 
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concern are ‘schemes of salvation’ which exclude large swathes of humanity such as the ‘good 
Brahmin’,735 savages,736 or the suicide.  
Salvation is thus an ongoing process rather than a one-off event; the child must make dai-
ly choices to be obedient. MacDonald’s remarks along the lines of ‘I don’t care what you be-
lieve’737 here come into focus, for no ‘plan of salvation’ or belief in a ‘correct’ theory of atone-
ment can substitute for this daily, relational walk with Christ who, through his Spirit, leads to-
wards truth: ‘for to hold a thing with the intellect, is not to believe it. A man’s real belief is that 
which he lives by.’738 
There is a corresponding rejection of any notion that the work of Christ ‘imputes’ right-
eousness or ‘covers’ unrighteousness; this, like the emperor’s new clothes, is illusory. He ap-
peals to the Apostle John for support: 
There is no clothing in a robe of imputed righteousness, that poorest of legal cobwebs spun by 
spiritual spiders. To me it seems like an invention of well-meaning dulness [sic] to soothe insanity; 
and indeed it has proved a door of escape out of worse imaginations. It is apparently an old ‘doc-
trine;’ for St. John seems to point at it where he says, ‘Little children, let no man lead you astray; 
he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous’.739  
Righteousness, therefore, is an ongoing, obedient response to divine forgiveness, and 
‘salvation’ involves turning to God with a childlike heart. But how is this achieved? 
5.6 (b) The Christ event 
We now outline key aspects of MacDonald’s soteriology. 
Two fundamental concerns drive his articulation of the Christ event which he expresses 
thus: ‘the worst heresy, next to that of dividing religion and righteousness, is to divide the Fa-
ther from the Son’.740 The first division leads to a religion of belief (theory) rather than faith 
(obedience); the second creates the conditions for the false notion that Jesus shields us from the 
angry Father. Both are summarised in his objection to the idea of imputed righteousness: 
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That is, that, by a sort of legal fiction, Jesus was treated as what he was not, in order that we might 
be treated as what we are not. This is the best device, according to the prevailing theology, that the 
God of truth, the God of mercy, whose glory is that he is just to men by forgiving their sins, could 
fall upon for saving his creatures!741 
As John McLeod Campbell had noted in 1848 (also using the term ‘legal fiction’), it im-
plied ‘a demand in the divine nature for a certain amount of suffering as the punishment of a 
certain amount of sin’, and that Christ was ‘actually in His Father’s eyes as a criminal through 
imputation of man’s sin’—an idea ‘that men have revolted from’.742 
MacDonald’s objection is that the imputation of righteousness of which Paul speaks con-
cerns Abraham being considered righteous because of his own faith, not because of the faith of 
another: ‘To impute the righteousness of one to another, is simply an act of falsehood; to call 
the faith of a man his righteousness is simply to speak the truth.’743 The alternative he offers is 
that God forgives sins (past sinful deeds), but must destroy the inclination to sinfulness: ‘Let me 
be regarded as the sinner I am; for nothing will serve my need but to be made a righteous man, 
one that will no more sin.’744 In his view: 
Christ died to save us, not from suffering, but from ourselves; not from injustice, far less from jus-
tice, but from being unjust. He died that we might live—but live as he lives, by dying as he died 
who died to himself that he might live unto God.745 
It is an emphasis on sanctification—‘growing in and toward righteousness’746—rather 
than salvation. Salvation is viewed as the destination of the Christian journey rather than its 
starting point; union with God, rather than creating the conditions for that union; a process ra-
ther than an act. On this journey, God ‘swallows up all our imperfections, all our defects, all our 
evils’,747 which, as Presbyterian George McCrie fumes, entails ‘small need of the blood, or for 
anything more than an exercise of magnanimity’.748 His colleague Samuel Law Wilson is like-
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wise offended: it reduces conversion to a ‘slight and facile process’ that involves little more 
than a human decision to do better, ignoring ‘the awful controversy caused by sin’.749 
The clearest statement of MacDonald’s soteriology is in the polemical sermon ‘Justice’: 
God forgives past sin; through Christ we have the power to overcome present sin—the inclina-
tion towards sinfulness. He argues here, as we noted earlier,750 that there is no essential ‘schizo-
phrenic’ opposition between God’s justice and God’s mercy, and his starting point is Psalm 
62:12 which (in his KJV) reads: 
Also unto thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy: for thou renderest to every man according to his work. 
The ‘religious mind’ would substitute ‘justice’ for ‘mercy’751 leading to the question, 
‘How could he be a just God and not punish sin?’752 To which he replies: mercy only exists, or 
is necessary, because sin exists; if there was no sin there would be no need for God to exercise 
mercy. In which case, are not mercy and justice in God equivalents? 
If God punish sin, it must be merciful to punish sin; and if God forgive sin, it must be just to for-
give sin. We are required to forgive, with the argument that our father forgives. It must, I say, be 
right to forgive. Every attribute of God must be infinite as himself. He cannot be sometimes merci-
ful, and not always merciful. He cannot be just, and not always just. Mercy belongs to him, and 
needs no contrivance of theologic chicanery to justify it.753 
If punishment were somehow an offset for sin, then ‘God would be bound to punish for 
the sake of the punishment; but he cannot be, for he forgives’,754 leading to the assertion: 
Primarily, God is not bound to punish sin; he is bound to destroy sin. 
[…] 
Punishment, I repeat, is not the thing required of God, but the absolute destruction of sin.755 
Erskine before him, ‘alarmed at the state of religious teaching in Scotland’, had expressed 
similar views. ‘Everywhere’, he wrote, ‘salvation from punishment was substituted for salvation 
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from sin, and sin itself was conceived as a series of particular offences, rather than as the whole 
state of man’s alienation from God.’756 Instead, ‘the absolute destruction of sin’ is needed: God 
freeing God’s children from sin’s power, the starting point being the repentance of the culpable 
individual that recognises and ‘loathes’ the sin in its being. Jesus died to give humans the power 
to overcome sinfulness: 
Repentance, restitution, confession, prayer for forgiveness, righteous dealing thereafter, is the sole 
possible, the only true make-up for sin. For nothing less than this did Christ die. 
[…] 
[T]he work of Jesus Christ on earth was the creative atonement, because it works atonement in 
every heart. He brings and is bringing God and man, and man and man, into perfect unity: ‘I in 
them and thou in me, that they may be perfect in one.’757 
It is a prioritising of declarations that Christ came to neutralise the power of evil (such as 
Heb. 2:14–15) and a rejection of what are considered misinterpretations of passages that imply 
that righteousness is a ‘substance’ that can be somehow imputed to a sinner (such as 2 Cor. 
5:21). 
In short, since the problem of evil is couched primarily in terms of enslaved human will, 
Christ creates the conditions for that will to make a genuinely free choice to return to the Father. 
It reflects the Maurician emphasis on the deepest place in the universe being the love of God, 
relegating sin to a temporary state that ends with the repentance, not the destruction, of the sin-
ner. It is a cosmology—and therefore a soteriology—based on the premise that: 
There is nothing eternal but that which loves and can be loved, and love is ever climbing towards 
the consummation when such shall be the universe, imperishable, divine. 
Therefore all that is not beautiful in the beloved, all that comes between and is not of love’s kind, 
must be destroyed.758 
Speech about ‘growing into childhood’ reflects two priorities that characterise an ac-
ceptable response: first, that ‘childhood’ is the essence and goal of human nature since this is 
the divine ‘idea of the universe’, and second, that it is not a one-off salvation event, but an on-
going choice to be obedient. Humans grow into childhood: like Swedenborg’s angels, they be-
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come progressively younger, and, like Gregory of Nyssa’s soul, ‘expand’ and become more di-
vine as the journey towards God progresses. As MacDonald put it, writing towards the end of 
his life: ‘If we are not little ones of a perfect love, I can see no sense in things.’759 
It is evident that MacDonald fails to account for the negative and destructive forces em-
bedded in this ‘system of Soul-making’ that genuinely damage creaturely well-being by acting 
on a person, rather than being the result of individual sin, particularly the thorny issue of de-
structive natural events, disease, or suffering that, if attributed to God, would imply suspect di-
vine morality. Neither does he consider consequential evil: that, since we are located in a finite 
world, even with ‘the best (childlike) will in the world’, human decisions may have destructive 
implications for others. The refrains ‘all will be well’, and ‘a great good is coming’760 are com-
forting, but they look to eschatological resolution without addressing ‘earthly’ issues which, as 
David Kelsey insists, should really be on the table if theology is to do its job.761 These are issues 
to be borne in mind as we read further. 
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Chapter 6 Critiquing the Evangelical world from fairyland 
6.1 MacDonald’s via media 
The increasingly vocal defence of ‘The Truth!’762 by parties within Evangelicalism forms the 
backdrop to MacDonald’s thought. As explored in Chapter 1, the picture is one of a church di-
vided by contrasting responses to external pressures. While located in a wider ecclesial battle 
for survival, the skirmish between Evangelical conservatives and liberals exercises MacDonald 
because his personal journey was a migration from the former to the latter. However, although 
broadly ‘liberal’—and certainly anti-conservative—he offers another perspective which chal-
lenges both by questioning the validity of truth-claims; truth, he argues, must be appropriated 
‘aesthetically’ by imaginatively discerning its symbolic and metaphorical nature. Although os-
tensibly making him vulnerable to the charge of subjectivism, he is suggesting that so-called 
external ‘facts’ relating to religion are just as illusory and that—since phenomenally perceived 
by human consciousness—claims to validity are not as strong as supposed. 
In this chapter we explore MacDonald’s via media, his alternative to rationalist method-
ologies which, in his view, had lost connection with reality, ‘reality’ for MacDonald being a 
cosmos redolent with God’s immanent presence in nature and in human consciousness provid-
ing a wider context in which to evaluate the fruits of logic. One way of exploring that wider 
context is MacDonald’s use of fairy children. As we look through the eyes of the fairy child in 
his narratives, he suggests a new way of seeing the world, particularly the Evangelical world. 
MacDonald’s questionable account of evil is, I shall argue, a reaction to even more ques-
tionable accounts. We begin by exploring the conservative and liberal Evangelical perspectives 
against which he is reacting, noting that the polarities described here represent the extremes of a 
spectrum of views. Negative criticism should not distract from the fact that Evangelicalism as a 
whole was having its time in the sun and making a positive impact on British society. Evangeli-
cals were generally associated with ‘the cultivation of vital Christianity’.763 
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6.2 Evangelical views of evil 
6.2 (a) The conservative view 
The antagonism between conservative and liberal Evangelicals arguably led to a sense of unre-
ality in the theology of both, that is, a disconnect between theological claims and lived experi-
ence; that propositions, although ‘logical’, did not ‘ring true’. For example, the conservative 
insistence on a young earth and a literal fire of eternal hell was undermined by scientific (in the 
former case) or moral (in the latter case) objections. Critics touched a raw nerve when challeng-
ing the veracity of conservative truth-claims, often provoking a vehement response since the 
foundations of faith were at stake. As Nicholas Lash observes: 
Perhaps only a faith that has lost its nerve feels obliged continually to insist that it is quite sure of 
itself, and knows quite clearly what is to be said concerning the mystery of God.764 
Retreat, resulting in increasing polarisation, ensued, the most notable example being 
Spurgeon, who declared his inability to fellowship with those in the Baptist Union who denied 
the ‘real gospel’. As Hopkins notes, his refusal to engage personally in the debates surrounding 
the ‘down grade’ controversy added to its acidity,765 and ‘Spurgeon’s views on holiness and sin 
sufficed unaided to set up a barrier between himself and the entire spectrum of contemporary 
liberal theological revision’.766 
The conservative inability to accept the liberal position that truth was ‘relational’—that 
is, contingent upon cultural and conscious engagement with it—led to the defence of traditional 
Evangelical orthodoxy. Criticism of such received orthodoxy centred around the problem of 
evil: the perception that God was not so much addressing the issue of evil as responsible for it; 
that the ‘plan of salvation’ on offer was subtly artificial; that eternal torment implied a morally 
corrupt deity; and that the proposition that humans were entirely depraved was untenable. 
Words like ‘darkness’, ‘inflexibility’, and ‘hardness’ were frequently used to describe the ex-
treme forms of Calvinism, said to foster a severe view of life, even madness. Christopher 
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White’s review of American Christianity in the years 1830–1880, for example, notes that inci-
dences of anxiety tending towards madness were not uncommon: 
Liberals across the spectrum—from free-preaching frontier Universalists and Congregationalists to 
urbane Unitarians—thought Calvinism promoted an unhealthy piety that made believers hopeless 
and mentally unstable. Different symptoms resulted—an infirm body, poor mental development, 
depression, insomnia, insanity.  
The case of Elizabeth Cady Stanton—who later became a ‘disenchanted Evangeli-
cal’767— illustrates the practical effects of the doctrine of election which so troubled Annie in 
Alec Forbes, amplified by Thomas Cramm’s efforts to get her ‘convertit’: 
The young […] Stanton was terrified about salvation and was caught in a paralyzing conviction of 
her inability. Though she somehow mustered a moment of joyful conversion, her relief was cut 
short by Charles G. Finney’s incessant harpings on “the depravity and deceitfulness of the human 
heart.” Had her heart fooled her into thinking she had been saved? What could she do? How could 
she know?768 
White notes that such heart-searching was not a by-product of Calvinism but, like Man-
ning’s sermon from a Tractarian perspective,769 one of its goals: ‘Calvinist doctrines were in-
tended to produce an anxious alertness, an unsettling conviction of total sinfulness’ from which 
there was no escape. MacDonald, likewise, speaks of those who— 
lie wasting themselves in soul-sickening self-examination as to whether they are believers, wheth-
er they are really trusting in the atonement, whether they are truly sorry for their sins—the way to 
madness of the brain, and despair of the heart.770 
The picture is confirmed by a recent study of the effects of strict Calvinism in one of the 
last areas in Scotland where it survives in its most Federal form—the island of Lewis. Here, the 
church divides people into the elect and the reprobate, denying the latter access not just to 
communion but to the communion service. Like MacDonald’s sketch of the disturbed Charley 
whose repressive religious father dominates the skyline of his son’s life, the result here is ‘a 
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profound sense of guilt’ leading to increased incidences of depression and suicide that have 
been linked directly to Calvinist preaching.771 
Those doing the preaching were not immune. R. W. Dale, for example, as assistant minis-
ter pressured to teach the ‘old theology’ under the watchful eye of his predecessor at Carrs Lane 
Congregational Church in Birmingham, John Angell James, speaks of ‘[s]easons of depression, 
heavy, terrible, overwhelming, come over me’;772 Spurgeon also, having earlier in his career 
relished the preaching of damnation, later said the doctrine gave him ‘the bitterest anguish of 
spirit’.773 Echoing Iain McGilchrist’s observation that at the Reformation ‘the Flesh is made 
Word’,774 the author of the Isle of Lewis report concludes: 
What we have is a religion of words instead of an encounter with the living Word, words that have 
been made into an idolatry and substitute for what they represent. From a psychoanalytic perspec-
tive, what we have here is a schizoid faith, split away from incarnation, from the flesh and guts of 
the world, withdrawn from involvement in the world’s suffering, from its history, its politics, its 
economics.775 
That this represents extreme conservative Calvinism (Law’s accusation)776 is admitted; 
the issue, however, is that such ‘hard’ views were always in the background in the nineteenth 
century, bleeding into the softer forms of Evangelicalism. As Mark Johnson observes, the 
forced marriage of the ‘moderate Calvinism’ of the early part of the century (election) to Evan-
gelicalism (Christ died for all) resulted in ‘a confused mixture’,777 one that in the eyes of Mac-
Donald had never exorcised the demons of the past. Rather than account for evil, many critics 
considered conservative theology a source of evil. In short, the conservative theological account 
of evil, and its practical consequences, did not (at least for the sceptical) ‘ring true’. 
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6.2 (b) The liberal view 
The same, however, could be said of the liberal position. Conservatives accused liberals of be-
ing ‘effeminate’ and ‘sentimental’, particularly those of a more Romantic persuasion such as the 
Congregational minister Thomas Toke Lynch (for MacDonald, ‘a man of true insight and large 
heart’).778 The issue came into focus in 1855 when Lynch published an inoffensive book of de-
votional poems called The Rivulet: a Contribution to Sacred Song, a work having an ‘obvious 
debt to the romantic spirit’ illustrating the rise of a subjectivism that was seen as the polar oppo-
site to the objectivity of the old school giving rise to what was termed ‘The New Theology’.779 
Like William Hale White, who attributed his escape from Congregationalism to the ministra-
tions of Wordsworth,780 Lynch too—though a poor poet—was clearly influenced by his hero. 
Nature imagery abounds, and we are treated to stanzas such as: 
Flowers will not cease to speak 
And tell the praise of God 
Even to the careless man 
Who has upon them trod. 
[…] 
Pure juices sweetened by the skies 
Are in the grass; and, look! 
There feeds the lamb for sacrifice 
In meadows by the brook.781 
These lines would perhaps have benefitted from the oblivion of history had it not been for 
John Campbell’s heated objections. Campbell, who had been the Congregational minister at 
Moorfields Tabernacle in London in the 1830s–1840s and then the self-appointed spokesman 
for Evangelical conservatism through his platform as the editor of Congregational publications, 
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had become increasingly obsessed [in the late 1840s] with what he correctly saw to be an erosion 
of the orthodox evangelicalism, or the moderate Calvinism of the Congregational churches […] he 
singled out “an increase in German error”.782 
Campbell saw The Rivulet as anything but inoffensive, rather the first trickle of a liberal 
inundation in danger of swamping true Christianity. Lynch was, according to another critic (one 
James Grant), ‘pervaded throughout by the Rationalist Theology of Germany’.783 Such Roman-
tic ‘rationalism’ was, ironically, seen as producing an excess of speculation and imagination. 
MacDonald, for example, stood accused of: 
the enthronement of the individual consciousness over any objective rule of faith. 
[…] 
[A theory] which discredits the authority of Scripture, and leaves every man free to shape his own 
theology according to his own tastes, feelings, and even prejudices, [and] is Rationalism, pure and 
simple.784 
Neither Darwin’s conclusion that nature was demon-designed, or Tennyson’s view that it 
was ‘red in tooth and claw’, nor the conservative view that both humanity and nature were in-
trinsically corrupt were compatible with Goethe’s view of nature as God’s robe. As Spurgeon 
had pessimistically put it: ‘the best we can do with this world is to get through it as quickly as 
we can, for we dwell in an enemy’s country’,785 and, as Campbell pointed out, Lynch’s own 
words betrayed him: nature was not as benign or numinous as those such as he claimed: 
O, the bright and vast creation 
Can be terrible and stern, 
From its stroke be no salvation, 
Though on every side we turn: 
Lord of nature, Lord of nature, 
Then to Thee our spirits yearn.786 
The optimistic view of human nature was also criticised for ignoring ‘the awful contro-
versy caused by sin’,787 a phrase summative of the conservative view that Romantic liberalism 
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was deficient in its account of reality, particularly relating to sin. Not only did the Romantic 
view of reality undermine conservative Evangelical orthodoxy, it also (for the sceptical) did not 
‘ring true’. 
6.3 ‘A little world of his own’—the view from fairyland 
MacDonald would, I believe, have applauded Chesterton’s views on madness: 
Imagination does not breed insanity. Exactly what does breed insanity is reason. Poets do not go 
mad; but chess-players do. […] I am not, as will be seen, in any sense attacking logic: I only say 
that this danger does lie in logic, not in imagination.788 
However, if extreme ‘logical’ conservatism caused madness, then Romantic liberalism, 
one might say, tended towards blindness. Both ‘views’ of reality arguably resulted in an inabil-
ity to see truly, to account for the world experienced by human consciousness. MacDonald of-
fers an alternative perspective by using his ‘fairy vision’789—by viewing the world through the 
eyes of a fairy child, a fantasy creation of mid nineteenth century Romanticism and therefore 
prone to a somewhat over-optimistic view of the world, but one attempting, nevertheless, to see 
clearly and through whose eyes we survey a sometimes bleak, often idealised, landscape. Unlike 
the children of Calvinism, this Coleridgean child prioritises imaginative vision on the under-
standing that imagination is a ‘repetition in the finite mind of the I AM’; it is also, therefore, a 
divine agent. From fairyland, from the other side of Chesterton’s hedge,790 it gives us a fresh 
perspective on the world of humans. The confusion comes when this child, one such as Gibbie, 
visits the real world. Before exploring this approach in MacDonald’s fantasy text Lilith, we crit-
ically consider MacDonald’s thought experiment. 
At the outset, it is important to make the distinction between the ideal and the fantastic. 
The former is a state of affairs that might be possible in a world of perfection. As evil exists, the 
ideal is always unattainable in the present quotidian context but nevertheless may dictate a legit-
imate course of action which is a moral good. The fantastic only exists in fairyland and repre-
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sents a state of affairs unattainable in the quotidian world but which may nevertheless throw the 
nature of that world into relief. One problem we face in MacDonald is the blurring of the 
boundaries between the real (the human proximate context), the ideal, the fantastic, and the 
transcendent—the latter being, in MacDonald’s scheme, that which exists in God’s imagination 
beyond present human knowledge, elements of which might be abductively revealed by the 
Spirit. 
To give an example: F. D. Maurice’s ‘brotherhood of man’ theology led to a belief that 
the prime need was not for evangelism aimed at transferring people into the kingdom of God, 
but waking people to knowledge of their present status as members of it. Thus the task of the 
evangelist was to: 
[call forth] the heart and conscience of men, so that being first able to see their Father in heaven 
truly, and themselves in their true relation to Him, they may afterwards manfully investigate, as I 
am sure they will long to do, the conditions under which they themselves, His children, exist.791 
This optimism underpinning Maurice’s Christian Socialism, that men—especially poor 
men—would ‘manfully investigate the conditions under which they exist’, is dramatized in 
Robert Falconer. Falconer, a superhero who appears to know most Londoners by name and can 
fell recalcitrant policemen with a single blow without charges being pressed,792 offers some ad-
vice to a destitute Spitalfields weaver. The narrator notes: 
This man had lost his wife and three children, his whole family except a daughter now sick, by a 
slow-consuming hunger; and he did not believe there was a God that ruled in the earth. But he 
supported his unbelief by no other argument than a hopeless bitter glance at his empty loom.793  
Unbelief rather than unemployment is the main issue. To wake his ‘higher nature’ he is 
admonished to snap out of it and serve his even more impoverished neighbours on the basis 
that— 
the nature of the Son of Man was in him, and that to get him to do as the Son of Man did, in ever 
so small a degree, was the readiest means of bringing his higher nature to the birth.794 
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Being already a child, indwelt by the Spirit, all is needed is obedience to the initial spark 
of revelation to fan the fire of faith. 
In such ways MacDonald was mediating his understanding of Maurice’s academic prose 
to a wider audience, and I suggest that the process, the creative process of dramatizing that the-
ology, reveals its shortcomings—not necessarily shortcomings in Maurice’s theology, but in 
MacDonald’s interpretation of Maurice. There is often a naivety, sentimentality, and unreality 
prompting one critic of the novel Guild Court, for example, to observe that ‘he might as well 
have located his characters in Eden or in the planet Mars’.795 So how should we read it? 
It is clear that Falconer is a Christ figure796—the policeman incident reinforces this in that 
he is somehow above earthly law—but having arrived via fairyland (with Christ-like attributes 
but nevertheless a product of MacDonald’s imagination) has clearly misread the social situation 
and assumed that either God has ordained poverty or that inequality is inconsequential com-
pared to the more fundamental issue of ‘unbelief’. The tableau illustrates the admissible propo-
sition that Christ is active in society and humans have a responsibility to acknowledge this, but 
sets this within a fantastic setting. Purporting to be a picture of nineteenth century London, its 
idealist caricature is so far from lived experience that the message—the poor must be woken up 
and work towards their own salvation—is perceived to be a foreign import from fairyland. It is 
the story of a naive fairy visitor to an ideal world.  
Similar comments might be made regarding characters such as Gibbie. Also a Christ-
inspired being from fairyland (or ‘Eden or the planet Mars’) Gibbie’s muteness, like Diamond’s 
incoherence,797 reinforces his fairy status: his inability to converse with humans (except imper-
fectly through his wife’s intuitive relaying of his wishes or through the cumbersome efforts of 
writing on a slate)798 indicates a fundamental otherness. He does not speak human language. He 
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cannot relate to, neither does he belong, in the quotidian world, for the world he inhabits, on 
closer inspection, is on the borders of fairyland where a good fairy is making sure nothing terri-
ble happens. Furthermore, he brings with him a perspective from fairyland which remains un-
forged in the crucible of human interaction. His belief, in other words, has no need to be refined 
or challenged in the furnace of conversation; it has no need to evolve. He is essentially a fairy 
fundamentalist, firmly convinced his dogma is the truth. The proposition that Christ deals with 
the problem of evil and in some sense absorbs it on behalf of humanity is blunted by the fairy 
context in that the evil of ‘the grey city’ bears little resemblance to its real-world corrosive 
counterpart. 
The reason for this is simply that MacDonald has projected onto the nineteenth century 
landscape a Romantic naivety about human nature combined with the prevailing view that so-
cial hierarchy is ordained by God, that Church and State are guardians of this hierarchical flock, 
and it is the divine will that some were born to serve others. There was hitherto little will to 
change the status quo: literature exploring the education of the poor during the first half of the 
century, for example, is less concerned about bettering their lot than enabling them to fulfil their 
divinely-ordained station, and Evangelical children’s literature likewise assumed that this was 
the norm. In The Fairchild Family, for example, John Trueman, the servant of a household that 
lives in an idyllic leafy suburbia, is described thus: 
He was a poor working man, and had a wife and six children. But I should not call him poor: I 
should rather call him rich; for he had cause to hope that his wife and all his children (that is, all 
who were old enough to inspire such hopes) had been brought to the knowledge of God; and as for 
John himself, there was reason to think that he was one of the most faithful servants of God in all 
the country round.799  
MacDonald does not, in the main, challenge social roles: his ideal peasants are content 
with their lot and are the salt of the earth; it is social climbers, such as Rev. Clement Sclater in 
Sir Gibbie, who want to ‘improve’ themselves that endanger social equilibrium. The main sin of 
the arch-villain in David Elginbrod—the Count from Bohemia who uses a ring and powers of 
                                                




mesmerisation to entrap weak women—is not, it seems, his immoral behaviour but the fact that 
he is a fallen servant with pretensions beyond his station.800 
MacDonald, then, is a man of his time with a Romantic perspective. That he tends to turn 
a blind eye to evil must be acknowledged. That in many ways he accepts the social views of his 
age must also be acknowledged, but, as we have explored, this does not prevent him making an 
incisive challenge to male middle class views of women through texts such as North Wind, nei-
ther is his contribution to the theology of childhood inconsequential. What is of particular inter-
est is MacDonald’s use of fantasy to explore and articulate theology. 
6.3 (a) The nature of fairyland 
In The Fantastic Imagination, MacDonald focuses on ‘fairy stories’ and underlines the legiti-
macy and purpose of an author ‘inventing a little world of his own’: 
The natural world has its laws […] but they themselves may suggest laws of other kinds, and man 
may, if he pleases, invent a little world of his own, with its own laws; for there is that in him 
which delights in calling up new forms […]. When such forms are new embodiments of old truths, 
we call them products of the Imagination; when they are mere inventions, however lovely, I 
should call them the work of the Fancy: in either case, Law has been diligently at work.801 
The Coleridgean language reinforces the divine source of human imagination, unlike that 
of fancy which is ‘mere invention’.802 Both are worthy human endeavours that must conform to 
‘law’—the nineteenth century was preoccupied with the need to conform to the fundamental 
divine principles undergirding reality803—but only the former embodies ‘truth’ understood as 
something already conceived by God. ‘New forms’ and ‘new embodiments of old truths’ may be 
new expressions of truth, that is, of divine ideas, but do not add to it.804 Unlike Chesterton and 
Tolkien, for example, for whom an artwork was, in the scholastic sense, a ‘thing in itself’ radiat-
ing its own truth, MacDonald focuses on the human imagination’s ability to reflect and embody 
God’s thoughts. Alison Milbank summarises thus: 
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The distinction between truth and its embodiment […] is quite foreign to Chesterton and Tolkien’s 
[strongly realist] view of a work of art as a thing in itself […]. MacDonald strives to the same end 
as they [to stress the divine origin of art], but has a less positive conception of the value of the ma-
terial as against the spiritual and disembodied.805 
Instead of ‘spiritual and disembodied’, the words ‘mental and conscious’ might equally 
be used in recognition of MacDonald’s radical idealism. This is particularly evident in the earli-
er essay The Imagination: Its Function and Its Culture where the subjective nature of reality is 
underlined: 
For the world is […] the human being turned inside out. All that moves in the mind is symbolized 
in Nature. Or, to use another more philosophical, and certainly not less poetic figure, the world is a 
sensuous analysis of humanity, and hence an inexhaustible wardrobe for the clothing of human 
thought.806  
In fairyland, then, as in the real world, ‘Law is diligently at work’, that is, it is a jurisdic-
tion where divinely-ordained moral principles apply. Because they are divine, ‘no man must 
interfere with them’; the author ‘must not meddle with the [moral] relations of live souls’. ‘In 
physical things a man may invent; in moral things he must obey—and take their laws into his 
invented world as well.’807 MacDonald’s vision of human creativity thus parallels his vision of 
human being: just as human being equates to God’s thoughts, so fairy being equates to human 
thoughts. Imagination is not only the connection between them but the ever-present flux of real-
ity—temporal and transcendent—leading to the observation: 
if [imagination] be to man what creation is to God, we must expect to find it operative in every 
sphere of human activity. Such is, indeed, the fact, and that to a far greater extent than is common-
ly supposed.808  
Fairyland, therefore—if the genuine product of imagination rather than the ‘mere inven-
tions’ of fancy—is, being divinely inspired, part of the kingdom of God. Furthermore, if aspects 
of fairyland are fanciful, since fancy must also conform to ‘Law’ this too can shed light on the 
nature of reality. The child of fairyland is therefore a child of God. Being a citizen of both fairy-
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land and the kingdom of God it has the right to critique the world of humans. However, as the 
knight remarks to Anados in Phantastes, ‘Somehow or other […] notwithstanding the beauty of 
this country of Faerie, in which we are, there is much that is wrong with it’:809 sin and evil also 
exist in fairyland (dragons need to be slain) and fairy vision is not necessarily correct vision. 
Fairies, too, have their preconceptions and biases. 
MacDonald views Evangelical liberalism and conservatism (among other things) through 
the eyes of this fairy child, offering not just an alternative view but a new way of seeing. While 
it is true that liberals were broadly ‘imaginative’, and conservatives more ‘logical’, it would be 
wrong simply to categorise them as such. While liberals did indeed lean towards a more imagi-
native view, both were essentially wedded to ‘scientific’ methodology. The antagonism 
stemmed less from methodology as from different starting points leading to logically irreconcil-
able positions: God could not be a benign Father as well as a torturer; humanity could not be 
both sinless and depraved; the Bible could not be both inerrant and historically contingent; the 
earth could not be both 4,004 years old (Ussher’s date confidently inscribed in family Bibles) 
and have evolved, and so on. MacDonald’s fairy child provides a wider perspective, not op-
posed to intellection, but offering fresh vision to guide its ‘plodding brother, reason’ towards a 
more contextual understanding. 
6.3 (b) Learning to see again—the vision of fairyland 
MacDonald is challenging what he saw as naive, sadistic, and juridical caricatures of God. Con-
crete alternative theological proposals have emerged, but, as MacDonald explicitly states, his 
goal is not to impart information but to waken imagination. In a positivist age prone to what 
might be termed cataphatic literalist fundamentalism, MacDonald offers a mystical apophatic 
theological approach which apparently moves truth away from ‘objective’ fact and locates it in 
human consciousness. However, it has more to do with rejecting the illusion of objective fact 
and locating truth in a wider concept of shared human–divine consciousness. 
                                                




(i) Making the familiar strange 
By leading us into fairyland, MacDonald is giving us new categories with which to view reality 
by means of two processes. First, there is making the familiar strange. With fairy vision we take 
a fresh and more objective look at the idols that have taken up residence among us. They are 
familiar, part of the religious landscape, but should they be there? This is dramatized in Phan-
tastes where there is a thinly-veiled critique of Reformed religion and the ‘terrible idol’ at its 
centre.810 The fantasy tale concerns the quest of Anados (‘on the way up’)811 to find his true 
identity. False identity results from self-centredness which gives rise to the presence of an evil 
shadow from which Anados longs to be free (a metaphor for the rebellious self becoming 
opaque to the light of God’s radiance).812  
Anados’s emancipation is rendered more likely by his volunteering to serve a knight, a 
fellow traveller in Faerie whose own redemption is also imminent having slain a dreaded drag-
on. Knight and squire are travelling through a forest at sundown when they happen upon a reli-
gious service taking place in a woodland ‘cathedral’ formed by a rectangle of yew trees. Reli-
gious and military architecture is evoked (as is death, as yews are associated with graveyards): 
gothic ‘trees grew to a very great height’ forming ‘conical battlements all around the walls’. The 
trees ‘contained […] a parallelogram of great length’ filled with worshippers, ‘men and women 
and children, in holiday attire’ (that is, sabbath dress) flanked on each side by three rows of 
priests: these men are armed with swords, ‘although the rest of [their] costume and bearing was 
more priestly than soldierly’. The contrast between the devotional sincerity of the worshippers 
and the menacing presence of military priest-guardians gives an air of deception, compounded 
by the fact that the altar with the object of worship is so distant that the congregation, in the twi-
light, are unable to see it clearly. Anados, however, with fairy vision enhanced by his sacrificial 
decision to serve the good knight, ‘was able to perceive more clearly what took place […] at the 
other end’: ‘I knew that my sight was so much more keen than that of most people, that I had 
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good reason to suppose I should see more than the rest could.’813 It is a disturbing picture. As 
night falls the sense of menace grows: young robed acolytes are led to the altar surrounded by 
priestly guardians that prevent the congregation from seeing what is going on. As the congrega-
tion sings in worship and robed figures kneel at the altar— 
The knight whispered to me [Anados], “How solemn it is! Surely they wait to hear the voice of a 
prophet. There is something good near!”  
But I, though somewhat shaken by the feeling expressed by my master, yet had an unaccountable 
conviction that here was something bad. So I resolved to be keenly on the watch for what should 
follow.814 
What follows is human sacrifice as the trusting acolytes are pushed through a hidden 
trapdoor in the idolatrous altar as the congregation sings.815  
The scene ends with Anados unmasking the deception in an act which results in his own 
death. After gaining the platform, he wrests the throne from its pedestal exposing a pit: ‘up out 
of it rushed a great brute, like a wolf, but twice the size’. The struggle that ensues results in the 
death of both, but for Anados this is the sweet death of self-sacrifice through which he is finally 
separated from his evil alter-ego, the shadow.816 
The narrative illustrates Milton’s view that God uses evil to serve the good: 
O goodness infinite, goodness immense! 
That all this good of evil shall produce, 
And evil turn to good; more wonderful 
Than that which by creation first brought forth 
Light out of darkness!817 
Reflecting this, the story ends with an equally optimistic summary of MacDonald’s doc-
trine of evil: ‘What we call evil, is the only and best shape, which, for the person and his condi-
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tion at the time, could be assumed by the best good.’818 Conversely, the knight’s evaluation that 
‘there is something good near!’ indicates that what is perceived as good is often evil.  
This scene clearly presents a jaundiced view of popular religion as that presided over by a 
demon who is served by complicit priests intent on deception. Phantastes represents MacDon-
ald’s manifesto for all his future work. From this point on, ‘we find the child’s simple faith 
dominating all his writings as surely as in his youth it first took control of his theology’.819 This 
vision from fairyland may or may not represent reality, but it does force a closer inspection of it. 
Making the familiar strange forces a re-evaluation of reality that exposes idols—imposters—
that should be expunged. To frame the issue from an alternative perspective, since culture es-
sentially inheres in the aggregate of symbols that result from a society’s worship—what that 
society valorises and ‘cultivates’—fairy vision helps to counteract the blindness of convention. 
(ii) Making strange the familiar 
The second function of fairy vision is to make strange the familiar. This has less to do with ex-
posing falsehood as revealing truth—the problem that familiarity, if not breeding contempt, has 
a tendency to breed indifference and complacency. Again, MacDonald’s target is primarily reli-
gious views. ‘Are you,’ he asks, ‘so familiar with the artefacts of faith that they no longer pro-
voke a response?’ Fairy vision startles with its revealing perspectives, challenging the conclu-
sions (social or individual) of prior experience. 
MacDonald’s work, as theodicy, is primarily concerned with exploring the true nature of 
God. If God is not a ‘wolf’, what is God like? Repeatedly the reader is presented with a child 
who either claims to be, or represent, divinity, such as the Old Man of the Earth—a child who 
appears as the ‘oldest man of all’ in The Golden Key820—or Gibbie with a cross cut into his 
back, or a child whose implicit trust in God as the perfect father, like Clare Skymer, is never 
misplaced. Furthermore, many of MacDonald’s divine agents and theophanies are female, chal-
lenging the stereotypical view of God as male. 
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MacDonald, following Carlyle, saw the task of the poet as disinterring words from the 
grave of convention so that they could glow once more with true meaning,821 or as Coleridge 
had put it, ‘genius’ rescues ‘the most admitted truths from the impotence caused by the very 
circumstances of their universal admission’.822 The fairy story is one of his main vehicles for 
this. Not that words simply had value according their original symbolic meaning, rather it was 
the opposite: a quest to rediscover layered metaphor in a world increasingly focused on the con-
ventional ‘surface’ of words. Symbol had replaced the symbolised; theologically, les mots had 
dethroned la Parole. In this, MacDonald anticipated the later fin de siècle frustration of those 
such as Chesterton which led to the latter’s quest to ‘find new ways to restore language as a sig-
nifying medium of the real world: namely, the fantastic’.823 Likewise in Russia in 1914, Victor 
Shklovsky lamented that ‘words are now dead, and language is like a graveyard’ leading to a 
call for the defamiliarization of both words and art.824 Arguing that we can become so habituat-
ed to art (and, by implication, the world around us) that we fail to see it, Shklovsky suggested a 
three-fold strategy of defamiliarization: to refuse to name art, thereby making it strange; to offer 
an unusual viewpoint; and to engage in ‘the childlike description of something familiar as if it 
were seen for the first time’.825 
In the next chapter we consider how MacDonald uses all three of these techniques in his 
most enigmatic work, Lilith. 
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Chapter 7 The child against the vampire: a reading of Lilith 
7.1 Lilith—making strange theology 
Lilith—according to Greville MacDonald, ‘the majestic thought of his [father’s] old age’—is 
illustrative and summative of MacDonald’s life’s work. Published when he was seventy-one 
(1895), it is opaque and enigmatic, and he was nervous about publishing.826 His assurance that 
‘there is nothing very obscure in it that is worth finding out’827 is controverted by the subsequent 
kaleidoscope of interpretations, and by the fact that the manuscript was repeatedly amended re-
flecting a quest to communicate something with precision. As autobiographical fiction, its im-
portance is underlined by MacDonald’s comments about biography and fiction: 
Deep is the relation between the life shadowed forth in a biography, and the life in a man’s brain 
which he shadows forth in a fiction—when that fiction is of the highest order, and written in love, 
is beheld even by the writer himself with reverence.828 
Lilith, as we will see, concerns ‘the life in a man’s brain’. 
Lilith is a mystical work. Just as ‘only a Kabbalist, one who ascends to a particular spir-
itual degree, attains what [the Zohar] conveys’,829 or only a ‘true magus’ can access the wisdom 
of Boehme,830 ‘we are here in a region […] open only to the heart of the child’.831 Imaginative 
engagement (and patience) is needed, and rewarded. The Times, perhaps lacking such, observed 
that, compared to the dream of Phantastes, Lilith was more of a nightmare: 
To an intellect in which the Celtic is mixed with “the German paste” all this may seem very agree-
able, and even subtly edifying, but this wilderness is tedious to the ordinary student.832 
A close reading of this text is necessary since two of its central themes are evil and child-
hood. 
                                                
826 ‘I often doubt if I shall write another book. There is one in the printers’ hands now, which, however, I fear you 
may not quite like’ (‘To Lady Mount-Temple’, Letters GM, p. 364). 
827 Ibid., pp. 366–67. 
828 Review of ‘Essays on some of the Forms of Literature’ by T. T. Lynch, in Orts, p. 222. 
829 ‘What is The Zohar?’, ‘Kabbalah’, http://www.kabbalah.info/engkab/mystzohar.htm [accessed 18 Aug 2106]. We 
meet Lilith in the Zohar shortly. 
830 Page 140. 
831 Note 647. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that MacDonald is proposing an occult or ‘gnostic’ scheme 
accessible only to the initiated. His central point is that all are children; all have access to God. 




Lilith is primarily set in a cabbalistic ‘region of the seven dimensions’ presided over by 
archetypal figures, mostly female.833 These are both an attraction and a threat to the protago-
nist—the aptly-named Mr Vane—more the latter in the case of the central and ambiguous char-
acter of the vampire, Lilith. The region of the seven dimensions appears to exist primarily in the 
consciousness of Vane: a realm of bewildering hallucinatory dream-sequences where shape-
shifting characters and set are constantly mutating and where boundaries are blurred. This im-
pression is confirmed by specific references to mental states; at one point, for example, Vane 
remarks: ‘I realised I was inside the brain of the princess.’834 
Labyrinthine mansions, in MacDonald’s work, are metaphors for the mind.835 Here, 
Vane, having come of age, has inherited the ancestral mansion—the divine gift of human body 
and consciousness—which he has little motivation to explore. Like its human counterpart, the 
house has doorways to fairyland, a fantasy realm not so much beyond ‘reality’ as entwined with 
it.836 He is content to spend his time in the library, a repository of conventional wisdom collect-
ed by ancestors, hermetically isolated from the wider reality of which he is a part. One day, 
wandering into the attic, he discovers the mirror which is the gateway to a hitherto unexperi-
enced region: 
“If I know nothing of my own garret,” I thought, “what is there to secure me against my own 
brain? Can I tell what it is even now generating?—what thought it may present me the next mo-
ment, the next month, or a year away? What is at the heart of my brain? What is behind my 
THINK? Am I there at all?—Who, what am I?”837 
                                                
833 In Kabbalah, seven—in Judaism the number of divine perfection (Dictionary NT Theology, II, pp. 690–692)—
frequently occurs in relation to God’s creative acts. Both the Zohar and Lilith also feature three mothers whom we 
will meet in due course (see Arthur Edward Waite, The Doctrine and Literature of the Kabalah (London: The 
Theosophical Publishing Society, 1902), pp. 52, 61, 62, 233). According to Waite (ibid., p. xi), only two books on 
Kabbalah were published in the nineteenth century in English, the first, in 1865, somewhat critical; the second, S. L. 
MacGregor Mathers, The Kabbalah Unveiled (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1887), includes 
translations and commentaries on three books of the Zohar and conceivably influenced MacDonald. Although Lilith 
does not appear in the latter, mutual themes include an emphasis on God being both male and female (Kabbalah Un-
veiled, pp. viii, 21, 22, 25), that God has been dethroned from Christianity and ‘in his stead [you] have placed [a] 
demon’ (p. 2), that heaven and earth are intertwined (p. 21), and that life is a dream followed by waking in eternity 
(pp. 31, 37). 
It is more likely, however, that MacDonald was more generally influenced by the growing late Victorian interest in 
the mind, psychic phenomena, and theosophy. 
834 Lilith, p. 191. 
835 Edmund Cusick, ‘MacDonald and Jung’, in The Gold Thread, ed. by William Raeper (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1990), pp. 56–86 (p. 63). 
836 Page 135. 




This text centres on this existential question of true identity. The library at the centre of—
and dominating—the house represents the mind (particularly a ‘scientific’ mind that has become 
anaesthetized by convention) whose ‘garrets’ (imagination) are unknown territory and whose 
portals (the doors and mirrors of imagination) may lead to danger or, conversely, give danger-
ous forces entry. In the same way that North Wind challenges the conventional understanding of 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’, Vane realises that the inside of his ‘house’, far from being a refuge, is 
dangerously sited at the edge of a greater reality of which he is ignorant.  
It is a dream where Vane is aware, or suspects, that he is dreaming, a dramatization of 
MacDonald’s conviction that mind is the stuff of the universe and that Novalis was right when 
he said, ‘Our life is no dream, but it should and perhaps will become one’ (a quotation that 
opened his manifesto, Phantastes, and closes this one).838 It is exemplary of what W. H. Auden 
(and C. S. Lewis) called ‘his greatest gift’,839 that of ‘dream realism’, a gift used here to destabi-
lize and defamiliarize, to make strange the familiar, and to explore a thesis set out in The Por-
tent thirty years previously: 
A man who dreams, and knows that he is dreaming, thinks he knows what waking is; but knows it 
so little, that he mistakes, one after another, many a vague and dim change in his dream for an 
awakening. When the true waking comes at last, he is filled and overflowed with the power of his 
reality.840 
Vane ‘wakes’ often, only to conclude he is probably still dreaming. For example, fleeing 
from his dream reality to wake once more in his library, he ponders: 
Had I come to myself out of a vision?—or lost myself by going back to one? Which was the real—
what I now saw, or what I had just ceased to see? Could both be real, interpenetrating yet unmin-
gling?841 
The narrative dramatizes the conviction that death is the final sleep from which all will 
wake into true consciousness; prior to that, life is a dream: 
For we are dreaming, fast asleep, 
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This dream of ache and strife.842 
 All includes Lilith, the demonic and vampiric ‘queen of Hell’, Satan, and all humanity. 
MacDonald is dramatizing (to extremes) the ‘larger hope’ so despised by those such as 
Spurgeon. Thus a feature of the supernatural world beyond Vane’s house is a vast ceme-
tery/dormitory whose sexton is Adam. Only those who submit to the sleep of death in the world 
of the seven dimensions may truly wake in the next—truly real—transcendent world. 
Adam is assisted by Eve, their role being to ‘watch the flock of the great shepherd’ until 
they wake843 which, since Lilith also consents to sleep there, implies that she also is one of the 
great shepherd’s sheep. The ‘second death’, which, unlike its Johannine counterpart, always 
leads to life,844 is the final exit door from purgatorial reality leading to union with the Great 
Consciousness. In the meantime, the world of human consciousness (both pre- and post-
mortem) is a purgatorial experience preparatory to that end. Adam and Eve’s jurisdiction over 
the fantasy world indicates that it represents the post-lapsarian nightmare realm of rebellious 
humanity, escape from which can only be achieved through the acceptance of ‘bread and wine’ 
(a meal that Adam and Eve frequently offer their guests)845 and repentance, prerequisites for 
submitting to the final sleep that leads to the eschaton.846 
Reflecting Shklovsky’s tactic of defamiliarization, the story opens with Vane seeing 
something with imaginative childlike vision ‘as if for the first time’.847 It is ‘childlike’ as it con-
cerns the realisation that he is the child of a dynasty to which he owes both existence and alle-
giance. 
Vane reads his ‘science’ books—exploring the ‘history of the human mind in relation to 
supposed knowledge’848—unaware that this second-hand, historical knowledge is about to be-
come present reality. It is the picture of a mind—MacDonald is perhaps thinking of a conserva-
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843 Lilith, p. 46. 
844 Rev. 21.8. 
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tive Evangelical mind—content to accept without question the received wisdom of ancestors. 
However, one day a shaft of sunlight enters the library and illuminates a picture: 
I knew it as the likeness of one of my ancestors, but had never even wondered why it hung there 
alone […]. The direct sunlight brought out the painting wonderfully; for the first time I seemed to 
see it, and for the first time it seemed to respond to my look. With my eyes full of the light reflect-
ed from it, something […] made me turn and cast a glance to the farther end of the room, when I 
saw, or seemed to see, a tall figure reaching up a hand to a bookshelf. The next instant […] I saw 
no one, and concluded that my optic nerves had been momentarily affected from within.849 
The library, one might say, represents the ‘left hemisphere’ of Vane’s consciousness, a 
repository of conventional truth, classified and filed by ancestors. It might also represent con-
servative views of the Bible (τὰ βιβλία) as a complete and final literal-factual revelation of di-
vine truth. However, the shaft of sunlight from outside the library changes everything: Vane is 
suddenly aware of a transcendent context, the world behind or beyond the ‘text’ of his life, a 
world inhabited by ancestors. As he puts it: ‘The house’—his mind and body—‘had grown 
strange to me.’850 
This epiphany is Vane’s first glimpse of a world beyond convention, the beginning of his 
search for his true identity. His ghostly visitor, the old butler informs him, was probably a Mr 
Raven, a one-time librarian that had been known to haunt the house. But when he later follows 
the ghostly librarian through the magic mirror into fairyland, he not only transforms into a ra-
ven, but also—we find out in due course—is really Adam, both sexton and librarian of bodies 
waiting for resurrection.851 Books, like people, are doorways to fairyland. 
Many characters appear in multiple guises. Lilith, for example, is both a beautiful woman 
and a leopardess, and in one scene—as if powerless to hide her true nature—her body disinte-
grates, but not before limbs have become snakes and ‘something […] like a bat’ has flown from 
her852—gothic images associated with evil and vampires. Consonant with MacDonald’s view 
that ‘the world is […] the human being turned inside out’,853 so, he suggests, ‘you can tell what 
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sort a man is by his creature that comes oftenest to the front’.854 Materiality is a manifestation of 
mind, and identity a schizoid hydra until such time as true God-given identity is accepted. Iden-
tity based on the false premise that one is ‘inside’ one’s house is merely illusory. 
Identity, MacDonald is arguing, is not defined by naming something or someone. The 
name simply represents the conventional understanding of what an entity appears to be in a cer-
tain context and can mask its true nature. Dramatizing Shklovsky’s second defamiliarization 
tactic of refusing to name art, Vane, on being asked his name by Mr Raven, finds himself una-
ble to recall it. He has become strange to the art that is himself: 
I became at once aware that I could give him no notion of who I was. Indeed, who was I? […] 
Then I understood that I did not know myself, did not know what I was, had no grounds on which 
to determine that I was one and not another.855 
He, like Carlyle’s words, finds himself ‘disinterred from the grave of convention’856 and 
is suddenly aware of the groundlessness of his own self-understanding. His amnesiac nameless-
ness forces him to question the nature of his reality. He cannot, for example, understand how 
one half of a book (human being) which he can see in his library—a trompe l’œil which ‘some 
inventive workman’ (God) has fixed so that half of it appears to be sticking out of a cupboard 
door fronted with false book spines857 (the visible world)—can appear in his world when the 
other half, according to Adam/Mr Raven/the librarian, appears in his library in ‘fairyland’. Ad-
am’s response summarises the methodology in Lilith, underlining its purpose to force a re-
evaluation of reality through making strange the familiar: 
[Y]ou are constantly experiencing things which you not only do not, but cannot understand. You 
think you understand them, but your understanding of them is only your being used to them, and 
therefore not surprised at them. You accept them, not because you understand them, but because 
you must accept them: they are there, and have unavoidable relations with you! The fact is, no 
man understands anything; when he knows he does not understand, that is his first tottering step—
not toward understanding, but toward the capability of one day understanding. To such things as 
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these you are not used, therefore you do not fancy you understand them. Neither I nor any man can 
here help you to understand; but I may, perhaps, help you a little to believe!858 
This is MacDonald’s response to naive cataphatic theology with its conventions: ‘your 
understanding of them is only your being used to them’. His aim is to help the reader ‘a little to 
believe’ by distancing faith from its nineteenth century scaffolding. 
The attraction to MacDonald of casting Lilith as the main antagonist becomes clear as we 
consider her pedigree and nineteenth century incarnation. 
7.2 Lilith—anti-child and antichrist 
Lilith carries a terse epigraph, a rebuke from the Kabbalah: ‘Off, Lilith!’, as if the Good Shep-
herd is calling off his most evil sheepdog. In that text, Lilith is the wife of Samaël, or Satan: 
Their ultimate destruction is hinted, but meanwhile Lilith is the devastation of the world and the 
lash in the hands of the Holy Blessed One to strike the guilty. She is God’s maidservant.859 
Having made a brief appearance in Isaiah 34.14 as a hairy Babylonian demon of the de-
sert,860 Lilith, in Jewish tradition, is infamous for her sexual and infanticidal proclivities, and in 
this tale her passion is drink to the blood of ‘the Little Ones’. In the cabbalistic text The Zohar 
(and in Lilith) she is the first wife of Adam who, refusing to submit and have children by him, 
becomes instead the mother of hordes of demons. Her paedophilic attraction to the cherubim, 
with their ‘little faces of tender children’, turns to a jealous loathing that God uses as a tool to 
‘lash’ the children of Eve (after all, God scourges those God loves):861 
From the moment she came forth, she went up and down to the cherubim who have the ‘little faces 
of tender children’ and desired to cleave unto them and be one of them and was loathe to depart 
from them (Zohar I 18b). 
But the Holy One, blessed be He, removed her from them and made her go below … He chid her 
and cast her into the depths of the sea, where she abode until the time that Adam and his wife 
sinned. Then the Holy One, blessed be He, brought her out from the depths of the sea and gave her 
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power over all those children, the ‘little faces’ of the sons of men, who are liable for punishment 
for the sins of their fathers (Zohar I 19b).862 
Lilith’s punishment of the children of Eve is reflected in Jewish folklore, such as the tale 
of a couple who buy a house in Tunis, reputed to be haunted. Before its demolition, the wife 
insists on salvaging valuables, including a mirror. Their daughter ‘glanced at herself in the mir-
ror all the time, and in this way she was drawn into Lilith’s web’: 
For that mirror had hung in the den of demons, and a daughter of Lilith had made her home there. 
And when the mirror was taken from the haunted house, the demoness came with it. For every 
mirror is a gateway to the Other World and leads directly to Lilith’s cave.863 
In Lilith, the garret mirror in Vane’s ‘mansion’—his little-used imagination—leads also 
to ‘Lilith’s cave’. 
This essential antagonism of Lilith to children, fuelled, it appears, by her jealousy that 
they carry the divine image, provides MacDonald with the ideal antitype: an antichrist and ‘an-
tichild’. Furthermore, because Eve gave birth to Cain as a result of the ‘filth of the serpent’, Lil-
ith, like Satan in the book of Job, was given the right as God’s maidservant to punish Eve by 
stealing and killing her children.864 Either, therefore, God is vindictively punitive and holds 
children ‘liable for […] the sins of their fathers’, or Lilith, like Milton’s Satan, is the unwitting 
servant of good. This text strongly affirms the latter, but unlike Milton’s Satan who with ‘reiter-
ated crimes [heaps] on himself damnation’, Lilith’s crimes contribute to her salvation. 
In the late nineteenth century, Lilith was a femme fatale with ‘a place in vampire lore ei-
ther as the first and most powerful of the vampires, or at least as their queen’,865 a dreaded dom-
inatrix embodying the male fear that Victorian females might not be as submissive as imagined, 
as illustrated by Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s seductive women, ‘part priestess, part temptress’—
including Lady Lilith—who are more a picture of his state of mind than real women.866 Women 
such as Lilith and Salome became symbols of female threat in an age when Romanticism was 
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becoming more symbolic; psychological overtones and dream-like, evocative prose reflected a 
‘surrealist perception of half-articulated or unexpressed mental phenomena’,867 a phrase that 
sums up Lilith.868 
7.3 The landscape and action in Lilith 
The mirage-like ‘realm of seven dimensions’ in Lilith conceals a simple yet highly ambiguous 
landscape. The daylight world of forests, rocky hills, and deserts populated by exotic or benign 
floræ and faunæ becomes a world of nightmare after sundown. As Vane journeys by night, 
monsters erupt from the ground beneath his feet, skeletons perform a macabre dance in a wood-
land cathedral like that in Phantastes, and while he sleeps Lilith drinks his blood. She is the 
source of every nightmare scene and is frequently glimpsed on the edges of vision. She ‘pos-
sesses’ a large part of his psyche. 
Reflecting MacDonald’s preoccupation with the polarities of good and evil, day and 
night,869 the fantasy world is the ambiguous meeting point of these two opposites whose bound-
ary is blurred. An enigmatic moon presides over the night of Vane’s nightmares: if not the di-
rect radiance of God’s light then at least indicative of indirect divine protection. The moon slays 
the monsters of the deep, and shines when most needed. But equally, this feminine light is asso-
ciated with vampires, and Vane frequently encounters Lilith in cold moonlight. Is the moon be-
nign or demonic? Similarly, Lilith, the queen of Hell who has enslaved ‘the great Shadow’,870 is 
also the ruler of a city that, unlike the phantom night-visions that dissolve with the dawn, also 
exists in the realm of daylight. It is this intersection of conflict that interests MacDonald—the 
liminal realm where humans have to choose between good and evil; the ‘epistemic distance’ 
from the divine sun where wrong choice leads to outer darkness.871 
                                                
867 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 
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Two settlements are located in this landscape placing ‘evil’ opposite ‘childlikeness’ but 
they also are fraught with ambiguity and paradox. The city represents an overt criticism of nine-
teenth century materialism, a place whose inhabitants have allowed walls to separate them from 
divine reality, and whose primary aim in life is to exploit others. ‘They were rich, and had eve-
rything made for them in other towns,’ and considered it ‘a disgrace to work’. The princess (Lil-
ith) has taught them to mine jewels from the foundations of their houses; these they use to buy 
what they need from others who labour. They are an indolent and dull people, content to watch 
their city slowly crumble into ruin, inconsiderate of the plight of the poor.872 
A counterfeit New Jerusalem, the city is centred on a temple where the princess resides. 
Unlike the former city of light that has no need of temple, sun or moon,873 it has a heart of dark-
ness: a black chamber at the heart of Lilith’s temple. When Vane enters this, he experiences a 
procession of grotesque images, all of which he has encountered in the world beyond the city 
walls, bringing the realisation that he is ‘in the brain’ of the princess.874 Lilith, radiating evil into 
this ‘mental’ universe (or rather, absorbing light), is the antithesis of the God that emanates 
goodness. Furthermore, for Lilith to survive she must drink the blood of the city’s new-born. 
Hers is a counterfeit and deceptive Eucharist. Like Adam and Eve, Lilith, in the silver robes of a 
vampire,875 also offers Vane bread and wine, seductively saying, ‘Here we do not kill to eat […] 
but I think you will like what I can give you’,876 however her ‘wine’ is the diluted blood of chil-
dren. Unlike the true Eucharist that is preparation for the submissive sleep in Adam’s cemetery, 
her false Eucharist aims to prolong a rebellious life: ‘Old age is to you a horror,’ she remarks, 
‘to me it is a dear desire: the older we grow, the nearer we are to our perfection. Your perfection 
is a poor thing, comes soon, and lasts but a little while; ours is a ceaseless ripening.’877 The per-
fection that Lilith seeks, in other words, is the opposite of childhood and a chimera. 
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The ‘city’ of human rebellion, MacDonald is proposing, being founded on evil, is inher-
ently and doubly self-destructing. Since Lilith can only survive by killing new-born infants, the 
population is destined to decline. In addition—like the city whose ruin is described in Babyloni-
an terms at the end of The Princess and Curdie—greedy mining for gems in the foundations 
will necessarily lead to collapse. In that narrative: 
One day at noon, when life was at its highest, the whole city fell with a roaring crash. The cries of 
men and the shrieks of women went up with its dust, and then there was a great silence.878 
The plot centres on the need to spirit away new-born babies from the city before they be-
come vampire prey. These are carried to a forest where they form a tribe of ‘Little Ones’ whose 
existing inhabitants care for the new arrivals, innocent of knowledge of either their own origins 
or those of their charges. 
The Little Ones are ‘innocent’ and naive in the extreme. Like Peter Pan, they are eternally 
prepubescent and (apparently) prelapsarian. They are led by a girl, Lona—who ‘was become 
almost a woman, but not one beauty of childhood had she outgrown’—who reminds Vane of his 
beautiful, half-remembered mother and with whom he becomes disturbingly infatuated: ‘My 
every imagination flew to her; she was my heart’s wife!’879 She, and other female characters, 
cry out for Jungian or Freudian interpretations;880 however, the issue in focus here is the chil-
dren’s naivety. Like Gibbie, they are not human: Vane has fallen in love with an illusion, possi-
bly the product of his own fantasy, which is nevertheless considered real by both him and his 
fantasy-world guide, Adam. 
Extreme versions of the children in Murdoch Malison’s class, the innocence of these Lit-
tle Ones has no real-world counterpart. They chatter happily, never argue, and revere Lona as 
their mother. Unlike Peter Pan, they have the dangerous potential to mutate into dull ‘giants’ 
like their parents (and a few do). What is lacking is any positive view of adulthood. In Tolkien’s 
words: 
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If we use child in the good sense (it has also legitimately a bad one) we must not allow that to push 
us into sentimentality of only using adult or grown-up in a bad sense (it has also a legitimately 
good one). The process of growing older is not necessarily allied to growing wickeder, although 
the two do often happen together. Children are meant to grow up, and not to become Peter Pans. 
Not to lose innocence and wonder, but to proceed on the appointed journey.881 
These children, however, are not allowed to grow up and MacDonald has been ‘pushed 
into sentimentality’. They embody innocence until they make the choice to eat the bitter apples 
that grow in this Eden, at which point they mutate into sinful and dull ‘adults’. The theological 
issue, however, is not so much natal innocence as that these Little Ones are invited by Adam to 
sleep in his cemetery, apparently bypassing the temporal ‘system of soul-making’ where genu-
ine issues relating to good and evil must be faced. Their origin is not the world of three dimen-
sions; they have not tasted Dostoevsky’s apple.882 This reflects the duality that Rousseau and 
Blake set up between innocence and experience, nature and culture,883 a duality that fails to ac-
count for the fact that true humanity involves distinguishing good from evil and making moral 
choices—possibly the primary message of Genesis 1–3. In Alison Milbank’s words, the Roman-
ticism of those such as MacDonald’s has ‘served to strand children across a hermeneutic 
chasm’.884 The Little Ones appear to be stranded on the wrong side. 
Vane falls in love with one of these phantoms (who, incidentally, is the daughter of Lil-
ith—she did have one child by Adam—who has inherited none of the traits of her vampire 
mother except extraordinary beauty; despite being the offspring of the ‘queen of Hell’, the 
daughter is without sin). He is, therefore, far from the ideal human. His Ruskinian obsession 
with this prepubescent child-woman is disturbing. Vane’s weakness is his attraction to all the 
beautiful women he meets which often spills over into unwise action, such as his abortive at-
tempt to storm the city with an army of children and capture Lilith—despite having been specif-
ically warned by Adam against this. Nevertheless, God makes sure ‘all things work for good’ 
(since this is the beginning of Lilith’s reformation). When Vane asks what the consequences 
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will be of him making a wrong choice, Adam’s answer further clarifies MacDonald’s philoso-
phy of evil: 
“Then some evil that is good for you will follow.” 
“And if I remember [to heed your advice]?” 
“Some evil that is not good for you, will not follow.”885 
In other words, when it comes to evil it is always a win-win situation. 
Wrong choice is evident when Vane initially encounters Lilith. He finds her emaciated 
body, naked and cold, lying inert in a forest. Unaware that she is the arch-enemy of the Little 
Ones, and convincing himself that his main motive is to prevent ‘irreverent eyes [looking] on 
it’,886 he decides to give the body a decent burial, but, unsure whether she is really dead, he re-
ports: ‘I […] got as close to her as I could, and took her in my arms. I had not much heat left in 
me, but what I had I would share with her!’887 The erotic overtones are evident. He remains with 
her for many days unaware that as he cradles her each night she is drinking his blood, regaining 
life while feigning death. Vane is, therefore, responsible for reviving the worst danger possible 
for the Little Ones. He, as a human being from the world of three dimensions, is needed to pro-
vide the blood which the parasite of evil needs for life; in other words, it is the evil in him 
(which he convinces himself is good) that nourishes this existential evil. Each descendent of 
Adam and Eve, MacDonald is saying, is responsible for the threat to childhood. The irony is 
that it is a descendant of Lilith (Lona) who protects the children. 
7.4 The tactic of defamiliarization 
Through these destabilizing and defamiliarizing tactics, MacDonald is demanding the reader 
consider the nature of evil. Evil may appear good, as in the case of seductive Lilith, but equally, 
good may appear evil, as in the character of Mara. Regarding the former, having insisted that 
‘beauty is the only stuff in which Truth can be clothed’,888 he muses: ‘Could such beauty as I 
saw, and such wickedness as I suspected, exist in the same person?’889 The latter, who seems 
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evil at first sight, is the guardian of the Little Ones, and also she who—in the form of a pure 
white leopardess—steals newborns from the city and deposits them in the forest for the Little 
Ones to find. Of course, mothers consider her evil, unaware that she is protecting their offspring 
from the vampire princess who, in a further destabilizing tactic, also appears as a white leopard-
ess but with black spots, prowling the city searching for new-born blood. Furthermore, although 
her name is biblical—a reference to Naomi’s self-designation as Mara, ‘bitterness’890—in Bud-
dhist theology, Mara is the equivalent of Satan who has three daughters, also known as Maras, 
whose job it is to seduce and destroy humans. It is possible that MacDonald was aware of this. 
Like her Buddhist counterparts, Mara in this tale is a shape-shifter (woman and leopardess), and 
may be a product of his reading of an 1871 text on Buddhism which describes the Maras as de-
mons who can ‘assume the most hideous forms’.891 In a final twist, we learn that Mara is the 
daughter of Eve. 
To summarise this confusing scenario: the Little Ones are in mortal danger from Lilith, a 
fallen being created by God to be the original mother of the race but who is now the ‘anti-
mother’, and are protected by two step-sisters, one the daughter of Eve, and one the daughter of 
Lilith herself,892 through whom—it has been prophesied—Lilith’s downfall will come. This is 
the final piece of the jigsaw. Lilith is aware that ‘[t]here is an old prophecy that a child will be 
the death of her’,893 and therefore lives in fear of its fulfilment, however, in MacDonald’s lan-
guage, death equates to salvation and access to the eschaton: Lilith, the personification of evil, 
will also be saved. Nevertheless, it is essentially the story of the child against the vampire. 
7.5 The battle in (and for) the mind 
That all is foreseen, if not pre-scripted, by God is dramatized in a scene where Lilith, in the 
guise of a Persian cat (witchcraft), has managed to follow Adam and Vane back to the latter’s 
                                                
890 Ruth 1.20. 
891 Henry Alabaster, The Wheel of Law: Buddhism (London: Trübner & Co., 1871), p. 151. Further parallels may 
indicate familiarity. The abortive attempt of the army of children to storm the city, some mounted on miniature ele-
phants, appears a parody of the Buddhist narrative of the Mara attacking the Buddha. The Mara ‘assuming an im-
mense size, and with a thousand arms brandishing all kinds of martial weapons, riding on his elephant Girimaga, a 
thousand miles in height, led the way. The van stretched two hundred and fifty miles before him […] “Advance my 
soldiers,” he shouted, “seize and bind the Prince”’(ibid., p. 150). 
892 Adam reveals he had one child, Lona, by Lilith (p. 204). 




library. In the library—Vane’s mind—there is a battle between good and evil; Adam versus his 
unsubmissive ex-wife, the mother of evil. The all-powerful Adam, who seems to equate more to 
Paul’s new Adam than his old namesake,894 casts spells that prevent the cat’s escape before cas-
ually taking the ancient volume, hitherto an immovable feature of Vane’s faux bookcase: 
He opened the vellum cover, and turned a leaf or two. The parchment was discoloured with age, 
and one leaf showed a dark stain over two-thirds of it.895 He slowly turned this also, and seemed 
looking for a certain passage in what appeared a continuous poem. Somewhere about the middle of 
the book he began to read.896 
The ‘continuous poem’—God’s creative thoughts—reveals foreknowledge of Lilith’s ex-
istence and actions. A reader might be tempted to skip the stanzas, however they reveal much 
about Lilith. First, she is indeed given life and substance by male fantasy. Articulating Lilith’s 
thoughts, the poem begins: 
But if I found a man that could believe 
     In what he saw not, felt not, and yet knew, 
From him I should take substance, and receive 
     Firmness and form relate to touch and view; 
     Then should I clothe me in the likeness true 
Of that idea where his soul did cleave!897 
Just as God’s thoughts become human reality, so human ideas create ‘substance’. Con-
firming Calvin’s worst fears,898 male imagination gives birth to evil. Imaginative Romantic lib-
eralism is not a panacea against the perceived evils of dogmatic conservatism. It gives birth to 
the distorted feminine and demonic ‘idea where his soul did cleave’ and is given ‘firmness and 
form’ through ‘Vane’s’ (‘self-centred’) male fantasies. This is not God’s idea of who Lilith 
should be, but neither is it Vane’s: she, like Vane, has lost her true identity having sold her soul 
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to the great Shadow, Satan; Vane has given birth to something beyond his control. Both are 
slaves to the evil will of the Shadow. 
Although in some sense the product of a human mind, she should not, however, be con-
sidered ‘immaterial’: in MacDonald’s idealism, such reality equates to the stuff of everyday life. 
She has erotic power and is the personification of the worst of male Victorian fears:899 
In me was every woman. I had power 
   Over the soul of every living man 
A power indiscernible by the five senses, but able to 
    […] trammel brain and spine 
   With rooted bonds which Death could not untwine— 
Or life, though hope were evermore deferred.900 
The phrase ‘that Death could not untwine—Or life’ reiterates the conviction that freedom from 
evil—‘untwining’ oneself from evil—is not the result of death (that is, the ‘second death’ that 
leads to eternal life) but a prerequisite of it: one cannot lie down in Adam’s cemetery and await 
the great awakening without first having renounced evil. Neither is it a natural consequence of 
life, however long such ‘hope is deferred’.901 Rather, freedom from evil involves a renunciation 
of it, either in this world or the purgatorial afterlife. 
The poem continues with Lilith rejoicing in her power to seduce the male through whom 
she is ‘clothed human’, a seduction focused on antagonism to the divine presence. Claiming her 
right to human worship, to be the ‘candle’ at the centre of human consciousness,902 she declares: 
Ah, who was ever conquering Love but I! 
     Who else did ever throne in heart of man!903 
Thus throned, and deluded that she has conquered Love, she is an antichrist. Furthermore, 
in her body she has a wounded side—a dark spot of evil that she tries to hide—and a wounded 
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hand clenched in defiant possession, holding back the water of grace that will heal the land, 
counterfeit stigmata to match her counterfeit Eucharist. 
She is, according to Adam, essentially parasitic: ‘Vilest of God’s creatures, she lives by 
the blood and lives and souls of men. She consumes and slays, but is powerless to destroy as to 
create.’904 She may ‘slay’ those who have existence in this life or the next, but eventually these 
lie down in Adam’s cemetery to wake in a realm over which Lilith has no jurisdiction (the im-
plication being that her evil designs work for the reformation of others). She is, then, ultimately 
impotent, even when it comes to the making or destroying of her own life. In her quest for au-
tonomy she is described as having enslaved the ‘great Shadow’, but in this she is deceived. Ad-
am describes how, after rejecting his authority, 
she […] fled to the army of the aliens, and soon had so ensnared the heart of the great Shadow, 
that he became her slave, wrought her will, and made her queen of Hell.905 
There is, however, paradox here for only one greater than her can bestow queenhood. It is 
but an illusion: in reality she is ‘slave of sin’.906 
So what is MacDonald’s understanding of the great Shadow? 
7.6 Satan—the great Shadow 
Shadows are code for evil. Mara, for example, the guardian of the Little Ones, appears as a pure 
white leopardess. In contrast, Lilith, their enemy, hunts as a white leopardess covered with 
black spots. As she metamorphoses into a woman, these coalesce into one permanent shadow on 
her side, indicative of the evil eating at her heart. One night, however, Vane observes a dark 
shadow haunting the streets, apparently an informant bringing news of new birth back to the 
princess. One reading is that this is the ‘soul’ of the princess—her essential shadow-nature—
locating newborns but incapable of seizing them unless returning incarnate as the spotted leop-
ardess. But another, more plausible, reading is that this is the great Shadow, the devil ‘walking 
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about seeking whom he may devour’.907 It may be a case of mistaken identity, but Vane does 
use the pronoun ‘he’ in his account: 
he cast no shadow, and was himself but a flat superficial shadow, of two dimensions. He was, nev-
ertheless, an opaque shadow, for he not merely darkened any object on the other side of him, but 
rendered it, in fact, invisible. In the shadow he was blacker than the shadow; in the moonlight he 
looked like one who had drawn his shadow up about him, for not a suspicion of it moved beside or 
under him […] the shadow seemed once to look at me, for I lost his profile, and saw for a second 
only a sharp upright line.908 
Lilith, it seems, is powerless unless ‘possessed’ by the Shadow; she has to wait for its re-
turn before she can emerge in the form of a leopardess or a woman. Just as humans have no in-
dependent existence and are entirely dependent on God,909 Lilith is entirely dependent on Satan. 
Deluding herself that she has enslaved the will of the great Shadow (as Adam suggests)910 it is 
she who is the slave. 
Reflecting Cosmo’s reflections on the nature of evil in What’s Mine’s Mine,911 the es-
sence of evil is, by this account, perfect shadow, a ‘black body’ (as in physics) that absorbs all 
divine light but which itself has no substance. MacDonald offers no explanation for its origin 
apart from noting that the darkness in Lilith is something that ‘God could not have created’.912 If 
God is light, it is the ultimate antithesis—a will set perfectly against God’s. In Lilith’s case, her 
insubmission to Adam is opposition to God: ‘For her first thought was power;’ says Adam, ‘she 
counted it slavery to be one with me, and bear children for Him who gave her being.’913 
MacDonald, however, does not believe in ‘pure’ evil, but that the universe is essentially 
good, that, in words reminiscent of Maurice, ‘love, not hate, is deepest in what Love “loved into 
being”’;914 a sentiment reflected in one of Vane’s epiphanies: ‘evil was only through good! self-
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ishness but a parasite on the tree of life!’.915 Lilith, therefore, is also not pure evil, just a distort-
ed good creature whose will, as queen of Hell, is the ultimate Shadow. 
Lilith’s powerlessness apart from the Shadow accounts for the ease of her capture by the 
Little Ones, which, for an all-powerful queen of Hell, appears absurd. After a chaotic assault on 
Lilith’s temple, during which Lilith kills her daughter (Vane’s lover), a procession of Little 
Ones emerges from the temple with Lilith bound hand and foot, tied to an elephant. It is not that 
they have become powerful, but that she has become powerless—the Shadow has left her, 
knowing that her time has come. The account of its flight as a dark two-dimensional being that 
tries, and fails, to ‘possess’ the children in its path implies that there is a pure will that is evil, 
distinguishable from the will of any host,916 a paradox explored below. 
The procession, after some days, arrives at Mara’s House of Bitterness where the daugh-
ter of Eve sets out to reform her step-sister. The account of her final submission to Adam is re-
vealing. ‘Bitterness’, and ministry from Mara who the children know as ‘the cat-woman’, is 
needed to precipitate reform. As Vane explains to the accompanying children, Lilith needs the 
‘ministry of pain’:917 ‘A friend is one who gives us what we need, and the princess is sorely in 
need of a terrible scratching.’918 The process involves Lilith experiencing the spectrum of God’s 
being, from burning core of love to outer darkness, where she stares into, and then enters, the 
abyss of non-being. It is based on the conviction that, like Vane in search of his true identity, 
Lilith is not her ‘true self’—God’s idea of her. It is MacDonald’s dramatization of his convic-
tion that none, even ‘Satan’, can resist God’s inexorable love. 
As a ‘silver worm […] white-hot, vivid as incandescent silver, the live heart of essential 
fire’ crawls across her prostrate body ‘until it reached her bosom, where it disappeared among 
the folds’ and enters her ‘secret chamber’,919 Mara urges her to embrace her true identity: ‘Alas, 
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you are another now, not yourself! Will you not be your real self?’ As the silver fire burns in-
side Lilith, Mara explains: 
“The central fire of the universe is radiating into her the knowledge of good and evil, the 
knowledge of what she is. She sees at last the good she is not, the evil she is. She knows that she is 
herself the fire in which she is burning, but she does not know that the Light of Life is the heart of 
that fire. Her torment is that she is what she is.”920  
As the knowledge of good and evil dawns, Lilith burns in the hell of her own making, un-
aware, or refusing to admit, that ‘the Light of Life is the heart of that fire’. She refuses to repent, 
blaming God for making her: ‘He alone is to blame for what I am! […] He meant me such that I 
might know it and be miserable!’921 
She is then forced to stare into the void of non-being. Vane is empathetically aware of ‘an 
invisible darkness’: 
A horrible Nothingness, a Negation positive infolded her; the border of its being that was yet no 
being, touched me, and for one ghastly instant I seemed alone with Death Absolute! It was not the 
absence of everything I felt, but the presence of Nothing. The princess dashed herself from the set-
tle to the floor with an exceeding great and bitter cry. It was the recoil of Being from Annihila-
tion.922  
Even this, however, results in defiance. Only when a ‘heavenly mirror’ shows her two 
images—‘the one what God had intended her to be, the other what she had made herself’923—
does she finally, but reluctantly, submit (‘her submission was not feigned, neither was it re-
al’).924 At this point, Mara draws her patient’s attention to her clenched fist, the fingers enclosed 
on something she refuses to release. Lilith replies defiantly: ‘I will yet be mistress of myself! I 
am still what I have always known myself—queen of Hell, and mistress of the worlds!’, result-
ing in her being pushed over the threshold into ‘non-being’. Like ‘the lost soul’, in the ‘outer 
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darkness’ she is aware that the ‘source of life had withdrawn itself; all that was left her of con-
scious being was the dregs of her dead and corrupted life’.925 
Lilith finally submits. ‘“I yield,” said the princess. “I cannot hold out. I am defeated.—
Not the less, I cannot open my hand”’926—a symbol of her yet being a slave to something be-
yond herself, which Mara puts thus: 
“A slave thou art that shall one day be a child!” answered Mara.—“Verily, thou shalt die, but not 
as thou thinkest. Thou shalt die out of death into life. Now is the Life for, that never was against 
thee!”927 
Despite her repentance, Lilith is still ‘enslaved by sin’.928 Reflecting MacDonald’s view 
of atonement as involving reconciliation with, and forgiveness from, those sinned against, as 
well as reparations for wrongs committed, the final step involves a confrontation with Adam. 
The journey to Adam’s cemetery, though, is significant, in that on the way the entourage 
has to traverse the ‘bad burrow’ where earlier monsters of nightmare had erupted from the 
ground beneath Vane’s feet. Despite Lilith’s repentant state (she is now weeping copiously) the 
monsters once more heave from the ground with Lilith as their main target. The children are 
oblivious to their presence. There are paradoxes in this image. First, that children are immune to 
evil. Second, that despite implying that the evil in the land emanates from Lilith’s mind, these 
monsters appear to have their genesis elsewhere: Lilith has renounced evil, so where do they 
come from? The repentance of the queen of Hell appears not to imply that existential evil has 
ceased, but that the great Shadow still holds sway in other ‘hosts’—Vane, perhaps, being among 
them. Evil, in MacDonald’s scheme, will only be defeated when all created beings—including 
the great Shadow itself—have chosen to turn towards the light (although this conclusion will be 
examined more closely below). 
Eve’s response to Mara’s optimism when they finally arrive at the house of death rein-
forces this: 
 “Your children are no longer in her danger,” said Mara; “she has turned from evil.” 
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“Trust her not hastily, Mara,” answered her mother; “she has deceived a multitude!”929  
But there is paradox here too, for despite the great Shadow being a two-dimensional enti-
ty that is essential negation (clearly an image of Satan since Eve notes in passing, ‘Even now is 
his head under my heel!’)930 here Eve remarks: ‘When the Shadow comes here, it will be to lie 
down and sleep also.—His hour will come, and he knows it will.’931 
Lilith finally sleeps in Adam’s cemetery, but the account raises further questions. First, 
she is far from submissive. On arrival, Adam offers to carry her into the house, but ‘she re-
pulsed him, […] unsubmissive’.932 Eve, however, expresses universalist optimism: ‘Sooner or 
later all will be little ones, for all must sleep in my house! It is well with those that go to sleep 
young and willing!—Lilith […] is neither young nor quite willing, but it is well indeed that she 
is come.’933 Second, although the children gladly receive bread and wine from Eve before they 
sleep, Lilith refuses: 
“Thy beauty slays me! It is death I would have, not food!” said Lilith, and turned from her.  
“This food will help thee to die,” answered Eve.  
But Lilith would not taste of it.  
“If thou wilt nor [sic] eat nor drink, Lilith,” said Adam, “come and see the place where thou shalt 
lie in peace.”934 
Lilith would still rather be the priestess of a counterfeit Eucharist than share in the real 
one. The paradox is that in refusing bread and wine she ‘has no life in her’,935 and yet she longs 
for death. Third, in these scenes Lilith appears to have her own substantial being, negating the 
pains MacDonald has gone to portray her as fundamentally parasitic. Who is ‘hosting’ her now? 
It appears to be God. 
Her final capitulation to sleep is ambiguous to the end in that she never unclenches her 
hand. Instead, on the basis that it has been closed for a thousand years and ‘the fingers have 
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grown together and into the palm’,936 she demands that Adam cut it off. Despite volunteering 
her hand for amputation, her ultimate submission to the divine will is itself ‘parasitic’ on the 
will of another. 
The narrative ends with Vane being instructed to travel to a desert location and bury the 
hand. This time he follows instructions. As a result, water flows in the desert and the land trans-
forms into an Edenic paradise. On returning from his commission, Vane receives bread and 
wine from Adam and Eve and is finally laid to rest at Lona’s side. He sleeps, dreaming that he 
is once more abroad in the land, a ‘dream’ which ends with him waking once more in his own 
house. After four nights, he wakes once more in the house of death to find Lona standing and 
smiling by his side. He is now, according to Adam, ‘clothed-upon with Death, which is the radi-
ant garment of Life’.937  
Thus clothed and (apparently) post-mortem, he and Lona experience ‘a glorious resurrec-
tion-morning. The night had been spent in preparing it!’, described in MacDonald’s most purple 
prose. An entourage of Little Ones and beasts led by Vane and Lona set out for a celestial city 
whose upper reaches are hidden in clouds. They traverse once more the now-fertile land flowing 
with the water of grace, but this Eden is not without its snakes: as they pass the ‘bad burrow’, 
now a crystal lake, Vane reports: 
I gazed into its pellucid depths. A whirlpool had swept out the soil in which the abortions bur-
rowed, and at the bottom lay visible the whole horrid brood: a dim greenish light pervaded the 
crystalline water, and revealed every hideous form beneath it.938 
Are these dead forms, or might they also be resurrected if another Lilith was to arise, se-
duce another Vane, and make the land a desert? 
On arrival at the ‘New Jerusalem’ the group climbs towards heaven. As the children hur-
ry forward to meet Christ,939 at the last moment an unseen hand pushes Vane through ‘a little 
door with a golden lock’: 
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The door opened; the hand let mine go, and pushed me gently through. I turned quickly, and saw 
the board of a large book in the act of closing behind me. I stood alone in my library.940 
Vane has just emerged from a ‘book’, that magic gateway to the transcendent world of 
imagination which is not imaginary. We emerge from the book pondering, with Vane, whether 
experienced reality is merely the product of mind—‘My brain was its mother, and the fever in 
my blood its father.’ However, MacDonald locates the human mind in the divine, and God, like 
a violinist, guides the bow across the strings of experience.941 Vane concludes: ‘When a man 
dreams his own dream, he is the sport of his dream; when Another gives it him, that Other is 
able to fulfil it’,942 and thus he lives in hope. 
Writing in 1857 to his father, MacDonald expresses this hope in a prayer: 
May the one Father make us all clean at last by his beautiful forgiving tenderness & his well-
ordered sufferings, & when the right time comes, wake us out of this sleep into the new world, 
which is the old one, when we shall say as one that wakes from a dream—Is it then over, & I 
live?943 
                                                
940 Ibid., p. 348. 
941 Ibid., p. 350. 
942 Ibid. 
943 Letters GM, p. 124; cf. ‘To Henry Sutton’ (ibid., p. 163): ‘when we lie down at last God will give a glorious wak-
ing to all our dreams; all that was lovely in them we shall find true’. 
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Chapter 8 Lilith—a summary of George MacDonald’s theology  
8.1 A realist fantasy 
Ronald MacDonald remarked that his father’s— 
iridescent imagination gave its colour to the religion that was his. […] his imaginative faculty was 
a prism, falling through which the Great White Light was disparted into seventy times seven hues 
of human delight.944 
Lilith is certainly ‘colourful’. This end-of-canon narrative refracts many core themes into 
more visible elements. This chapter attempts to identify these, clarifying specific theological 
ideas already discussed by considering Lilith’s methodology and content. Some immediate criti-
cal comments are offered, but the primary aim is to present a concise summary of MacDonald’s 
‘theology of childhood’. 
MacDonald’s reluctance to publish Lilith was, I believe, twofold: first, the first-person 
narrative implies an autobiographic dimension, or at minimum an account of scenes familiar to 
an author. Since these describe mental states, MacDonald is necessarily making himself vulner-
able to charges of, for example, sexual perversion and erotic fantasies. He is saying, in effect, 
that these are normal (or at least common) male fantasies, a revelation that may not have sat too 
comfortably with his readership. The genre of ‘Christian gothic erotic fantasy’, as now, no 
doubt raised a few eyebrows. 
But the point is that these are normal.945 Although Lilith appears ‘fantastic’—the ‘little 
world of his own’ that the author has created seems, at first glance, to bear little relation to lived 
experience—in many respects this is ‘realist fantasy’: this is how MacDonald views his world. 
‘The world is […] the human being turned inside out’,946 a place where evil affects (or infects) 
vision, and where lived reality emanates from the divine mind. That there are few ‘material’ 
touchstones should not distract from the concrete nature of the proposals being made regarding 
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issues such as identity, childhood, and evil, underscored by numerous biblical references. This 
is a very concrete and ‘realist’ theological work. 
I have not formally defined human imagination, but if one considers this as essentially a 
high-level cognitive faculty allowing us to make sense of lived reality by providing a perspec-
tive higher than the ambiguities of lived experience and convictions about the past, and bridging 
the two,947 then this text may be viewed as a fairy child—personified imagination, if you like—
standing above the battle for religious truth, offering an alternative epistemological perspective. 
Plotz disparagingly suggested that the Romantic child is, in Emerson’s words, ‘the perpetual 
Messiah which comes into the arms of fallen men, and pleads with them to return to para-
dise’.948 This text is just such a fairy child. Since ‘paradise’ for MacDonald is the kingdom of 
the childlike ruled by the child-king—a place where ‘the spirit of children [is the] pervading 
spirit throughout, from lowly subject to lowliest king’949—MacDonald’s children plead with us 
to return to childhood. It is a protest against adulthood with its pretensions, conventions, idola-
try, and self-centredness, forcing a reconsideration of adulthood and the world in which ‘adults’ 
live. 
8.2 The theological implications of MacDonald’s methodology in Lilith 
8.2 (a) An alternative epistemology—shape-shifting truth 
Lilith is a lesson in imaginative ‘fiduciary hermeneutics’. The shape-shifting characters and mi-
rage-like set underline the need for subjective interaction with presenting states of affairs: the 
truth of such states (apparent meaning) cannot be accepted at face value, neither is ‘naming’ 
them adequate. Instead, the reader (of both this narrative and God’s ‘artwork’ of life), must en-
gage with the truth—it must be personally evaluated and internalised in the same way that faith 
cannot simply remain assensus, but must become fiducia, fidelitas, and visio.950 The word must 
become flesh in the sense outlined by Nishitani (it must make a difference to the way we live). 
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Similarly, MacDonald emphasises that human engagement with Christ—for Augustine, the art 
or ‘skill of the omnipotent and wise God’951—is also an aesthetic encounter: 
The reality of Christ’s nature is not to be proved by argument. He must be beheld. The manifesta-
tion of Him must “gravitate inwards” on the soul. It is by looking that one can know. 
This beatific vision is contrasted with ‘notions whose chief strength lay in their precon-
ception’, in other words, the conclusions of prior generations. The latter, reminiscent of J. H. 
Newman’s ‘notional assent’ (distilled from general principles rather than experienced personal-
ly),952 is mere theory: 
For a man to theorize theologically in any form, while he has not so apprehended Christ […] is to 
bring on himself […] such errors as the expounders of nature in old time brought on themselves, 
when they speculated on what a thing must be, instead of observing what it was; this must be hav-
ing for its foundation not self-evident truth, but notions whose chief strength lay in their precon-
ception.953 
Lilith, especially, proposes that humans were not made to live in such a ‘library’ of se-
cond-hand wisdom, nor that mere logic will decode the riddle of life—especially when it comes 
to evil. I will refer to these contrasting views of truth as ‘aesthetic’ and ‘conventional’. 
There are period-specific distractions. For example, Eve is always the server who sets 
bread and wine on the table,954 Adam supervises not only her but the world in general, and all 
the women are mothers (including Lilith, her main failure being to reject that role). Vane’s in-
fatuation with Lona, a girl half his age,955 is also worrying to the modern reader:956 she repre-
sents the male fantasy of a submissive virgin who caresses the face of her ‘king’ with childlike 
adoration.957 These, however, should not distract from some very precise theological, philosoph-
ical, and moral proposals. 
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The first of these relates to aesthetic truth. Like Jesus leading the blind man out of his vil-
lage,958 this fairy child leads the reader away from the bickering of contemporary religion, offer-
ing a wider perspective—away from preconceptions, presuppositions, and the familiarity of 
conventional ‘village’ life. At first we see an odd landscape, ‘men like trees walking’, but, like 
Jesus, MacDonald’s agenda is not just to give sight, but to wake new vision—new categories, 
new ‘visual vocabulary’, a new lens through which to view reality. 
The narrative specifically highlights the destructiveness and provisionality of convention-
al truth. As MacDonald remarks elsewhere: ‘What many men call their beliefs, are but the prej-
udices they happen to have picked up.’959 So, perhaps with the Leicester Conference or the 
‘down grade’ controversies in mind, he has skeletal fighters slaughtering one another in a dark 
forest (dark religion) screaming out ‘The Truth! The Truth!’ while Lilith calmly orchestrates the 
destruction from above.960 ‘The holiest words went with the most hating blow’, and, in an image 
that brings to mind those such as the self-appointed and pugnacious protector of Congregation-
alism, John Campbell,961 MacDonald has one frenetic fighter ‘who wheeled ever in a circle, and 
smote on all sides’.  
Lilith, then—drinking the blood of children and given form and substance by the Vanes 
of this world—is both a product of dark religion (the ‘pitcher of Calvinism’; the ‘false form of 
true religion’)962 and the idol at its centre demanding worship and orchestrating the infighting. 
This narrative does not, therefore, simply champion unchecked imagination; there is a caveat: 
demons are reified and vivified by human imagination. Rather, it is promoting cognitive bal-
ance; that imagination is needed for, indeed the leader in, healthy cognition—not that rationalis-
ing is redundant. Vane’s problem is that he ‘saw not, felt not, and yet [was deluded into thinking 
that he] knew’,963 a knowing that gives substance to Lilith. Had he truly ‘seen’ and ‘felt’—that 
is, remained cognisant of the wider divine context beyond himself—he would have recognised 
that he was responsible for nourishing, ‘hosting’, evil. 
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So although imaginative, this narrative does not propose that anything may be imagined. 
Aesthetic truth is the ‘topmost stone’ of something, ‘the thing it is made for’ and is, ironically, a 
warning against being too imaginative and attributing false meaning to something which has 
‘obvious’ meaning (after all, ‘To men who are not simple, simple words are the most inexplica-
ble of riddles’).964 This may seem a bit rich coming from an author with an idealist vision who, 
according to Ruskin, reads whatever he likes from presenting phenomena, but it is a warning 
against reading badly, of accepting ‘unacceptable’ truth—truth that fundamentally corrodes un-
derstanding of ‘The Truth’.965 If the beatific vision is not held in view, the result is ‘such errors 
as the expounders of nature in old time brought on themselves, when they speculated on what a 
thing must be, instead of observing what it was’.966 For example, MacDonald’s conviction that 
God is light means that he cannot accept Dante’s ‘hell of exhausted mercy’.967 His advice—
following Newman’s dictum that ‘no religion is from God which contradicts our sense of right 
and wrong’968—is to beware of attributing to God ungodly attributes: ‘If any statement is made, 
any word employed, that we feel unworthy of the Lord, let us refuse it.’969 
Better to refuse even the truth for a time, than, by accepting into our intellectual creed that which 
our heart cannot receive, not seeing its real form, to introduce hesitation into our prayers, a jar into 
our praises, and a misery into our love. If it be the truth, we shall one day see it another thing than 
it appears now, and love it because we see it lovely; for all truth is lovely.970 
Just as art is a conversation between artist and observer, aesthetic truth stresses the need 
for a different way of seeing; the imprecision of truth-claims does not necessarily imply inade-
quacy, simply that humans are dealing with ‘the beauty of the infinite’. MacDonald’s agenda, 
therefore, is not to help us accurately (albeit imaginatively) perceive specific truth-claims, but to 
waken our imagination to the wider context, the depth of God’s art. In Lilith, at every page-turn 
we encounter defamiliarization and paradox: fairy vision does not resolve paradox, but creates 
it, forcing readerly engagement. ‘What,’ one must ask, ‘does this mean?’ MacDonald’s thesis is 
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that such engagement is, at least in part, responsible for creating reality. An individual’s reality 
may be a construct forged by the interaction of subjective experience and objective ‘others’, but 
he goes further, suggesting that human consciousness, made in the image of God, partners with 
God in the creation of those ‘others’ and therefore has a moral responsibility to discern and act 
wisely. 
A failure to perceive accurately a presenting state of affairs, allied to a preoccupation 
with self, results in evil—Vane resurrecting Lilith, the enemy of children. In contrast, true per-
ception and selflessness helps to create a new heaven and the new earth. In Lilith, with such re-
vitalised vision, Vane walks through the land where previously monsters had erupted from be-
neath his feet: 
it was a summer-day more like itself, that is, more ideal, than ever man that had not died found 
summer-day in any world. I walked on the new earth, under the new heaven, and found them the 
same as the old, save that now they opened their minds to me, and I saw into them.971 
It suggests that the external ‘artwork’ of the world is almost entirely shaped by the view-
er, that, as Carlyle had put it, ‘Matter exists only spiritually, and to represent some Idea and 
body it forth’;972 but, rather than this being solely God’s idea, that human ideas play a creative, 
and major, part. Here, for example, Vane’s experience of the ‘new heaven and earth’ is consid-
ered entirely a matter of perception: ‘A wondrous change had passed upon the world—or was it 
not rather that a change more marvellous had taken place in us?’973 The obverse of this is that 
evil results from human ideas not chiming with God’s: that evil is both the creation and subjec-
tive experience of people whose God-consciousness is dimmed—that evil is located in con-
sciousness rather than context (a prevalent nineteenth century view).974 These propositions are 
discussed more fully below. 
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8.2 (b) The child against the vampire 
In Lilith, the identity of the fairy child offering us this alternative epistemology is not immedi-
ately apparent. The Little Ones, for reasons identified by Milbank and Tolkien,975 are more pa-
rodic than metaphoric. Eve’s observation that ‘[s]ooner or later all will be little ones’976 seems 
more of a threat than a promise. Their childlikeness represents absolute trust but little more. 
Their main role in the narrative is as a mirror by which other characters establish their creden-
tials. They reveal Vane’s naivety (ironically by being naive in the extreme themselves), Lilith’s 
vampirism, and Mara and Eve’s motherliness. They also prompt reflection on the idea of a col-
ony of children growing up in Lilith’s territory, an irony not lost on Adam.977 One might also 
ask why some are ‘elected’ for salvation by Mara while others are left to become vampire prey. 
These issues are worthy of reflection but we do not view the world through their eyes. 
The obvious candidate is Vane; however, he is hardly a child. Not only has he just come 
of age, he is obsessed with a girl he hardly knows (who reminds him of his mother), is erotically 
attracted to a vampire, prefers war to diplomacy, has delusions of becoming king and restoring 
the crumbling city (with Queen Lona by his side), ignores the advice of supreme beings, and 
prefers reading ‘science’ books. His ‘logical’ military campaign to liberate the city is criticised 
by Adam as unimaginative.978 While Adam, Eve and Mara are, in a sense, perfect children, I 
suggest the main child protagonist of this ‘autobiographical’ novel is MacDonald himself in the 
guise of Vane. As son Ronald remarked in 1911, ‘there has probably never been a writer whose 
work was a better expression of his personal character’, continuing: 
The ideals of his didactic novels were the motive of his own life. […] we have had until lately a 
poet […] living among us a life of literal, and, which is more, imaginative consistency with his 
doctrine.979 
In this ‘realist fantasy’, MacDonald uses symbol and metaphor to paint as accurate a pic-
ture as he can of his vision of idealist reality and places within this ambiguous world an un-ideal 
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child—himself. Compared to the idealised children we have met in his ‘realist’ novels—whom 
he places in fantasy worlds that look like Aberdeen or London but where evil, it seems, is of 
little consequence—Vane appears normal. That he struggles to make sense of his world and of-
ten fails to make wise decisions does not make him less of a human child, simply a more real 
one. If childhood inheres primarily in a submissive and obedient response to divine transcendent 
cues, then Vane is a child in the making. The sun, waking his fairy vision by revealing the pic-
ture in his library ‘as if for the first time’, begins the process. Realisation dawns that his ances-
tor in the picture was once a human like himself, a predecessor who had worked out from first 
principles the content of many of the books now in his ‘library’ (his consciousness). He realises 
that he is not an ‘isolated, punctiliar, psychic monad’,980 but is connected—not just to ancestors, 
but to a transcendent reality. The autobiographical dialogue reinforces this, but (like that other 
‘autobiographical’ narrative of the mind, Wilfrid Cumbermede, that also, in many regards, offers 
a more faithful sketch of the human condition) it is primarily the description of mind rather than 
body (in the philosophical sense) that allows no other reading.  
This is not to say that MacDonald sees his mind as unconnected with others. From his 
perspective, action and set are objective realities, but are, and can only be, phenomenally per-
ceived by that mind. It is his theological picture of an idealist world, but not his view of total 
reality: transcendent reality beyond the ‘second death’ is hinted at, but inaccessible. Lilith is his 
dramatization of the interaction between quotidian human existence and the purgatorial realm 
where God prepares his children for the second death (although both, it seems, are purgatorial). 
Like Diamond, he is visiting the back of the North Wind. Apart from Lilith’s proleptic experi-
ence of the fire of God, it is notable that even in this purgatorial realm God remains hidden. 
Christ is only hinted at in bread and wine. Even purgatory demands, and fosters, faith. 
Considering MacDonald as a fairy-child author is revealing. Having his own particular 
view of Christian childhood, he writes as a child, not only to foster the same in others, but by 
appealing to mutual childhood. His goal is to engage his ‘child’ readers empathetically and 
wake their imagination. But, as the text of Lilith makes clear, this child spends much of his time 
                                                




in fairyland: Vane’s excursions to the realm of the seven dimensions in this idealist ontology are 
as real—more real to MacDonald, it seems—than his three-dimensional life. 
This appears the source of a two-fold frustration when reading his more realist novels. 
First, that they seem childish rather than childlike representations of the world, reflecting Lew-
is’s comments about third-rate authorship. They are a child’s sketch that tends to ignore evil and 
believe the best. They also have the limited perspective of a child. Nevertheless, they have a 
certain attraction which Lewis described as ‘holiness’; an aesthetic attractiveness that communi-
cates truth if one is prepared to overlook technical ability, an attraction dependent on relation-
ship with the child (we do not display the art of unknown children on our fridges). That Mac-
Donald writes ‘for the childlike, whether of five, or fifty, or seventy-five’981 is more than a cli-
ché: he is assuming (and fostering) a relationship with the reader, one based on his vision of 
God as mutual father. 
However, the optimistic claim that all humans are already part of God’s family could be 
challenged. Christ, for example, rejected Pharisaical claims to mutual fatherhood with the blunt 
words: ‘You are of your father the devil’, ‘you are not of God’, words, moreover, spoken to 
‘those Jews who believed Him’ whom he yet described as ‘slaves to sin’.982 This reinforces the 
observation that MacDonald, the childlike author, is drawing pictures in his nineteenth century 
nursery. This is not to denigrate his work, simply to note a limited perspective reflecting the 
prevailing Zeitgeist, and that he is drawing for the ‘family’ around him who in some measure 
claim, or are familiar with the concept of, religious adherence. He is writing to those who claim 
childlikeness with a view to encouraging moral integrity. He would also, I believe, not be an-
noyed at being accused of having a limited perspective, for his methodology and contribution to 
theology involve undermining those who claim not to be subject to such limitations, in other 
words, those who claim that their own limited ‘net of a presumptuous self-styled orthodoxy’983 
represents the full truth. 
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The second frustration is that the adult and the child that are MacDonald are often at 
odds. He insists that a picture must speak for itself: 
if I cannot draw a horse, I will not write THIS IS A HORSE under what I foolishly meant for one. 
Any key to a work of imagination would be nearly, if not quite, as absurd.984 
The point being that ‘horse’ means nothing to someone who has never encountered one 
and merely adding a label will not bring enlightenment. However, the adult in him often rises up 
to add explanatory notes or a sermon or two. Despite stubbornly refusing to explain his work on 
the basis that ‘[i]f my dog can’t bark, I’m not going to sit up and bark for him’,985 he regularly 
does just that, but from within the text. For example, when Maggie, the ‘honest peasant’ daugh-
ter of the soutar (cobbler) in Salted With Fire who has just prayed to see God, stumbles across a 
crying baby on the moors, ‘Her first thought was, “Can that be Himsel, come ance again as he 
came ance afore?”’. On finding the abandoned child under a bush, she ‘claps[ed] it close to her 
panting bosom’: ‘clearly she thought of nothing but carrying the infant home to her father’. The 
metaphor of an abandoned child being carried to a loving father is immediately obvious, but 
MacDonald cannot help informing us that: 
Maggie […] received an instantaneous insight that never left her: now she understood the heart of 
the Son of Man, come to find and carry back the stray children to their Father and His.986 
As Voltaire once remarked, ‘Le secret d’ennuyer est celui de tout dire’. This failure to 
separate adult and child is perhaps another expression of T. S. Eliot’s dictum that, in a great 
writer, the mind which creates must be separate from the mind that suffers.987 
In MacDonald’s fantasy works, however, this separation is more evident. Especially in 
Lilith, the fairy child author explores fairyland without (on the whole) being chaperoned, cen-
sored, or ‘explained’ by the ideal (possibly false) adult companion. As we look through the 
more honest eyes of this fairy traveller and try to understand the resulting childlike picture—
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‘the blossom of it, the thing it is made for’988—without being too critical of its execution, we 
will understand better MacDonald’s ‘theology of the child’. 
MacDonald, then, casts himself opposite Lilith—essential negation. If Murdoch Malison 
is essentially a distorted divinity (the antithesis of the child-God),989 Lilith is a distorted crea-
ture: she is the anti-child and, therefore, the antichrist. Whereas Christ sheds his blood on behalf 
of the children, she drinks it. She is also anti her true self: she refuses to accept her God-given 
identity. So who is she? 
Her essential negation has two aspects. First, she is a fallen being, that is, she was given 
life and a specific identity by God which was then rejected. Being Adam’s first wife, she was 
human but is now ‘bodiless, alone’—a seemingly demonic entity (reflecting Jewish lore). She 
lusts after childhood (her attraction to the cherubim), but only on her own terms, despising the 
corresponding need for submission. Exactly what ontological status her body has in this idealist 
scheme is (forgive the pun) immaterial; the issue is that by her decision to centre her life on her-
self she is the ultimate example (with the possible exception of the great Shadow) of a cor cur-
vum in se that is tending towards non-being. 
The second aspect, then, is her need to find an alternative life-source. Since ‘blood’ is 
needed for life,990 her only solution is to live as a vampire. The irony is that in her parasitism 
she is, indirectly, dependent on the God who has given life to others. All humans, inasmuch as 
they reject their own God-given identity, are complicit in giving their blood to nourish this anti-
christ. Since this is a ‘religious’ act, the primary arena in which the battle for true identity takes 
place is that of religion, accounting for MacDonald’s particular attention to what are, in his 
view, distorted religious schemes at whose centre Lilith is both nourished and worshipped. 
To summarise, insofar as ‘without shedding of blood there is no remission [of sins]’,991 
Lilith, drinking blood, represents unforgiveness, condemnation, and judgement and is therefore 
guilty of the ‘unforgiveable sin’ since God can only forgive those who want to be forgiven (‘I 
believe that no man is ever condemned for any sin except one—that he will not leave his sins 
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and come out of them, and be the child of him who is his father’).992 Her residence at the heart 
of religion makes it sacrilegious. 
In this narrative, both fairy child and vampire are above the battle for ‘The Truth!’. Each 
offers a perspective on the religious war raging at their feet as ‘skeleton and phantoms [fight] in 
maddest confusion’. As these fight, there are— 
Wild cries and roars of rage, shock of onset, struggle prolonged, all mingled with words articulate 
[…]. Curses and credos, snarls and sneers, laughter and mockery, sacred names and howls of hate. 
[…] Phantom-throats swelled the deafening tumult with the war-cry of every opinion, bad or good, 
that had bred strife, cruelty in any world.993 
This is MacDonald’s jaundiced view of the nineteenth century war for the truth, one or-
chestrated by Lilith who moves ‘at her will above the strife-tormented multitudes, now on this 
front, now on that, one outstretched arm urging the fight’.994 
The scene closes with a biblical quotation: ‘Just before sunrise, a breeze went through the 
forest, and a voice cried, “Let the dead bury their dead!”’, words which MacDonald had first 
used in the sermon Justice—a withering critique of the Reformers’ doctrinal efforts, where he 
states his contrary aim to ‘prevent the dead from burying the living’.995 The reader must choose 
between a Reformed death, or submissive death in Adam’s cemetery. 
We will further consider Lilith’s existential status shortly. 
8.3 Key theological proposals that emerge from Lilith 
In Lilith, MacDonald’s three-tier universe is evident. First, there is the ‘world of three dimen-
sions’ that I have referred to as quotidian reality; here I will simply call this ‘reality’. Second, 
there is ‘the world of seven dimensions’; this I will refer to as ‘fairyland’ (I was tempted to call 
it ‘purgatory’, but, as we will shortly explore, all three tiers are purgatorial). Third, there is the 
transcendent realm where God is encountered, which I shall refer to as ‘heaven’. 
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It will be remembered that a sonnet in The Diary of an Old Soul begins: ‘Yestereve, 
Death came, and knocked at my thin door.’996 For MacDonald, a Celt raised on the borders of 
Faerie, there is only a thin door between reality and fairyland, and much commerce between the 
two. Fairies are glimpsed occasionally, and reality glows with a numinous presence—both fairy 
and divine. There are also shared phenomena: trees in fairyland grow through chimneys in the 
realm of reality, and ‘books’ (humans) intersect both realms. ‘Ah, the two worlds! so strangely 
they are one’, remarks Adam in Lilith, ‘And yet so measurelessly wide apart!’997 Temporally 
they may be divided by human death (a doorway in a faux ‘bookcase’), but ‘physically’ (how-
ever that is understood) they are entwined. Both are dream-worlds prior to the final awakening. 
Together they make up a dualist ‘system of Soul-making’. 
Those who might, for example, insist that ‘after death comes judgement’998 and object to 
this scheme must realise that MacDonald has moved the goalposts of death further ‘back’: true 
death, the sleep in Adam’s cemetery, is the real doorway to heaven. In the meantime, reality and 
fairyland partner together to prepare humans for that final sleep. To this end, commerce be-
tween the two realms is humanly possible: Vane’s imaginative excursions to fairyland, and his 
‘waking’ back in reality, illustrate this dual citizenship. Thus MacDonald, for example, has con-
fidence that the suicidal Charley will receive a warm welcome in fairyland—that Adam will 
help him to sleep. 
The submission of sleep—choosing to relinquish consciousness—is a prerequisite for the 
second death, symbolic of the complete renunciation of self-will. Only those so choosing will 
wake with joy in God’s presence to be embraced as children. Thus the focus in Lilith is the pur-
gatorial office of both reality and fairyland preparatory for this moment. It involves the rejection 
of evil, couched in terms of self-will—the wilful rejection of one’s God-ordained identity. This, 
however, is beyond the power of enslaved human will. Only by accepting bread and wine prior 
to the second death can one overcome the power of evil and joyfully embrace the fire of God. 
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Christ—being the only perfect imago Dei who has ‘slept’ perfectly—offers others the power to 
sleep. 
Prior to the second death, then, MacDonald conceives of existence as an iterative process 
of purgatorial refinement involving commuting (in the mind) between reality and fairyland.999 
Although after the first death humans might not ‘physically’ be able to return to reality, he is 
clear that the post-mortem influence of others folds back into reality. Lilith, for one, has contin-
ued power over the minds of ‘men’. It is a scheme which is theodically necessary since it goes 
some way to mitigate the thorny issue of dysteleological evil in the ‘vale of soul making’, and 
anticipates the work of John Hick: 
Hick recognises this apparent failure of soul-making teleology in this world, and refers to ‘further 
scenes of “soul making”’, and a future eschaton where one experiences ‘an infinite good that 
would render worthwhile any finite suffering endured in the course of attaining it’. So he implies a 
future purgatorial state where soul-making activities might continue, and he proposes a future ex-
perience of such profundity that it justifies all suffering.1000 
However, for MacDonald, such purgatorial refinement does not (necessarily) end with the 
second death. First, the sleep in Adam’s cemetery is ambiguous. Those not yet ready to wake in 
God’s presence (that is, with residual evil that would mean a destructive encounter with God’s 
fire) are ‘sent back’, ‘waking’ once more in either fairyland or reality, a repeated experience of 
Vane. So the sleep in Adam’s cemetery is also purgatorial. Finally, the encounter with God is 
also purgatorial in that God’s fire will purge any residual evil and finally purify the soul: 
It is not that the fire will burn us if we do not worship thus; but that the fire will burn us until we 
worship thus; yea, will go on burning within us after all that is foreign to it has yielded to its force, 
no longer with pain and consuming, but as the highest consciousness of life, the presence of 
God.1001  
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Eve’s comment that ‘it is well with those that go to sleep young and willing!’1002 implies 
that this post-(final)-mortem divine encounter can be ‘hell’ for some. Although I remarked that 
Lilith ‘got off lightly’ in her encounter with Adam,1003 the implication is that her encounter with 
God—being still in some measure rebellious and having refused bread and wine—will be far 
from pleasant. If her proleptic experience of this at Mara’s hands is indicative, the implication is 
that she may even be annihilated. 
One might, perhaps, read too much into this model, or, indeed, into MacDonald’s general 
tendency towards esotericism and syncretism. His willingness to explore subjects such as evolu-
tion and reincarnation should be viewed as exploratory—‘aesthetic’ engagement with issues to 
explore what they offer. The Curdie stories, for example, feature goblins (regressed humans)1004 
who keep macabre ‘pets’ that are either evolving or regressing. There is also the curious (and 
depressing) tale of the ‘shop in heaven’ exploring ‘evolutionary reincarnation’ where sinners are 
sent back to earth— 
and there must he grow up again, crawling through the channels of thousand-folded difference, 
from animal to animal, until at length a human brain be given to him, and after generations he be-
come once again capable of being born of the spirit into the kingdom of liberty.1005 
The late sermon ‘The Hope of the Universe’ (1892) likewise explores reincarnation, as 
well as the mid-century belief that the foetus mirrored the stages of evolutionary ascent in 
utero1006—albeit with the caveat, ‘I do not care to spend thought or time, least of all argument’ 
on such ideas. Despite the caveat, however, strong evolutionary ideas regarding creation are 
expressed.1007 
That evolutionary processes are at odds with the idea that the child has some kind of pre-
natal heavenly existence is a side-issue: as with his ontology, MacDonald is not concerned with 
mechanics. Rather, his moral focus is to replace negative views of childhood with positive ones: 
evolutionary savagery or original sin is replaced by divine evolutionary truth (‘evolving truth 
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upon truth in lovely vision’)1008 or the innocence of the imago Dei. Whatever the ‘mechanics’, 
the goal of God’s creation is that ‘child hearts’ might be brought to birth. Similarly, the purgato-
rial scheme pictured in Lilith is more about purpose—that children might be formed—than me-
chanics. 
 
Further comments are needed about the existential nature of Lilith. First, that she is hu-
man. She may be ‘bodiless alone’, but is not a non-human demon. She is Adam’s ex-wife and 
bore at least one daughter, Lona. Her quintessential rebelliousness, however, has trapped her 
essence, her ‘spirit’, in fairyland; only through vampirism, ‘possessing’ and feasting on a host, 
can she revisit and express her lost humanity—a humanity she constantly longs for; a misguided 
quest for reincarnation on her terms instead of accepting her God-given identity. She, then, like 
Charley in Cumbermede is ‘demonic’: he, however, recognises this—‘I am a devil’—she does 
not. In Lilith, MacDonald is illustrating the connectedness of human minds, not only that ideas 
have power, but that through ideas (in this idealist universe) ancestors haunt us. If evil, these are 
the ‘principalities’, ‘powers’, ‘rulers of the darkness of this age’, and ‘spiritual hosts of wicked-
ness in the heavenly places’ in Vane’s mind that he must overcome:1009 he is ‘born in sin’1010—
connected to the sin of others—and must renounce this in preparation for sleep. 
It may be objected that this reading is pushing MacDonald’s text too far, and that the 
metaphor rather concerns the need for each Vane to destroy his or her Lilith. However, we face 
the issue that Vane does not destroy Lilith but (albeit inadvertently) saves her: his good inten-
tions work for evil in the same way that, in MacDonald’s scheme, evil intentions work for good. 
She is not merely his evil alter-ego, but the nemesis of all who aspire to become children. 
Through the connectedness of minds, MacDonald is suggesting that he, like many others, is 
nourishing her. However, she is nevertheless an existential fallen being—‘fallen’ in that she has 
been cast from heaven (no longer free to consort with the cherubim), and, moreover, responsible 
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for the Fall—causing the separation of ‘earth’ and heaven—having subsequently seduced Adam 
and Eve in the guise of a snake (an identity she struggles to hide).1011 
The ‘larger hope’, therefore, is synonymous with the eschaton, for the precondition for 
‘heaven and earth (fairyland and reality) to pass away’1012 is for all created beings to submit to 
God: there will be no contrary wills; all will sleep eventually in Adam’s cemetery and exit the 
two lower realms, at which point those two purgatorial realms will become redundant, paving 
the way for the new ‘heaven’ and earth where all (now true children) will live with their ‘elder 
brother’, Christ.1013 
Lilith, it appears, was the first to fall, and will be the last to be saved. The warning signs 
are, however, that her refusal of bread and wine (the last Adam) and insubmissive demeanour 
towards the first Adam prior to sleeping will result in a rude awakening. She will experience the 
full force of the wrath of God’s dark fire. However, saved she will be, for in MacDonald’s view: 
Annihilation itself is no death to evil. Only good where evil was, is evil dead. An evil thing must 
live with its evil until it chooses to be good. That alone is the slaying of evil.1014 
Furthermore, being the last creature in whom all rebellion is focused, her final repentance 
will be the destruction of the great Shadow. Substanceless and ‘hostless’, the pure will of evil 
will be extinguished by ultimate esse, God’s light. This is MacDonald’s expression of God be-
ing ‘all in all’. As Paul writes: 
Now when all things are made subject to Him, then the Son Himself will also be subject to Him 
who put all things under Him, that God may be all in all.1015 
At the outset of the previous chapter I suggested Lilith was worthy of close reading as 
two of its core themes were childhood and evil. It is apparent from this discussion that this is 
one theme: childhood and evil are the poles of a volitional moral continuum. At one extreme we 
have the vampire, ‘perfect’ disobedient rebellion; at the other, the child, perfect submissive 
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obedience to the divine will, exemplified perfectly this side of the eschaton by ‘the child in the 
midst’ that ‘slept’ in perfection and was raised from that submissive sleep. Since God is perfec-
tion, that is, as Trinity the perfect example of loving submission, God is the perfect child. 
On this account, all God-created beings are located somewhere between these two ex-
tremes: none is entirely depraved, just as none is perfect. (Only the great Shadow, being crea-
ture-created, is perfect negation; only God is ‘perfect perfection’.) All, therefore, have the po-
tential to turn towards God, and—that this might be a genuine expression of free will—creation, 
managed by God, conspires to that end by neither forcing obedience, nor allowing slavery to sin 
(the moral evil in the self or others). All things do work together for good, for all: God ensures 
that the evil generated by creaturely ‘hosts’ ultimately has no power to short-circuit free will; in 
addition, God uses what seems evil, but is really God’s goodness, to bring about reformation. 
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Chapter 9 The implications of George MacDonald’s theology of childhood 
9.1 ‘Death has come through our windows’ 
George MacDonald’s primary theodical aim is to exorcise from faith, particularly Reformed 
faith, the demons of the past as well as current idols. Lilith and the great Shadow exemplify the 
fundamental partnership at the root of this demonic infiltration of contemporary religion, that of 
human will aligned with ‘Satan’. 
Mara (‘bitterness’), the ‘cat-woman’ guardian of the children in Lilith, personifies Mac-
Donald’s main question. Her enigmatic fusion of tears and hope as she valiantly tries to protect 
the children from the vampire is modelled on the ‘weeping prophet’. Jeremiah, too, has ‘in the 
wilderness a lodging place for travellers’ outside of, and in opposition to, a corrupt city. He 
voices God’s question: ‘How shall I deal with the daughter of My people?’1016 Lilith embodies 
this theological conundrum: she was created by God, and like Israel is God’s daughter, but is 
evil. Jeremiah summarises the problem succinctly: 
death has come through our windows, 
Has entered our palaces, 
To kill off the children.1017 
The great Shadow haunting the streets ‘seeking those he may devour’, and Lilith’s subse-
quent nocturnal feasting, is at the heart of the drama. Death has come through our windows to 
kill off the children: how did death come to have such brazen access to humanity, and who is 
responsible? 
Since ‘windows’, for MacDonald, are access points to the human mind, his answer is 
clear: humans are responsible. They have genuine free will and, therefore, the right—indeed the 
tendency—to open their ‘windows’ to evil. Second, all evil is used by God for good purposes. 
God is sovereign. This familiar theological tension permeates his work. For him, evil is unique-
ly a question of sin, that is, all negative circumstances and experiences result from human rebel-
lion against God, and God’s response is an entirely appropriate solution to that rebellion. 
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But what is that response? How does MacDonald answer God’s question: ‘How shall I 
deal with the daughter of my people?’ In short, it is to remind God that Lilith is God’s daughter. 
Since she is the most depraved created being, ‘the vilest of God’s creatures’,1018 all ‘lesser’ cre-
ated beings must also be God’s children. God must ensure that ‘all things work together for 
good’—for all. God must expose all creation to ‘necessary evil’ in order to refine and redeem 
souls. What we call evil is, in reality, ‘the best good’ in disguise for a person at a particular 
time;1019 the ‘aching’ we call evil is ‘the unpleasant cure of evil’;1020 and if you sin, ‘[t]hen some 
evil that is good for you will follow’,1021 and so on. Ultimately, as Vane realises, ‘evil was only 
through good!’.1022 
MacDonald’s universe has a divine child of light at its centre opposed to which is a king-
dom of darkness ruled by the ‘anti-child’. It is a moral metaphor focusing on the nature of God 
and those made in God’s image; however, it is, therefore, also an ontological model: one cannot 
speak of the moral nature of things ‘made’ without making ontological claims, however second-
ary. Put differently, his focus on the ‘vale of soul-making’ as a moment in an exitus–reditus tra-
jectory necessarily demands an account of the nature of that ‘vale’ and its relationship to the 
being of God. In this chapter, therefore, we begin by considering the moral and ontological im-
port of MacDonald’s thought, beginning with the stage of his drama before looking more close-
ly at the actors. 
9.2 ‘A problematic attitude to the world’ 
This drama is played out in an ambiguous world. While materiality, the spatio-temporal ‘world 
of three dimensions’, is not completely negated, it appears marginalised. In reading his ‘realist’ 
works we noted a disconnect between his fictional ‘stage’ and normal human experience. For J. 
P. Stern: 
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In realism the relation that obtains between a work of literature and the world outside is positive, 
expressive of a fundamental assent, whereas in idealism it is negative, expressive of a problematic 
attitude to the world.1023 
Such a problematic attitude is evident. For example, in Lilith there is almost no ‘3D’ ac-
tion. Although Vane expresses regret that he has neglected to foster relationships with others in 
the ‘real’ world (‘I had not cared for my live brothers and sisters’),1024 all that has meaning takes 
place in his other-worldly mental reality, and the relationships formed there uniquely focus on 
the goal of him finding his true identity conceived as God’s timeless and unchanging idea of 
who he should be.  
It will be objected that MacDonald’s narratives, through their use of fantasy and ‘making 
strange’, are truly concerned with the human quotidian context and force a fresh consideration 
of that context, however, the problem one faces is that narratives such as Lilith tend not to look 
back on the quotidian world from the other side of fairyland’s hedge, but away from it towards 
the eschaton, and when they do look towards it, it is considered illusory; just a dream. 
This devaluing of materiality is theologically problematic as the biblical narrative takes 
the opposite view. Four issues are of concern. 
(i) Creation 
The first concerns the stage of the drama. That the mind (both divine and human) plays a key 
role in the construction of that stage is admitted, and we noted that the truth of the human con-
text must be evaluated ‘aesthetically’, a process involving the subject’s engagement with the 
‘art’ of life. But this should not distract from the biblical emphasis on the objective nature of 
that art, a focus which speaks less of the ontic status of matter as its radical otherness from God. 
The biblical phrase ‘before the foundation of the world’, for example, implies that God’s being, 
and certain actions, ‘pre-date’ creation.1025 Creation also has intrinsic value, so much so that 
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God will create a new heaven and a new earth, an event, according to Paul, anticipated by a per-
sonified creation waiting ‘eagerly for the revealing of the sons of God’.1026 
In contrast, MacDonald, with this verse in mind, says: 
I am inclined to believe the apostle regarded the whole visible creation as, in far differing degrees 
of consciousness, a live outcome from the heart of the living one, who is all and in all.1027 
The ‘degrees of consciousness’ referred to here are the various levels of sentience in crea-
tures, but ‘live outcome’ nevertheless implies a lack of otherness which may be a problem. It 
would appear to be a Neoplatonic view of the universe—a ‘highly monistic’ version of Plato-
nism, ‘one that posits a superexistent Source of all being that extends itself into various lower 
levels of being’, where ‘non-materiality is the highest form of reality’, this allied to ‘a belief in 
some form of immortality’ and ‘that the universe is essentially good’.1028 Rowan Williams 
summarises the problem: 
There is a growing trend, of course, towards the view finally expressed in the great Plotinus’s 
work, the source of Neoplatonism, that the entire complex world of things that can be known and 
talked about depends on or flows out of a simple, wholly unified primary reality, the One; but it 
would be odd to describe this as an action in the way ‘creating’ seems to be an action.1029 
Rather than a ‘fallen’ creation in some sense ‘other’ than God, then, where genuine hu-
man free will can have negative consequences (the biblical context of discussions relating to 
evil), MacDonald focuses on ‘corruption’ as being primarily a good individual’s sense of having 
failed to perfectly achieve God’s ‘idea’. All being is essentially good. Only what is good, says 
MacDonald, can suffer, for suffering is felt, can only be felt, by that part of a being that longs 
for deliverance from corruption: 
Corruption brings in vanity, causes empty aching gaps in vitality. This aching is what most people 
regard as evil: it is the unpleasant cure of evil. It takes all shapes of suffering—of the body, of the 
mind, of the heart, of the spirit. It is altogether beneficent […].1030 
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It is this insistence that all suffering (including that orchestrated by the ‘bad fairies’ and 
‘all demons’)1031 is ‘the unpleasant cure of evil’ and ‘altogether beneficent’ that raises questions. 
It appears grounded in a fusion of Neoplatonic monism and Christianity in that, rather than crea-
tion being fundamentally other than God, Christ is already ‘all, and in all’,1032 that is, those who 
suffer do so because they are impenitently encountering the omnipresent Christ. This is a mis-
application of Colossians 3:11, which refers to those who ‘were [proleptically] raised with 
Christ’, not the whole population or cosmos, an error which necessarily makes God complicit in 
evil. In Paul, however, the present ‘all in all’ applies only to those already citizens of the in-
breaking new kingdom.1033 That Christ will be ‘all in all’ is an eschatological hope rather than a 
present reality1034 leaving the question open as to whether the ‘all’ is a residue or the totality of 
created being. MacDonald believes it is the latter. 
For MacDonald, then, materiality is the lower expression of something greater. Nature 
displays God’s being; the human body is the visible expression of a human soul on a trajectory 
towards the perfect expression of God’s ‘idea’. This fundamental duality is exemplified in his 
discussion of Christ’s temptation: ‘the whole Temptation may be regarded as the contest of the 
seen and the unseen, of the outer and inner, of the likely and the true, of the show and the reali-
ty’.1035 
(ii) Incarnation, resurrection, and immortality 
This dualist leaning contrasts with the New Testament emphasis that, rather than humans need-
ing to escape from, or overcome, materiality, God’s solution to the human condition—that of 
genuinely destructive evil in the created sphere—was to share, and therefore in some sense re-
deem, materiality. Christ not only died, but ‘was buried’.1036 That the risen Christ embodied a 
new kind of materiality is not the issue: the point is that the incarnation was just that—God 
‘putting on’ flesh and blood, a Eucharistic physicality necessary to resolve the estrangement of 
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physical creatures: ‘as the children have partaken of flesh and blood, He Himself likewise 
shared in the same, that through death He might destroy him who had the power of death, that 
is, the devil’1037—not that he should destroy physicality. 
It is not that MacDonald ignores materiality, rather that in his thought ‘flesh and blood’ 
are not, as in the New Testament, intrinsic to what it means to be human. Ontologically speak-
ing, he considers materiality as inferior to the spiritual world of divine ideals, and not ‘good’ in 
se as declared by God. Thus salvation—that is, becoming a ‘true’ human morally and existen-
tially—involves escaping from a materiality that is primarily a delusional dream-state (so Nova-
lis).1038 He emphasises that Christ’s death gives the power to overcome sin and choose right-
eousness; that in a context of slavery to sin, Christ restores genuine free will by destroying ‘the 
devil’. Like Plotinus, MacDonald views the descent of the soul into present materiality as a 
‘necessary evil’: not evil as such, but a preparatory and transient state prior to reunion with God 
which, if experienced as evil, is the fault of the individual soul, not of God, but (unlike Plotinus) 
will be overcome if that soul opens itself to Christ’s ‘devil’-defeating power, that is, the power 
to overcome its own recalcitrance. Christ’s destruction of the devil takes place in the life of each 
individual. 
In contradistinction to the Neoplatonic emphasis on the impersonal return of the many to 
the One (but, nevertheless, with overtones of personal absorption), for MacDonald, the eschaton 
is, first and foremost, a personal reunion with God prior to which the soul must be purged of all 
sin through a cyclical process of self-atonement by which the ‘cunning and deceitful Self—ever 
cunning and deceitful until it is informed of God—[…] is thoroughly and utterly denied, and 
God is to it also All-in-all—till we have left it quite empty of our will and our regard’.1039 
It is ‘self atonement’ in that the self is responsible for ‘denying itself’ by turning to 
Christ, followed by ‘[r]epentance, restitution, confession, prayer for forgiveness, righteous deal-
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ing thereafter, [which] is the sole possible, the only true make-up for sin. For nothing less than 
this did Christ die.’1040 
MacDonald, then, prioritises the ‘all in all’ becoming personal reality as a precursor to a 
wider eschaton. He does, however, believe in physical resurrection—and, moreover, argues that 
animals will be resurrected1041—this being the final step when God ‘clothes’ God’s newly-
embraced children as the ‘prodigal son’ received a new cloak. However, this also relies on the 
constructive role of the human mind as it partners with God’s. Speaking of the present human 
body, he writes, for example, that: 
There is glory and might in this vital evanescence, this slow glacier-like flow of clothing and re-
vealing matter, this ever uptossed rainbow of tangible humanity. It is no less of God’s making than 
the spirit that is clothed therein.1042 
As for the resurrection body, ‘since all matter is radiant of spiritual meaning’, it will be— 
the same body, glorified as we are glorified, with all that was distinctive of each from his fellows 
more visible than ever before. The accidental, the non-essential, the unrevealing, the incomplete 
will have vanished. That which made the body what it was in the eyes of those who loved us will 
be tenfold there.1043 
This is not a negation of materiality, but is the assertion that the body, especially the res-
urrection body, is the ‘clothing’ of ‘the idea of each […] carried out in the perfection of beau-
ty’.1044 Perfect it may be, and ‘no less of God’s making’, but nevertheless subordinate to the 
spirit it expresses. Set against such bodily perfection is the notion that bodily imperfection and 
distortion is evidence of distorted (sinful) personhood, Lilith being the ultimate example of this 
in her ‘anti-theophany’ incarnation as a snake.1045 
Undergirding these views of incarnation and resurrection is the view that the soul is im-
mortal. This tacit acceptance of an unbiblical Greek doctrine1046 necessarily leads to universal-
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ism since God, being love, cannot sustain immortal creatures in a state of reprobation, neither 
(he submits) can they, without reflecting badly on God, be destroyed.1047 The doctrine also ren-
ders physical resurrection if not redundant then at least a lower state of being. Despite MacDon-
ald’s praise of the resurrection body, this is the expression of a higher ideal, an incipient dual-
ism leading to a devaluation of materiality. 
In themselves, these ontological observations may seem peripheral in that MacDonald’s 
primary concern is to make moral claims, however the issue is that they reveal flaws in his 
world view which have moral implications. We consider first the implications for human identi-
ty. 
(iii) Human identity 
The devaluing of the quotidian human context leads to a corresponding devaluing of social in-
teraction as a mechanism that forges human identity (as we noted in the context of Gibbie’s 
muteness and Vane’s solipsism, for example). In contrast, Paul’s assertions that ‘we, being 
many, are one body in Christ, and individually members of one another’ and that God is creat-
ing a ‘new man’1048 highlight the positive and mutually-constructive nature of quotidian social 
interaction that is inherent in human identity. This ‘vale of soul-making’ forges communities 
(Israel and the Church being prime examples) as well as individuals, and—as recent scholarship 
insists—the latter are not only a product of social interaction, but inherently socially construct-
ed.1049 Michael Banner goes as far as saying, ‘It is not that we have relationships, but that we are 
relationships.’1050 Human personhood is not simply a fixed divine idea (discussed further be-
low). 
It will be objected that there is social interaction in his fiction. Gibbie, for example, is 
mentored by his adoptive parents, the old shepherd and his wife; the curate, Thomas Wingfold, 
is similarly coached by the disabled social outcast Polwarth, and so on. However, these relation-
ships generally follow the pattern of the mentor providing a confirmatory rather than a formato-
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ry role. God is the true coach, present at the poles of being, that is, internally as the ‘candle of 
consciousness’1051 and externally in nature, and mentors are ‘honest peasants’ qualified to fulfil 
their office by being themselves close to God and nature, having remained untainted by the af-
fectations of culture. 
For MacDonald the Romantic, society, with its cultural mores, is a barrier to faith built on 
pretence, witness the destructive brittle relationships in Wilfrid Cumbermede. He writes: ‘It is 
better to be a child in a green field than a knight of many orders in a state ceremonial.’1052 Thus 
Sir Gibbie’s ascent to the mountain—the ‘grand nursery’ of nature1053—is contrasted with his 
persecutor’s (Fergus Duff’s) downward trajectory into the city to become a minister. Farmer’s 
son Fergus ‘would have been much more of a man if he had thought less of being a gentleman’, 
and, in a quest to impress what he hopes will be his future congregation, for example, has no 
qualms about memorising a printed sermon and passing it off as his own.1054 
Regarding evil, this devaluing of social interaction as a positive force results in a corre-
sponding denial of socially embedded evil as a destructive force—of the genuine destructive-
ness of dysfunctional, damaged societies. More broadly, it reflects the view that the Holy Spirit, 
and ‘the devil’, work primarily through personal, rather than social, means. It equates to a focus 
on sin rather than evil. 
David Kelsey, however, underlines the need for cognitive ‘realism’ in order to articulate 
‘with precise, accurate, and full truth just what the condition of the quotidian presently is’, a 
realism that admits that human relationships are forged ‘in the midst of evil’s deformations’.1055 
He notes that, ‘It is important for theological reasons […] to distinguish between sin and evil’; a 
failure in this regard results in ‘confusions in theological anthropology’. Whereas humans are 
morally accountable for the former, the latter acts on them through living in a distorted world. 
So rather than, as MacDonald implies, evil being simply the result of a God-dimmed conscious-
ness, Kelsey writes: 
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By contrast, I want to stress that we neither ascribe nor bestow reality and power to evil conditions 
or situations as evil; rather we acknowledge their reality and power as we suffer from their ener-
getic reality.1056 
While individuals may or may not contribute to aspects of quotidian distortion, such dis-
tortion is evil and acts against creaturely good: creatures are recipients of the ‘energetic reality’ 
of evil, not—at least directly or necessarily—responsible for it. In MacDonald’s work, it does 
result in ‘anthropological confusion’: whereas Christ, who was ‘without sin’, experienced the 
full force of destructive evil, characters such as Gibbie or Clare Skymer—also perfect chil-
dren—do not. The biblical emphasis, in contrast, is that humans are given strength to bear the 
negativity of evil, not that it will have no purchase.1057 
With regard to epistemology, MacDonald’s individualism leads to a corresponding un-
shakeable belief that an imaginative individual—experiencing God at the poles of being—has 
the ability to discern truth rightly on the basis that God primarily speaks to individuals. This 
reflects a nineteenth century climate. Reardon notes, for example, that the erudite Unitarian, 
James Martineau, later in his career moved away from viewing an infallible Bible as the prima-
ry source of revelation: 
Rather, if personality is the highest value known to man it is to be expected that revelation will be 
made through personal media and that the real criterion of divine truth is provided by the heart and 
conscience. In short, if a man would know the will and purpose of God let him first search the 
depths of his own nature. The primal authority in religion is experience itself, the inner witness of 
moral feeling and perception.1058 
F. D. Maurice, however, although expressing similar views that all humans have an in-
nate sense of right and wrong, puts his finger on the problem: a person ‘may be very much de-
ceived about his own preference for truth over falsehood in any particular case; he may be 
bribed to like a lie better than the truth’.1059 Or, as in the case of Charley Osbourne’s domineer-
ing religious father in Wilfrid Cumbermede, a person may be, perhaps unaware, guilty of 
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‘branding the truth of religion with the private mark of opinion’.1060 The problem, though, is that 
such as Osbourne are merely following MacDonald’s advice. Lilith’s success in seducing Vane 
is also a salutary example of the danger of relying on individual discernment. The issue is that 
the judgement that such discernment is misguided must necessarily come from others, others 
who, if MacDonald’s scheme is pushed to its limits, are de facto denied an opinion. MacDonald 
would respond to this by arguing that when the true heart acts on perceived truth, God will, if 
necessary, correct error. He thus locates the problem in volition rather than perception on the 
basis that humans have the genuine ability to choose the good, should they so desire. However, 
if, as we sense, Charley Osbourne is truer to life than Sir Gibbie, this argument is refuted: Char-
ley wants to perceive the truth but is prevented by quotidian circumstances. Furthermore, we are 
faced with the issue of many individuals acting on their perception of the truth resulting in evil 
consequences that God does not address. 
This discussion reveals a general principle when evaluating MacDonald’s work. His em-
phasis on the need to discern truth personally is not so much a foundational epistemological 
principle as a pastoral call to obedience underlining two key issues: that faith cannot be second-
hand, nor can it remain merely theoretical. His sweeping assertions do not necessarily have uni-
versal applicability since he writes pastorally for a specific audience.1061 One might observe, for 
example, that he himself is socially embedded and part of a wide conversation. We have identi-
fied numerous voices that have contributed to his understanding of the truth, not least that of 
childhood Calvinism. It could be argued, for example, that his criticism of faithful Calvinists as 
possessing faith despite, not because of, their religion might be aimed at himself: he has a vi-
brant faith despite the shortcomings in his own scheme—a scheme which owes a significant 
debt to its Calvinist heritage and the input of others. Put differently, he rightly underscores the 
need to personally evaluate and appropriate truth but in the process has championed a method-
ology that potentially leads to error. The apostle Paul asserted that even he only ‘knew in part’ 
and stressed the limited nature of personal prophecy;1062 since we live in a distorted world and 
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each is subject to a very limited perspective, the truth about God must primarily be discerned 
communally, not individually. 
(iv) Satan’s identity and the nature of evil 
It is striking that MacDonald’s cosmology omits beings such as demons or angels. Such, after 
all, are staples of fantasy. Where these are mentioned, they appear to be the literary expressions 
of evil or good ideas rather than references to created beings. Their origin is inevitably traced 
back to either human or divine creative thought; in other words, like Lilith, their existence is 
contingent. If we are to believe the narrator of The Shadows, for example, angels are ‘white 
shadows cast in heaven from the Light of Light’, in contrast to earthly shadows which, in a 
strongly Platonic image, are either frightening ‘body ghosts’ or good ‘soul ghosts’.1063 It may be 
objected that the cast of the fairy stories, which includes giants, witches and fairies, refers to 
such beings, but I would argue that these are either the creations of fantasy (often moral meta-
phors), or, more often, images symbolic of divine or human being—even children. As MacDon-
ald notes: 
all the powers that vivify nature must be children. The popular imagination seems to have caught 
this truth, for all the fairies and gnomes and goblins, yes, the great giants too, are only different 
sizes, shapes, and characters of children.1064 
In terms of divine images, we have theophanies in the form of ‘great-great-grandmothers’ (The 
Princess and Curdie) or ‘old men’ (The Golden Key). 
Regarding demons, the strongest image is the great Shadow in Lilith. For MacDonald, 
this is the immaterial personification of aggregate human rebellious will, a kind of negative He-
gelian Geist that will cease to exist when the last human child has repented. This reading is con-
firmed by Charley Osbourne’s words on recognising his own selfishness: his comment, ‘I am a 
devil’,1065 is set within an understanding of cosmic evil that conceives of God as the antithesis of 
selfishness: 
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I am the most selfish creature in the world—always taken up with myself. I do believe there is a 
devil, after all, I am a devil. And the universal self is the devil. If there were such a thing as a self 
always giving itself away—that self would be God.1066 
To which his friend Cumbermede replies: ‘Something very like the God of Christianity, I think.’ 
However, with regard to evil, it is that last human child—who was also the original ser-
pent, Lilith—who is Satan. Satan/Lilith is human.1067 All evil, in MacDonald’s view—from first 
sin to last sin—is down to human rebellion. It is a perennial refrain. Self-worship is devil-
worship, a good churchman or a good dissenter can be a devil, ‘self is our demon-foe’: only 
rarely is the urge to rebel attributed to ‘some roar of a wandering bodiless devil’1068 which, if 
Lilith’s pedigree is to be believed, might simply be a bodiless human rather than a demon (see 
below). Aware, no doubt, that ‘God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does He Himself tempt any-
one’, MacDonald, biblically, locates the source of evil in the human heart,1069 but does not put 
this down, as Jesus did, to the work of the ‘father of lies’, the father of lying Pharisees.1070 For 
him, Satan is a (human) person who has ‘resisted the truth with some amount of perception that 
it was the truth’ (echoing Jesus’s verdict on Peter): ‘Is not this to be Satan? to be in hell? to be 
corruption? to be that which is damned?’1071 
In the Bible, however, Satan is spoken of as a created non-human being. In the Old Tes-
tament he has access to heaven and accuses the righteous;1072 in the New, he has angels at his 
command,1073 is referred to by Jesus as the ‘prince of this world’1074 whom he saw ‘fall like 
lightning from heaven’ and, according to John, ‘was cast to the earth, and his angels were cast 
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out with him’.1075 But is this merely an anthropomorphism of evil? After all, a personified 
‘Death’ will be thrown into the lake of fire as well as ‘Satan and his angels’;1076 the former can 
only be metaphoric—why not the latter? It is also unclear whether Jesus’s followers are to pray 
‘deliver us from evil’, or ‘deliver us from the evil one’, and some have argued that since the Bi-
ble never speaks of the salvation of Satan, he cannot be personal.1077 What issues are relevant 
here? 
One key issue is MacDonald’s attribution of ‘evil’ to God, permissible only if evil is a 
good: in this sanitised (apparently) monist cosmos without demons, this is logically possible 
(indeed necessary) and, on the surface, biblical. There are numerous biblical allusions to God 
both creating and controlling evil: did not God place a tree of good and evil in the garden?; ‘If 
there is calamity in a city, will not the Lord have done it?’; and did not ‘the Spirit of the Lord 
depart from Saul’ to be replaced by ‘a distressing spirit from the Lord’?1078 The theme continues 
into the New Testament. According to John, for example, writing concerning ‘ten kings’ who 
‘make war with the Lamb’: ‘God has put it into their hearts to fulfil His purpose, to be of one 
mind, and to give their kingdom to the beast, until the words of God are fulfilled.’ In the apoca-
lyptic setting of Revelation, Satan does appear to be God’s evil sheepdog, sometimes on a short 
leash.1079 
MacDonald’s understanding of evil is limited since a monist cosmos, understood as the 
expression of God’s good thoughts, cannot admit evil creatures or destructive distortion without 
indicting God. Instead, and worryingly, God sometimes masquerades, or is perceived, as the 
devil. For example, commenting on John’s observation, quoting Isaiah, that unbelief is because 
‘He has blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts, Lest […] I should heal them’,1080 MacDon-
ald suggests that ‘in St. John’s reference, the blinding of the heart seems attributed directly to 
the devil’. In other words, ‘he’, in this verse, is the devil who has blinded people to prevent 
them turning to God. The Isaiah passage quoted (6.10), though, implies ‘he’ is Isaiah, God’s 
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agent, bearing—and in some sense enacting—the message of judgement to his peers, and the 
following verse (in John) suggests that ‘he’ is Christ: ‘These things Isaiah said when he saw His 
glory and spoke of Him.’ Perhaps MacDonald is thinking of ‘the god of this age’ blinding peo-
ple to the truth,1081 but the point is that for him the distinction is trivial: 
Whether this [blindness] follows as a psychical or metaphysical necessity, or be regarded as a spe-
cial punishment, it is equally the will of God, and comes from him who is the live Truth. They 
shall not see what is not for such as they.1082 
In other words, if it is the devil, he is simply doing God’s will; if God, it is God perceived 
badly, for as he notes: ‘God must be terrible to those that are far from him’—so much so that 
such ‘must prefer a devil’.1083 On this view, the French Revolution must be labelled ‘the right-
eous plague of God’, at least by permission: when there is contempt for the truth, ‘the wild beast 
in man breaks from its den’.1084 
This blurring of the boundaries between good, evil, and sin weakens MacDonald’s theol-
ogy simply because in his quest to rehabilitate God he has made God complicit in evil. This is 
not because he views God as other than pure light; on the contrary, a core theme is ‘in Him 
there is no darkness’.1085 Rather, it is his reluctance to concede that genuine depravity exists that 
cannot be co-opted for good and must be destroyed, or to allow that events such as the Lisbon 
earthquake serve no good purpose. As one contemporary put it: 
His optimism scarcely allows him to reckon with the terrors that sometimes run riot in the world. 
[…] He ignores the scientific interpretation of Nature, and never attempts to adjust it to his rosy 
Wordsworthian aestheticism.1086 
This theological problem becomes sharper when one compares the ‘marriage’ of Lilith 
and the great Shadow to that of the antichrist and the beast in Revelation. As von Balthasar 
notes, ‘The whole abyss of the mysterium iniquitatis yawns in the way it opposes the mysterium 
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Trinitatis.’1087 We have already noted how Lilith, with her counterfeit stigmata and Eucharist, 
represents that opposition. Von Balthasar notes that at every level, ‘the blasphemous structure 
of the trinity of hell [Antichrist, beast, and dragon] contradicts the divine Trinity in every last 
detail’.1088 The beast, too, has a fake wound; it, like Lilith, stages a fake resurrection; it also rep-
resents a fake incarnation: the dragon does not ‘beget’ the beast from itself, it arises out of the 
sea, a product of creation. Von Balthasar remarks: 
there is nothing here of divine self-emptying and so nothing of the Trinity’s self-disclosure and 
truth. The Dragon, absolute evil, remains hidden behind its hideous offspring and utterance, the 
beast [it has ‘blasphemy’ written all over it], but in such a way that the latter continues to put forth 
its monstrous seductive power [over all tribes and nations].1089 
Lilith, one might say, assuming the outward form of love (her true nature is snake-
like)1090—the ‘monstrous seductive power’ made visible—represents the Whore of Babylon, 
one who feeds on the ‘merchants of the earth’ who eventually mourn the destruction of her 
city.1091 The issue is simply this: inasmuch as both the Whore and Lilith are personifications of 
seductive evil, they must be destroyed (‘her smoke rises up for ever and ever’),1092 neither are 
they in any sense human: the beast is a product of creation. As a metaphor for the last deposit of 
aggregate evil will in humanity, Lilith serves an illustrative role, but to suggest that somehow 
she will be reconciled with ‘Adam’ and live in eternal bliss makes a mockery of Revelation’s 
claim that in the Whore—as in Lilith—‘was found the blood of prophets and saints, and of all 
who were slain on the earth’1093—blood that cries for vengeance, that is, genuine justice: ‘And 
she will be utterly burned with fire, for strong is the Lord God who judges her.’1094 Put simply, 
if God’s eschatological embrace of Lilith did not result in her annihilation, ‘blasphemy’ would 
be found in God. 
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To summarise, in my view, MacDonald’s theodicy is flawed in that—ironically for one 
suspicious of ‘intellect’—he has been over-rational in his approach to what is essentially a mys-
tery. Two fundamental assertions are made. The first: God is good, all has been created by God, 
therefore evil is essentially good—an untenable proposition as it ignores the biblical emphasis 
on the destructiveness and depravity of evil as a force that not only destroys creaturely wellbe-
ing, but also opposes God. One may assert, with Paul, that ‘all things work together for good’, 
but, contrary to MacDonald’s understanding, this must be qualified, first, by the recognition that 
this applies to those consciously choosing to ‘love Christ’, and second, that the Bible suggests 
that this good may not be evident until the eschaton; after a ‘judgement’. The second assertion 
is: since evil is uniquely the result of human wilfulness resulting from genuine free will, evil 
will be destroyed when the last human rebel repents—a proposition ignoring the significant bib-
lical attribution of evil to non-human creatures and a fundamentally distorted cosmos. As we 
will explore shortly, one may legitimately posit that God is responsible for evil, but only with 
respect to its resolution, not its genesis. Nevertheless, as we explore further below, MacDon-
ald’s focus on God’s love as the deepest and most powerful force in the universe is a welcome 
antidote to an ‘infernal toxicity’ infecting Western Christianity that assumes most of God’s 
good creation will be consigned to hell.1095 
9.3 ‘If we are not little ones of a perfect love, I can see no sense in things’ 
These observations regarding shortcomings in MacDonald’s view of evil must be borne in mind 
but do not nullify his work. As Thomas Toke Lynch remarked (as quoted by MacDonald): 
the critic is more than the censurer; and in his higher and happier aspect appears before us and 
serves us, as the discoverer, the vindicator, and the eulogist of excellence.1096 
What ‘excellence’ is revealed by MacDonald’s child? 
First, the child challenges the conventional approach to cognition and epistemology. Im-
balance is evident in Victorian views on children and childhood: that the practice of female gen-
ital mutilation, for example, would cure insanity; that female education would reduce fertility; 
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that children are born deaf, and so on.1097 Not only did such views negatively impact children, 
they also reveal the tenuousness of the underlying epistemology which, we noted, did not dis-
tinguish between reality and fiction. Conservative and liberal Evangelical beliefs, likewise, did 
not, at least to sceptics, ‘ring true’. Neither the Romantic or positivist perspective, when it came 
to children or religion, appeared to offer a reasonable account of lived reality. Against this 
backdrop, MacDonald echoes Jesus’s call to become childlike: apart from the moral and reli-
gious implications discussed, it is also a call for a more balanced cognitive approach emphasis-
ing the need to contextualise knowledge within a wider field and to be suspicious of truth-
claims that appear to offend wider moral or logical sensibilities. 
Those wider ‘sensibilities’ included openness to scientific and philosophical advances. 
The child represents an attitude of wonder to an evolving world not constrained or intimidated 
by revelation, from whatever quarter, on the basis that God not only indwells the world, but 
faith is beyond the vicissitudes of evolving world views. The year that MacDonald died, Ein-
stein produced his theory of relativity. We now have advanced quantum mechanics, we under-
stand more the processes of evolution, and the term ‘big bang’ (anticipated in Boehme’s ‘light-
ning strike’)1098 is no longer a term of derision. MacDonald’s legacy is a child who is at peace in 
such a changing world. 
Second, the child functions imaginatively, that is, is aware of a wider context, not simply 
intellectually but associatively. It will be remembered that one of Plotz’s criticisms of the Ro-
mantics was, citing Piaget, that their emphasis on the child’s connectedness with nature was 
unhealthy; that, instead, disassociation—the awareness of individuality—was necessary for 
healthy development.1099 However, it could be argued that we have become ‘over dissociated’. 
Recent work has claimed, for example, that humans have, to their detriment, completely lost a 
sense of connectedness to the cosmos or to divinity and in the process become disassociated 
from the human family, with catastrophic environmental consequences.1100 In contrast, ‘when 
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we receive the child in the name of Christ […] we receive all humanity’.1101 The child reminds 
us of the need to connect imaginatively with ‘nature’, to discern its ‘catholicity’, that is, a sense 
of the wholeness and connectedness of the cosmos,1102 to sense the abductive drawing of the 
Spirit, to sense the numinous in the mundane. MacDonald’s child is perhaps intuitively antici-
pating the post-Einstein equation of energy with matter. Although I have been somewhat critical 
of MacDonald’s idealist negation of materiality, it reflects the view that God, as the loving and 
sustaining ‘mind-energy’ of the universe is intimately invested and present in the cosmos; a 
recognition that ‘Heaven unfolds when we see the world for what it truly is, “pregnant with 
God”’,1103 a reminder, as Rowan Williams remarked, that ‘the overcoming of “nature” as a 
proper goal for spirituality is highly problematic’.1104 
Finally, the child challenges conventional Christian power narratives based on a false 
fundamentalism. As ‘the child in the midst’ represents dependence and humility, so ‘the spirit of 
children’ is the pervading spirit of the kingdom of God, ‘from lowly subject to lowliest 
king’1105—a challenge to unthinking emphases on God’s sovereignty and the quest for Christen-
dom. MacDonald writes: 
Not all the sovereignty of God, as the theologians call it, delegated to the Son, and administered by 
the wisdom of the Spirit that was given to him without measure, could have wrought the kingdom 
of heaven in one corner of our earth. Nothing but the obedience of the Son, the obedience unto the 
death, the absolute doing of the will of God because it was the truth, could redeem the prisoner, 
the widow, the orphan. But it would redeem them by redeeming the conquest-ridden conqueror 
too, the stripe-giving jailer, the unjust judge, the devouring Pharisee himself with the insatiable 
moth-eaten heart.1106  
Even divine sovereignty, supported by all the resources of heaven, cannot alone inaugurate the 
kingdom of God. The ‘idea of the universe’ is the father–son relationship,1107 and only loving 
obedience, not coercion, can be the foundation of a kingdom of love. The god of popular reli-
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gion, demanding obeisance, is a human creation, an imposter. The Son, obedient unto death and 
doing the will of the Father, releases transformative power to redeem society, a power available 
to those who, paradoxically, also make the choice to die. The Son, the perfect child, is our mod-
el, and the appropriate human response is to likewise live as a child, that is, to die, death being 
the renunciation of personal sovereignty (the essence of sin), the doorway to true life rather than 
its cessation. Salvation inheres in Christ being ‘all in all’, including oppressors: sin is defeated 
when sinners repent, not when they are condemned. He concludes: ‘The earth should be free 
because Love was stronger than Death.’1108 
Williams’s comment above follows the observation: 
creation is not an exercise in divine power, odd though that certainly sounds. Power is exercised 
by x over y; but creation is not power, because [being ex nihilo] it is not exercised on anything.1109 
The point is that creation is ‘unnecessary’—a gift expressing the graciousness of God, but not 
needed by God to complete God’s identity.1110 In a sense, creation represents God’s playfulness, 
the perfect, joyful expression of the divine ‘child’ which, for Robin Stockitt, is ‘fundamentally 
concerned with aesthetics […] enjoyment, beauty, joy and delight’. This understanding of the 
‘pointlessness’ of creation does not necessarily imply purposelessness; play may have ‘pro-
foundly purposeful’ outcomes.1111 It does, however, challenge the nineteenth century tendency 
to view creation as a moral exam presided over by an unforgiving headmaster. Thus for Stock-
itt, ‘The very heart of the coming kingdom of God announced by Christ is portrayed in terms 
that insist that we become like children.’1112 
In my view, though, Stockitt is wrong to suggest that ‘[i]t is to George MacDonald’s 
credit that he was sufficiently prescient to realize that the playfulness of God would one day 
need to be explored in much greater detail’: MacDonald, as we have noted, views reality as a 
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‘school time’ rather than a playground. He does, though, suggest that we are imaginative chil-
dren loved by a ‘playful’ (though somewhat Victorian and moralizing) God. As he concludes: 
‘If we are not little ones of a perfect love, I can see no sense in things.’1113 
9.4 ‘His quarrel is with all churches at home and abroad’ 
‘Evangelical Christianity,’ writes David Hempton of the nineteenth century situation, ‘under the 
pressure of new and threatening questions, was particularly prone to fundamentalist answers, 
thereby further undermining its appeal to thoughtful adherents.’1114 Recognising this, MacDon-
ald follows Maurice’s advice: 
it is a duty and a necessity to strike continually at a cancer which is eating out the heart of Chris-
tendom, the poisonous quality and deadly effects of which our most vehement Protestant declaim-
ers do not exaggerate but underrate.1115 
That ‘cancer’ inheres in false convictions that ‘outrage the conscience, […] misrepresent 
the character of God, [and] generate a fearful amount of insincere belief, positive infidelity, al-
so, I think, of immorality’.1116 As Lash remarks regarding such fundamentalism: ‘In many re-
spects, the withdrawal of the fideist into his world of private certainties is a greater betrayal of 
Christian faith than the open-minded uncertainty of the agnostic.’1117 For Iain McGilchrist, such 
private certainties are ‘the greatest of all illusions’: 
whatever kind of fundamentalism it may underwrite, that of religion or science, it is what the an-
cients meant by hubris. The only certainty, it seems to me, is that those who believe they are cer-
tainly right are certainly wrong.1118 
In the words of Pope Francis: ‘Fundamentalism is a disease that is found in all religions. […] 
Religious fundamentalism isn’t religion, it’s idolatry.’1119 
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Of MacDonald’s disdain for propositional certainty and ‘theologic’ systems, one contem-
porary critic concluded: ‘his quarrel is therefore with all the Evangelical Churches at home and 
abroad’.1120 However, I believe one might go further and claim he contests the foundations of 
Western Christianity. In this final section—an excursus into complex theological territory de-
manding more discussion than can be offered—we explore this claim. As this section perhaps 
raises more questions than it answers, it should be read as offering pointers to further research, 
and indicative of the relevance of MacDonald’s ideas to current theological debates, particularly 
relating to the rise in fundamentalism. 
We begin by looking more closely at David Kelsey’s Eccentric Existence (and responses 
to it) as the child in MacDonald’s work necessarily makes anthropological claims about the race 
of which it is representative. Kelsey’s theological anthropology appears to be based broadly on 
many of the principles that MacDonald rejected.1121 If critics such as Catherine Pickstock are 
right in their dismissal of Kelsey’s anthropology as fundamentally flawed, this may shed light 
on the nature and validity of MacDonald’s claims, particularly as in her view Kelsey’s project 
demonstrates ‘certain ways in which both “narrative theology” and the Genevan experiments 
fail the test of matching up to the witness of either the Bible or of Christian doctrinal tradi-
tion’.1122 Does MacDonald’s theology pass the test? 
One central issue is that of univocity—univocal speech about being that implies mon-
ism—a pertinent issue in light of MacDonald’s apparent espousal of Behmenist, or Plotinian, 
cosmology. Kelsey’s core claim that orthodox Western Christianity needs creation (‘all that is 
not God’) to be entirely separate from God is in danger, if univocal speech is used, of implying 
that God’s esse is on the same plane as created being, collapsing the essential ‘ontological dif-
ference’. In this regard, Pickstock notes—countering Kelsey’s suggestion that creation consid-
ered as a stand-alone project would still have meaning even if shorn of its eschatological telos—
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that the traditional understanding of creation holds ‘that creation was for the sake of human dei-
fication and cosmic transfiguration, in such a way that God would finally be “all in all”’. This, 
as noted, is MacDonald’s emphasis. In her view: 
This is at variance with Kelsey’s view that in the act of creation, God by no means “gives him-
self”, but rather gives the creation to be self-standing. But how can such an espousal of univocity 
of being by default be acceptable without a thoroughgoing justification? Simply waiving the com-
plex dilemmas which ensue from such a position, such as how there can be something other from 
the omnipresent God, does not do away with them.1123 
Pickstock is reacting here to Kelsey’s view of creation as a self-standing ‘gracious’ gift 
while at the same time insisting that it is ‘thoroughly other-than-God’ and may not be consid-
ered intrinsically gracious in the same way as God’s presence in creation by the ‘circumambi-
ent’ Spirit or the incarnate Son.1124 In other words, creation is a gracious gift, but not intrinsical-
ly ‘graceful’. In her view, it implies that creation is not ‘in’ God but somehow ‘alongside’ God, 
equating to ‘an espousal of univocity’.  
This seems a logical conclusion, but is perhaps based on a limited reading. In my view, 
Kelsey is attempting to reject univocity by insisting on ontological difference while at the same 
time allowing that God relates graciously to his ‘gift’ (impossible if this gift is not somehow 
‘other’). Elsewhere, for example, he insists on ‘the Creator-creature ontological difference be-
tween God […] and all that is not God’, that ‘the triune God is not one more causal factor in the 
complex of energy systems that make up the creaturely cosmos’, and that ‘God and creatures 
are by definition not on a common spatio-temporal framework, God and creatures are by defini-
tion not on a common ontological level’.1125 Pickstock’s reading seems to stem from Kelsey’s 
identification of three distinct biblical narratives concerning the way God relates to creation (as 
either creator, redeemer, or consummator) leading to a fragmented account of reality that, ac-
cording to Pickstock, misrepresents God by seeming ‘to endorse a (mis)reading of the Cappado-
cians in terms of a relational play between hypostatic centres somewhat independent in their 
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own right’.1126 This disassembling of the biblical narrative has the advantage of providing spe-
cific (and often profound) insights into aspects of God’s relating to ‘all that is not God’, but re-
quires a significant feat of imaginative reassembly which, if hasty, can lead to problematic con-
clusions. One suspects Catherine Pickstock may not have had the time to focus on ‘reassembly’ 
and in the process has perhaps confused hypothetical moves used to tease out aspects of how 
God relates to God’s creation with assertions that this is indeed how God acts (perhaps a fault 
also displayed by such as Samuel Law Wilson in their evaluation of MacDonald). 
Kelsey, in his response to Pickstock, identifies sixteen issues he feels she has misunder-
stood. A key issue is that Pickstock blames the tripartite narrative approach for voicing only one 
aspect of ‘The One Story’ as if only one divine hypostasis was acting. However, Kelsey repeat-
edly insists such sub-narratives must be viewed as simply one perspective on the triune God’s 
actions. For example, the observation that ‘God’s relating to us as our creator is not [gracious]’ 
(see below) must be understood in the context of God never acting as simply ‘creator’ on the 
basis that ‘[g]iven perichoresis, it is not simply the Father who creates, but the triune God’.1127 
The problems stem from the discursive tactic of considering each perspective as if the others 
might not apply leading, for example, to the claim that quotidian existence would have meaning 
in the absence of reconciliation or consummation. Thus in discussing Wisdom literature’s 
unique view of the quotidian, Kelsey notes that ‘[c]reation-as-a-whole is not understood by ref-
erence to a transcendent end or telos beyond itself’1128 and that human flourishing is a meaning-
ful concept even if couched in entirely immanentist terms.1129 This is no doubt true from this 
limited perspective, but Pickstock is essentially arguing that, being limited and necessarily in-
complete, it is invalid. And Kelsey seems to concur, for he also, for example, insists that human 
identity inheres in being ‘elected for eschatological consummation’.1130 MacDonald would, I 
believe, side with Pickstock and argue that it is dangerous to lose sight of the big picture. 
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The issue of univocity is, nevertheless, worth exploring further as according to Pickstock, 
John Milbank and Radical Orthodox colleagues, its assumption by Duns Scotus introduced a 
fault-line into theology which was ‘the greatest of all disruptions carried out in the history of 
European thought’1131—the idea that being can be considered in isolation without distinguishing 
between divine and created being—leading to the birth of secular philosophy and paving the 
way for ‘the Genevan experiment’, MacDonald’s primary target. At the heart of the Radical Or-
thodox perspective are claims, echoing MacDonald’s, that there is no ‘territory independent of 
God’, that it represents an alternative to the standard Christian polarities of conservatism and 
liberalism, and that radical truth may be found in medieval theology.1132 Furthermore, it is fun-
damentally suspicious of a ‘Barthianism [that] can tend to the ploddingly exegetical’ (MacDon-
ald’s ‘plodding brother’ of imagination, perhaps), and, as MacDonald did, rejects the ‘bastard 
dualisms of faith and reason, grace and nature’.1133 These issues inform Pickstock’s rejection of 
Kelsey’s project. Her particular concern is that while Kelsey states that ‘God’s creating is truly 
gracious’, he qualifies this by insisting that ‘God’s active relating to us as our eschatological 
consummator and […] as our reconciler is grace properly speaking; God’s relating to us as our 
creator is not’.1134 Nature, in other words, is not inherently gracious—an example of a ‘bastard 
dualism’.1135 
These issues of linguistics and semantics have a direct bearing on ontology and, in turn, 
implications for theological accounts of evil, God’s response to evil, and God’s moral nature. 
For if creation is entirely other than God, God is within God’s rights (as it were) to act as did 
Pilate: to wash his hands, turn his back, and say ‘this is nothing to do with me’. According to 
Milbank, such handwashing equates to a ‘basely sensual relation to reality’ or ‘a purely rational 
relation to the world’ symptomatic of the Enlightenment turning its back on transcendent 
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truth.1136 The nub of the issue is that while Western soteriology stresses that God in Christ has 
not ‘washed his hands’, the implication of articulations of damnation that somehow imply that 
God is unable to intervene salvifically for a subset of God’s creatures implies a realm where 
God is not sovereign, not present, and unable to act. At root are certain articulations of the doc-
trines of original sin and creatio ex nihilo, the doctrine of hell being the outworking of these 
foundations. 
These issues exercised MacDonald and, in his view, were behind what I called earlier the 
‘cataphatic literalist fundamentalism’ of his day that had prised God away from God’s creation 
and installed an idol. Focusing on Newton as exemplary of this move, John Milbank summaris-
es the issue: 
Newton no longer conceived of God as Being as such, and as the source of finite being produced 
from nothing but sharing by various degrees in his infinite simple esse. His God was rather a su-
premely powerful entity who had shaped alongside himself other entities with whom he communi-
cated […].1137 
MacDonald counters such views by insisting that we are not forged by God in, and from, 
some universal ground of being—but from God’s created ‘nihil’. The spatio-temporal stage of 
the drama, MacDonald insists, emerges from the heart of God rather than existing ‘alongside’ it. 
‘If God were not, there would not even be nothing. Not even nothingness preceded life. Noth-
ingness owes its very idea to existence.’1138 Creation exists in some sense ‘in’ God and is not 
independent of God: ‘This world is not merely a thing which God hath made, subjecting it to 
laws; but it is [not was] an expression of the thought, the feeling, the heart of God himself.’1139 
Since the essential being of God is love, ‘Love is the one bond of the universe, the heart of God, 
the life of his children.’1140 This focus on the immanence of God and the graciousness of nature 
leads MacDonald to insist that God cannot ‘wash his hands’ in regard to certain of his creatures, 
for all are God’s children: 
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[God] is bound in himself to make up for wrong done by his children, and he can do nothing to 
make up for wrong done but by bringing about the repentance of the wrong-doer.1141 
For this reason, MacDonald must conclude that the mysterium iniquitatis is ‘in’ God, and that 
God will eventually act such that God will be ‘all in all’. It leads to the universalist perspective 
recently articulated in Rob Bell’s short popular apologetic, Love Wins (resulting also in signifi-
cant backlash from the Evangelical community).1142 MacDonald likewise insists: 
For nothing less than this did Christ die. […] He brings and is bringing God and man, and man and 
man, into perfect unity: ‘I in them and thou in me, that they may be perfect in one.’1143 
We need, however, to realise that MacDonald’s Neoplatonic or Behmenist model of God radiat-
ing being into lower orders of existence is metaphorical rather than ontological. It may have 
ontological, that is ‘scientific’ in MacDonald’s language, implications, but it is primarily a met-
aphor for God’s moral relationship with humanity. As noted, MacDonald refuses to speculate 
on the ontic nature of the human proximate context.1144 
That said, I am nevertheless arguing that fundamental theological claims made by Mac-
Donald resonate with the quest of the Radical Orthodox ‘movement’ to overturn erroneous em-
bedded ideas that have structurally warped Western theology. His critique of Calvinism cannot 
simply be dismissed as a reaction to contemporary excesses, as David Bentley Hart realises. To 
explore this and the moral implications of MacDonald’s emanationist model, we read Hart’s 
paper, ‘God, Creation, and Evil: The Moral Meaning of creatio ex nihilho’. 
The key issue we have identified is MacDonald’s seeming inability to articulate a con-
vincing account of evil. Hart summarises the dilemma: 
God in se is not determined by creation and […], consequently, evil does not enter into our under-
standing of the divine essence. All of this is true, of course, but left to itself it inexorably devolves 
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toward half-truth, and then toward triviality—a wave of the prestidigitator’s hand and Auschwitz 
magically vanishes.1145 
MacDonald does tend to wave such a ‘prestidigitator’s hand’. The other side of the coin, 
Hart notes, is that since the relationship between God and creation is one of contingency, one 
cannot simply assume that God’s ‘morality’ is alien to the human. MacDonald agrees: 
To say on the authority of the Bible that God does a thing no honourable man would do, is to lie 
against God; to say that it is therefore right, is to lie against the very spirit of God.1146 
For Hart, the issue is: ‘precisely because God and creation are ontologically distinct in the 
manner of the absolute and the contingent, they are morally indiscerptible’.1147 In other words, 
existential otherness does not imply moral otherness. 
In Hart’s view, following Gregory of Nyssa, since nihil is itself ex the ‘heart of God’ (to 
use MacDonald’s phrase), creatio ex nihilo necessarily implies an eschatological telos—a return 
to that heart. (One might say that the funereal phrase should be ‘heart to heart’ rather than ‘dust 
to dust’.) And, agreeing with MacDonald’s view that the whole purpose of creation is that, hav-
ing been flung into existence by God’s creative ‘sun’ we are destined to return such ‘that his life 
might be our life, that in us, too, might dwell that same consuming fire which is essential 
love’,1148 Hart writes: 
In the end of all things is their beginning, and only from the perspective of the end can one know 
what they are, why they have been made, and who the God is who has called them forth from 
nothingness.1149 
Such a concept only has meaning if God’s creatures are genuinely such, that is, created 
beings with independent existence without which a return to their source would simply be ab-
sorption rather than relationship. For Gregory, therefore, unlike Kelsey’s tripartite scheme 
which can countenance (but does not necessarily imply) a creation without such a telos, true 
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creation is only the result of consummation (not absorption); anything prior to that is necessari-
ly contingent and, in a sense, provisional.1150 
MacDonald’s cosmology envisages God as the radiating source of all that is. Hart notes 
that as long as this is not reduced to ‘a kind of gross material efflux of the divine substance into 
lesser substances’ (Milton’s misconception), there is no tension here with the doctrine of creatio 
ex nihilo. It still means that ‘all that exists comes from one divine source’ and, perhaps contra 
Kelsey, ‘subsists [rather than exists] by the grace of impartation’.1151 MacDonald expresses this 
by suggesting we are distinguished from God, but not divided from God: ‘that between creator 
and poet lies the one unpassable gulf which distinguishes—far be it from us to say divides—all 
that is God’s from all that is man’s’.1152 This is not to say that God and creation are ontological-
ly on the same plane, but it is to say that God is intimately involved in ‘all that is not God’. One 
might say that the ‘distinguishing’ gulf separates ontologically but not experientially. It is, 
therefore, in MacDonald’s words, 
teeming with infinite revelations, but a gulf over which no man can pass to find out God, although 
God needs not to pass over it to find man; the gulf between that which calls, and that which is thus 
called into being; between that which makes in its own image and that which is made in that im-
age.1153 
This involvement by God in creation, a creation which is not in any sense ‘needed’ by 
God (as if to somehow complete God’s identity)1154 but is a gift for which God takes full re-
sponsibility, means that in its graciousness and radical dependence on God as its final cause, 
‘there can be’, in Hart’s words, ‘no residue of the pardonably tragic, no irrecuperable or irrec-
oncilable remainder left at the end of the tale; for, if there were, this too God would have done, 
as a price freely assumed in creating’.1155 This is why MacDonald insists that ‘[a]nnihilation 
itself is no death to evil. Only good where evil was, is evil dead. An evil thing must live with its 
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evil until it chooses to be good. That alone is the slaying of evil.’1156 The conclusion, then, is not 
that God is responsible for, or condones, evil—with the implication that ‘every evil that time 
comprises […] is an arraignment of God’s goodness’—but that God is ‘responsible’ for its reso-
lution, a solution that will only be fully visible in the eschaton. Hart again: ‘until the end of all 
things, no answer has been given’.1157 Thus Hart rejects the morality of an Augustinian hell, 
MacDonald’s ‘hell of exhausted mercy’: 
When Augustine lamented the soft-heartedness that made Origen believe that demons, heathens, 
and (most preposterously of all) unbaptized babies might ultimately be spared the torments of 
eternal fire, he made clear how the moral imagination must bend and twist in order to absorb such 
beliefs.1158 
Instead, he too insists that ‘the greater hope’ is the only reasonable position to take: 
Even Paul asks, in the tortured, conditional voice of Romans 9, whether there might be vessels of 
wrath stored up solely for destruction only because he trusts that there are not, that instead all are 
bound in disobedience only so that God might prove himself just by showing mercy on all.1159 
The key issue, to which both Hart and MacDonald object, is that Western Christianity in 
particular has evolved an erroneous theology, of which the doctrine of hell is the prime reductio 
ad absurdum, leading to evangelical zeal effectively motivated by the need to save people from 
God. Singling out Calvin for particular criticism, Hart observes that: 
Calvin had the courage to acknowledge that his account of divine sovereignty necessitates belief in 
the predestination not only of the saved and the damned, but of the fall itself; and he recognized 
that the biblical claim that “God is love” must, on his principles, be accounted a definition not of 
God in himself, but only of God as experienced by the elect (toward the damned, God is in fact 
hate).1160 
Hart seems to summarise MacDonald’s inability to accept such a schizophrenic character-
isation of God when he describes Calvinism as ‘an immensely influential but deeply defective 
theological tradition’1161 whose infernal toxicity has infected ‘just about the whole Christian 
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tradition’.1162 The issue of univocity underlies this ‘toxicity’ in that it is assumed that the mys-
tery of faith may be logically investigated on the same terms as the created realm. This is not to 
say that rationality is suspect, simply that when grace and nature are divorced, human logic is 
inexorably drawn towards absurdity. It results in ‘thin’ and insubstantial schemes that hide the 
true nature of God’s gracious creation and God’s relationship to it. For Hart, the many individu-
al texts that speak of universal salvation, along with the wider panoply of the biblical story as a 
whole, point to a consummation inhering in Christ being ‘all in all’.1163 Anything less than this, 
he argues, morally compromises God. ‘It is odd’, he remarks concerning passages that imply 
universal salvation, ‘that for at least fifteen centuries such passages have been all but lost behind 
so thin a veil as can be woven from those three deeply ambiguous verses that seem (and only 
seem) to threaten eternal torments for the wicked’.1164 Hart’s ‘thin veil’ is reminiscent of Mac-
Donald’s ‘robe of imputed righteousness’ made from ‘legal cobwebs spun by spiritual spiders’ 
manufactured by the Reformers.1165 MacDonald’s work represents an attempt to draw back this 
curtain and rediscover ancient Christian orthodoxy. 
Perennially suspicious of such ‘logical’ schemes that hide the truth of Christ, MacDonald 
focuses on the eschaton as providing resolution to the enigma of life at the expense of a robust 
theological account of social evil. Instead he focuses on religious evil. This is simply because 
he sees religious evil as the fundamental cause of all social evil. This is well articulated by Kel-
sey who suggests that for every worshipful response to the three fundamental ways that God 
relates to God’s creation—as creator, redeemer, and consummator—there are distorted respons-
es; that the distortion of the appropriate doxological responses of faith, love, and hope is the 
essence of sin, and that such responses inevitably further distort the context in which humans 
live. This is the root of social evil. So while there is a tendency in MacDonald to wave his ‘pres-
tidigitator’s hand so that Auschwitz magically vanishes’, this is because he firmly believes that 
God will ultimately resolve the issue of evil and be ‘all in all’. He can only see resolution in an 
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eschatological future. In a world where social evil was seen as almost inevitable, and where 
there was still a lingering view that God had ordained the social order, he prefers not to dwell 
on evil but instead address what he sees as its root cause. It is not an erroneous doctrine of evil 
per se, rather it is the consequence of a limited perspective of the ‘now’ and the ‘not yet’ of the 
kingdom of God—a failure to appreciate that present reality is not simply a ‘school time’ to 
prepare humanity for the eschaton, but that the kingdom of God is already proleptically present 
in the present age. This latter (more Maurician) perspective might have given MacDonald a 
more pragmatic view of the need to engage actively in the fight against social ills, a perspective 
that is clearly only in the background in his work. Instead, he brings before us idealised saints 
and critical fairy children to stir those who claim faith towards living more faithfully. 
Hart closes his paper by contrasting the vision of Gregory—of all souls being drawn to-
wards the joyous source of their being—with that of Augustine’s eschatological vision of two 
cities, in the most populous of which are quarantined those who are under God’s judgement and 
destined for perpetual sorrow. He concludes: 
There is no question to my mind which of them saw the story more clearly. Or which theologians 
are the best guides to scripture as a whole: Gregory, Origen, Evagrius, Diodore, Theodore, Isaac of 
Ninevah [sic] … George MacDonald.1166 
9.5 ‘The idea of the universe’ 
The child, while primarily expressive of humanity’s ‘vertical’ relationship with God, also un-
derlines the connectedness of humanity under the headship of Christ—that, in carrying the ima-
go Dei, the child is related to siblings. Although there are numerous historical and scholarly 
views of what it means to be a child and carry the imago Dei,1167 it is certainly contrary to Cal-
vin’s view that ‘he who perverted the whole order of nature in heaven and earth [Adam] deterio-
rated his race by his revolt’ with the result that ‘the heavenly image in man was effaced’,1168 and 
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that ‘the impurity of parents is transmitted to their children, so that all, without exception, are 
originally depraved’.1169 
For Calvin, humanity is connected by depravity; for MacDonald, the connection is love. 
For example, the child leads MacDonald to intuitively question the morality of eternal judge-
ment. Although he concurs with the many nineteenth century voices rejecting a Dantean hell, 
his Job-like criticism of God is more subtle for, as noted above, he is rather questioning the na-
ture of a God who is content to be ‘defeated’ by evil such that good creatures that God has given 
life to are eternally punished, or perhaps summarily destroyed, despite the fact Christ submitted 
to evil in order to emasculate it on their behalf.1170  
However, there is another aspect of the theology of final judgment to which the child 
speaks. Recent scholarship concerning human personhood highlights that while individuality is 
a meaningful concept, it cannot be divorced from community—that an ‘individual’ is not just 
forged in the crucible of social interaction but is in some measure constituted by it. It reflects 
Maurice’s assertion that God sees people as connected through participation in the kingdom of 
God, rather than ‘partially, or each in reference to a separate centre, as they naturally do’.1171 
Grenz, for example, quoting John Zizioulas, writes: 
“Communion does not threaten personal particularity; it is constitutive of it.” Such communion es-
tablishes the uniqueness of each person, in that the person is an indispensable and irreplaceable 
part of a relational existence.1172 
Grenz suggests that the monadic independent self typical of both medieval and enlight-
enment thinking is untenable; rather, that ‘communion’ has the implication that ‘[a] self does 
not amount to much, no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations’,1173 and that ‘the 
postmodern self is constituted by social relationships’.1174 David Kelsey concurs, reminding us 
not to forget that the ‘vertical’ relationship with God is also a dimension of human ‘social’ em-
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beddedness: ‘the proximate contexts into which we are born make us social beings all the way 
down, and all the way up to our responding to God as well’.1175 
So not only are there moral questions concerning eternal retribution for finite sin, there is 
the issue that if some of God’s creatures are to be destroyed this necessarily implies that some 
of the relational-structural content of the personhood of the eschatologically blessed will be lost. 
To put it crudely: can John Piper truly enjoy heaven as ‘himself’ knowing that his sons are eter-
nally suffering?1176 David Bentley Hart summarises thus: 
After all, what is a person other than a whole history of associations, loves, memories, attach-
ments, and affinities? Who are we, other than all the others who have made us who we are, and to 
whom we belong as much as they to us? We are those others. To say that the sufferings of the 
damned will either be clouded from the eyes of the blessed or, worse, increase the pitiless bliss of 
heaven1177 is also to say that no persons can possibly be saved: for, if the memories of others are 
removed, or lost, or one’s knowledge of their misery is converted into indifference or, God forbid, 
into greater beatitude, what then remains of one in one’s last bliss? Some other being altogether, 
surely: a spiritual anonymity, a vapid spark of pure intellection, the residue of a soul reduced to no 
one. But not a person—not the person who was. But the deepest problem is not the logic of such 
claims; it is their sheer moral hideousness.1178 
In response, however, it could be argued that ‘moral hideousness’ would equally result if 
God allowed, say, an abusive individual responsible for damaging others during earthly life to 
continue to abuse eternally, or if the distortions resulting from that influence were not beati-
fied.1179 Evil, as MacDonald argues, must be destroyed and sin atoned for—a strong element of 
his purgatorial emphasis. Hart’s words, though, do reveal the bankruptcy of simplistic and vol-
untarist notions of election such as Piper’s. 
In contrast, MacDonald’s universalism allows him to look forward to a resurrection body 
not only perfectly expressive of the individual, but cognisant of the many others to whom it 
owes its existence.1180 He views eschatological resolution as more than simply blessing for the 
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elect surrounded by ambiguity; with Paul, he looks for the redemption of the whole of crea-
tion.1181 Anything less than this, he maintains, amounts to defeat for God.  
These anthropological implications directly inform MacDonald’s doctrine of God. The 
divine image carried by the human child relates to childlikeness as a category. God, too, is ‘a 
child’: 
It is like king like subject in the kingdom of heaven. No rule of force, as of one kind over another 
kind. It is the rule of kind, of nature, of deepest nature—of God.1182 
 
 
Judith Plotz, with, I believe, some justification, locates the Romantic child as stranded between 
earth and heaven; neither connected with transcendence nor with the (sometimes grim) realities 
of earth. Wordsworth’s child may attempt to connect with God—and MacDonald may laud 
Wordsworth as the ‘high priest of nature’ who ‘in all things felt the presence of the Divine Spir-
it’1183—but, in many respects, Wordsworth’s Nature, with whom ‘The Child’ communes, is a 
surrogate deity somewhat divorced from Christ. As MacDonald himself notes, the ‘inclined 
plane from […] nature to […] the Son of Man’ is ‘what we miss in Wordsworth’.1184 Plotz, alt-
hough perhaps overstating the case, notes that in this godless Romantic mid-realm the child it-
self assumes the role of God.1185 
The Christian child, however—especially the Calvinist child—was, ironically, moved 
earthwards: the image of God having been effaced, it, like its secular counterparts burdened 
with evolutionary baggage, was in some sense less than human; a human in the making, per-
haps, but deeply flawed. Notably, and again ironically (noting the lack of childhood sexual 
                                                
1181 Rom. 8.22. 
1182 US1, p. 14; cf. pages 208, 243. 
1183 Orts, p. 247. 
1184 England’s Antiphon, p. 307. Elsewhere MacDonald notes: ‘He saw God present everywhere; not always immedi-
ately, in his own form, it is true’ (Orts, p. 247). 




awareness), it was considered to over-indulge in ‘passion’, deeply feared as, since Augustine, 
sexual awareness had been equated with the Fall.1186  
Against this backdrop, MacDonald places a child whose perfect model is Christ which, 
despite shortcomings in its dramatization, connects both earth and heaven. Despite Plotz’s pro-
testations, perhaps the Romantic child was the most positive incarnation of childhood of the 
period. MacDonald certainly thought so, and his child bears the marks of Romanticism; howev-
er, one must not lose sight of how MacDonald’s child—rather than floating in the mid-realm—
genuinely bridges, or attempts to bridge, earth and heaven. The hesitancy is on the earthward 
side: wanting to reconnect the child with transcendence, in his idealist enthusiasm he has per-
haps over-disconnected it, even uprooted it, from the earth; his fictional children do tend to float 
implausibly above nineteenth century grime; the social dimension of human life is lacking. 
However, our reading of MacDonald has revealed a nuanced challenge to contemporary 
theology, many aspects of which have continuing application, especially addressing the issue of 
Christian (or other religious or secular) fundamentalism. In an era broadly suspicious, or fearful, 
of childhood, MacDonald’s choice to make God a child, meaning that humans carrying the ima-
go are thus also children, was a radical challenge to the orthodoxy of the day. That MacDon-
ald’s child has Romantic flaws must be admitted, the most notable being its aversion to facing 
the true horror of evil, however, this should not distract from the radical nature of the claims 
being made. MacDonald’s theological embrace of the child has redeemed the child, that is, the 
child, instead of being viewed as less than human has been reinstated as essentially human: the 
tables are turned. The child questions whether ‘adulthood’, with its self-centredness, affecta-
tions, power-hunger, and conventional beliefs, is a valid expression of humanity. The child 
claims that it is the pretentious adult that is the sinner. It claims to see truly, imaginatively; it is 
the Pharisaical adult who is blind. 
Looking heavenwards, the false Romantic deity, ‘The Child’, as well as the Calvinist 
headmaster, are exposed as idols. However much one might want to soften this and argue that 
                                                
1186 The City of God against the Pagans, ed. by Philip Levine (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1966), chs 15, 18–
20. Calvin insists that no human ‘has not felt the power of concupiscence’ and generally blames this on Adam (Insti-




MacDonald is simply attacking what in his view is a distortion of Calvinism—simply misguid-
ed ‘popular religion’—will not wash. As I have argued above, I believe there is a strong case 
that MacDonald’s child fundamentally quarrels with ‘all the churches at home and abroad’, that 
is, not simply Calvinism or Evangelicalism and their offshoots: his theology is corrosive to 
many ideas considered foundational, especially in Western Christianity. 
At the heart of this is a rejection of the power narratives embedded in faith which suggest 
that God, instead of being the world’s advocate, has become its ‘infinite contrary’1187 and that, 
in consequence, the world has to be ‘overcome’. MacDonald’s ontology and cosmology may, in 
many respects, be flawed or naive, but one cannot escape that his valuing of ‘nature’—the quo-
tidian world in which humans live, however idealised—has reinstated creation as a place wholly 
‘in’ God and infused by God. Neither can one deny that, despite flaws in his account of evil, his 
emphasis that Christ will be all in all represents a challenge to the tacit assumption in Western 
theology that Christ will not be all in all; that there will be a residue of God’s creation impervi-
ous to God’s inexorable love. 
These priorities are summed up in MacDonald’s claim that ‘[t]he child-relation is the one 
eternal, ever enduring, never changing relation’ that is ‘the idea of the universe’.1188 An ‘idea’ 
which, since rooted in the ‘abyss of love’, means that the pursuit of aesthetic truth—that is, 
God—is an open-ended, eternal vocation. In Hart’s words, it is ‘perpetually to transcend any 
fixed identity: a transcendence which is always more transcendent, an infinite scope within the 
self that no self can comprise, and to which the self belongs. The imago Dei’, that is, being a 
child, ‘is not simply a possession of the soul as much as a future, a hope’.1189 MacDonald 
phrases it thus: 
Nobody knows to what the relation of father and son may yet come. Those who accept the Chris-
tian revelation are bound to recognize in it depths infinite. For is it not a reproduction in small of 
the loftiest mystery in the human ken—that of the infinite Father and the infinite Son?1190 
 
                                                
1187 Beauty of the Infinite, p. 134. 
1188 HG, p. 161 (pages 123, 243). 
1189 Beauty of the Infinite, p. 114. 
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